OESA-2026-4164 (CVE-2025-61669)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-30 13:47 – Updated: 2026-09-30 13:47 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
python-jupyter-server security update
Details

The backend for Jupyter web applications

Security Fix(es):

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In jupyter_server versions through 2.17.0, the next query parameter in the login flow is insufficiently validated in LoginFormHandler._redirect_safe(), which allows redirects to arbitrary external domains via values such as ///example.com. An attacker can use a crafted login URL to redirect users to a malicious site and facilitate phishing attacks. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2025-61669)

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, a path traversal vulnerability in the REST API allows an authenticated user to escape the configured root_dir and access sibling directories whose names begin with the same prefix as the root_dir. For example, with a root_dir named "test", the API permits access to a sibling directory named "testtest" through a crafted request to the /api/contents endpoint using encoded path components. An attacker can read, write, and delete files in affected sibling directories. Multi-tenant deployments using predictable naming schemes are particularly at risk, as a user with a directory named "user1" could access directories for user10 through user19 and beyond. A user who can choose a single-character folder name could gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.

Version 2.18.0 contains a fix. As a workaround, ensure folder names do not share a common prefix with any sibling directory.(CVE-2026-35397)

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python's re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2026-40110)

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2026-40934)

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "noarch": [
          "python3-jupyter-server-2.13.0-4.oe2403sp1.noarch.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "python-jupyter-server-2.13.0-4.oe2403sp1.src.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "python-jupyter-server",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/python-jupyter-server\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.13.0-4.oe2403sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "The backend for Jupyter web applications\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nJupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In jupyter_server versions through 2.17.0, the next query parameter in the login flow is insufficiently validated in `LoginFormHandler._redirect_safe()`, which allows redirects to arbitrary external domains via values such as `///example.com`. An attacker can use a crafted login URL to redirect users to a malicious site and facilitate phishing attacks. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2025-61669)\n\nJupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, a path traversal vulnerability in the REST API allows an authenticated user to escape the configured root_dir and access sibling directories whose names begin with the same prefix as the root_dir. For example, with a root_dir named \u0026quot;test\u0026quot;, the API permits access to a sibling directory named \u0026quot;testtest\u0026quot; through a crafted request to the /api/contents endpoint using encoded path components. An attacker can read, write, and delete files in affected sibling directories. Multi-tenant deployments using predictable naming schemes are particularly at risk, as a user with a directory named \u0026quot;user1\u0026quot; could access directories for user10 through user19 and beyond. A user who can choose a single-character folder name could gain access to a significant number of sibling directories. \n\nVersion 2.18.0 contains a fix. As a workaround, ensure folder names do not share a common prefix with any sibling directory.(CVE-2026-35397)\n\nJupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python\u0026apos;s re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2026-40110)\n\nJupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2026-40934)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-4164",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T13:47:13Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T13:47:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4164"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61669"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35397"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40110"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40934"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "python-jupyter-server security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2025-61669",
    "CVE-2026-35397",
    "CVE-2026-40110",
    "CVE-2026-40934"
  ]
}



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