{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-32632",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-18T18:15:48.491743Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-18T18:15:59.648Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-hhcg-r27j-fhv9"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "glances",
          "vendor": "nicolargo",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 4.5.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but prior to version 4.5.2, the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. Version 4.5.2 contains a patch for the issue."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.9,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-346",
              "description": "CWE-346: Origin Validation Error",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-18T17:47:25.929Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-hhcg-r27j-fhv9",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-hhcg-r27j-fhv9"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/5850c564ee10804fdf884823b9c210eb954dd1f9",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/5850c564ee10804fdf884823b9c210eb954dd1f9"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-hhcg-r27j-fhv9",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Glances\u0027s REST/WebUI Lacks Host Validation and Remains Exposed to DNS Rebinding"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-32632",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-18T17:47:25.929Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-12T15:29:36.559Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-18T18:15:59.648Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Glances"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32632"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T16:34:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T18:16:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nGlances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist.\n\nAs a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin.\n\nThis is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target.\n\n## Details\n\nThe MCP endpoint now has explicit host-based transport security:\n\n```python\n# glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py\nself.mcp_allowed_hosts = [\"localhost\", \"127.0.0.1\"]\n...\nreturn TransportSecuritySettings(\n    allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts,\n    allowed_origins=allowed_origins,\n)\n```\n\nHowever, the main FastAPI application for REST/WebUI/token routes is initialized without any host validation middleware:\n\n```python\n# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py\nself._app = FastAPI(default_response_class=GlancesJSONResponse)\n...\nself._app.add_middleware(\n    CORSMiddleware,\n    allow_origins=config.get_list_value(\u0027outputs\u0027, \u0027cors_origins\u0027, default=[\"*\"]),\n    allow_credentials=config.get_bool_value(\u0027outputs\u0027, \u0027cors_credentials\u0027, default=True),\n    allow_methods=config.get_list_value(\u0027outputs\u0027, \u0027cors_methods\u0027, default=[\"*\"]),\n    allow_headers=config.get_list_value(\u0027outputs\u0027, \u0027cors_headers\u0027, default=[\"*\"]),\n)\n...\nif self.args.password and self._jwt_handler is not None:\n    self._app.include_router(self._token_router())\nself._app.include_router(self._router())\n```\n\nThere is no `TrustedHostMiddleware`, no comparison against the configured bind host, and no allowlist enforcement for HTTP `Host` values on the REST/WebUI surface.\n\nThe default bind configuration also exposes the service on all interfaces:\n\n```python\n# glances/main.py\nparser.add_argument(\n    \u0027-B\u0027,\n    \u0027--bind\u0027,\n    default=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027,\n    dest=\u0027bind_address\u0027,\n    help=\u0027bind server to the given IPv4/IPv6 address or hostname\u0027,\n)\n```\n\nThis combination means the HTTP service will typically be reachable from the victim machine under an attacker-selected hostname once DNS is rebound to the Glances listener.\n\nThe token endpoint is also mounted on the same unprotected FastAPI app:\n\n```python\n# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py\ndef _token_router(self) -\u003e APIRouter:\n    ...\n    router.add_api_route(f\u0027{base_path}/token\u0027, self._api_token, methods=[\u0027POST\u0027], dependencies=[])\n```\n\n## Why This Is Exploitable\n\nIn a DNS rebinding attack:\n\n1. The attacker serves JavaScript from `https://attacker.example`.\n2. The victim visits that page while a Glances instance is reachable on the victim network.\n3. The attacker\u0027s DNS for `attacker.example` is rebound from the attacker\u0027s server to the Glances IP address.\n4. The victim browser now sends same-origin requests to `https://attacker.example`, but those requests are delivered to Glances.\n5. Because the Glances REST/WebUI app does not validate the `Host` header or enforce an allowed-host policy, it serves the response.\n6. The attacker-controlled JavaScript can read the response as same-origin content.\n\nThe MCP code already acknowledges this threat model and implements host-level defenses. The REST/WebUI code path does not.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThis issue is code-validated by inspection of the current implementation:\n\n- REST/WebUI/token are all mounted on a plain `FastAPI(...)` app\n- no `TrustedHostMiddleware` or equivalent host validation is applied\n- default bind is `0.0.0.0`\n- MCP has separate rebinding protection, showing the project already recognizes the threat model\n\nIn a live deployment, the expected verification is:\n\n```bash\n# Victim-accessible Glances service\nglances -w\n\n# Attacker-controlled rebinding domain first resolves to attacker infra,\n# then rebinds to the victim-local Glances IP.\n# After rebind, attacker JS can fetch:\nfetch(\"http://attacker.example:61208/api/4/status\")\n  .then(r =\u003e r.text())\n  .then(console.log)\n```\n\nAnd if the operator exposes Glances without `--password` (supported and common), the attacker can read endpoints such as:\n\n```bash\nGET /api/4/status\nGET /api/4/all\nGET /api/4/config\nGET /api/4/args\nGET /api/4/serverslist\n```\n\nEven on password-enabled deployments, the missing host validation still leaves the REST/WebUI/token surface reachable through rebinding and increases the value of chains with other authenticated browser issues.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote read of local/internal REST data:** DNS rebinding can expose Glances instances that were intended to be reachable only from a local or internal network context.\n- **Bypass of origin-based browser isolation:** Same-origin policy no longer protects the API once the browser accepts the attacker-controlled rebinding host as the origin.\n- **High-value chaining surface:** This expands the exploitability of previously identified Glances issues involving permissive CORS, credential-bearing API responses, and state-changing authenticated endpoints.\n- **Token surface exposure:** The JWT token route is mounted on the same host-unvalidated app and is therefore also reachable through the rebinding path.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply host allowlist enforcement to the main REST/WebUI FastAPI app, similar in spirit to the MCP hardening:\n\n```python\nfrom starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware\n\nallowed_hosts = config.get_list_value(\n    \u0027outputs\u0027,\n    \u0027allowed_hosts\u0027,\n    default=[\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027],\n)\n\nself._app.add_middleware(TrustedHostMiddleware, allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts)\n```\n\nAt minimum:\n\n- reject requests whose `Host` header does not match an explicit allowlist\n- do not rely on `0.0.0.0` bind semantics as an access-control boundary\n- document that reverse-proxy deployments must set a strict host allowlist\n\n## References\n\n- `glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py`\n- `glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py`\n- `glances/main.py`",
  "id": "GHSA-hhcg-r27j-fhv9",
  "modified": "2026-03-18T21:48:39Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T16:34:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-hhcg-r27j-fhv9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32632"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/5850c564ee10804fdf884823b9c210eb954dd1f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Glances\u0027s REST/WebUI Lacks Host Validation and Remains Exposed to DNS Rebinding"
}