PYSEC-2026-1273
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-07 16:03 - Updated: 2026-07-07 17:23Impact
Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write files outside the destination path where a project shall be generated or updated. This is possible when rendering a generated directory structure whose rendered path is either a relative parent path or an absolute path. Constructing such paths is possible using Copier's builtin pathjoin Jinja filter and its builtin _copier_conf.sep variable, which is the platform-native path separator. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user's write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc.
Write access via generated relative path
Reproducible example:
echo "foo" > forbidden.txt
mkdir src/
echo "bar" > "src/{{ pathjoin('..', 'forbidden.txt') }}"
uvx copier copy src/ dst/
cat forbidden.txt
Write access via generated absolute path
Reproducible example:
-
POSIX:
```shell
Assumption: The current working directory is
/tmp/test-copier-vulnerability/echo "foo" > forbidden.txt mkdir src/ echo "bar" > "src/{{ pathjoin(_copier_conf.sep, 'tmp', 'test-copier-vulnerability', 'forbidden.txt') }}" uvx --from copier python -O -m copier copy --overwrite src/ dst/ cat forbidden.txt ```
-
Windows (PowerShell):
```powershell
Assumption: The current working directory is
C:\Users\<user>\Temp\test-copier-vulnerabilityecho "foo" > forbidden.txt mkdir src Set-Content -Path src\copier.yml @' drive: type: str default: "C:" when: false '@ echo "bar" > "src{{ pathjoin(drive, 'Users', '', 'Temp', 'test-copier-vulnerability', 'forbidden.txt') }}" uvx --from copier python -O -m copier copy --overwrite src dst cat forbidden.txt ```
This scenario is slightly less severe, as Copier has a few assertions of the destination path being relative which would typically be raised. But python -O (or PYTHONOPTIMIZE=x) removes asserts, so these guards may be ineffective. In addition, this scenario will prompt for overwrite confirmation or require the --overwrite flag for non-interactive mode; yet malicious file writes might go unnoticed.
| Name | purl | copier | pkg:pypi/copier |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "copier",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/copier"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"7.1.0",
"7.2.0",
"8.0.0",
"8.1.0",
"8.2.0",
"8.3.0",
"9.0.1",
"9.1.0",
"9.1.1",
"9.2.0",
"9.3.0",
"9.3.1",
"9.4.0",
"9.4.1",
"9.5.0",
"9.6.0",
"9.7.0",
"9.7.1",
"9.8.0",
"9.9.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55214",
"GHSA-p7q8-grrj-3m8w"
],
"details": "### Impact\n\nCopier suggests that it\u0027s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn\u0027t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write files outside the destination path where a project shall be generated or updated. This is possible when rendering a [generated directory structure](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#generating-a-directory-structure) whose rendered path is either a relative parent path or an absolute path. Constructing such paths is possible using Copier\u0027s builtin `pathjoin` Jinja filter and its builtin `_copier_conf.sep` variable, which is the platform-native path separator. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user\u0027s write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc.\n\n#### Write access via generated relative path\n\nReproducible example:\n\n```shell\necho \"foo\" \u003e forbidden.txt\nmkdir src/\necho \"bar\" \u003e \"src/{{ pathjoin(\u0027..\u0027, \u0027forbidden.txt\u0027) }}\"\nuvx copier copy src/ dst/\ncat forbidden.txt\n```\n\n#### Write access via generated absolute path\n\nReproducible example:\n\n- POSIX:\n\n ```shell\n # Assumption: The current working directory is `/tmp/test-copier-vulnerability/`\n echo \"foo\" \u003e forbidden.txt\n mkdir src/\n echo \"bar\" \u003e \"src/{{ pathjoin(_copier_conf.sep, \u0027tmp\u0027, \u0027test-copier-vulnerability\u0027, \u0027forbidden.txt\u0027) }}\"\n uvx --from copier python -O -m copier copy --overwrite src/ dst/\n cat forbidden.txt\n ```\n\n- Windows (PowerShell):\n\n ```powershell\n # Assumption: The current working directory is `C:\\Users\\\u003cuser\u003e\\Temp\\test-copier-vulnerability`\n echo \"foo\" \u003e forbidden.txt\n mkdir src\n Set-Content -Path src\\copier.yml @\u0027\n drive:\n type: str\n default: \"C:\"\n when: false\n \u0027@\n echo \"bar\" \u003e \"src\\{{ pathjoin(drive, \u0027Users\u0027, \u0027\u003cuser\u003e\u0027, \u0027Temp\u0027, \u0027test-copier-vulnerability\u0027, \u0027forbidden.txt\u0027) }}\"\n uvx --from copier python -O -m copier copy --overwrite src dst\n cat forbidden.txt\n ```\n\nThis scenario is slightly less severe, as Copier has a few [assertions of the destination path being relative](https://github.com/copier-org/copier/blob/d106ea543fd26e1ac1b9a3dcef3e99cc70fdf57c/copier/_main.py#L747) which would typically be raised. But `python -O` (or `PYTHONOPTIMIZE=x`) removes asserts, so these guards may be ineffective. In addition, this scenario will prompt for overwrite confirmation or require the `--overwrite` flag for non-interactive mode; yet malicious file writes might go unnoticed.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-1273",
"modified": "2026-07-07T17:23:57.495026Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T16:03:01.489150Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/security/advisories/GHSA-p7q8-grrj-3m8w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/commit/fdbc0167cc22780b497e4db176feaf6f024757d6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/copier"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p7q8-grrj-3m8w"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Copier\u0027s safe template has filesystem write access outside destination path"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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