OESA-2026-3986 (CVE-2026-64551)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-20 13:23 – Updated: 2026-09-20 13:23 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness
When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header:
err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));
err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the 4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT, leaking uninitialized memory.
sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too short to hold the staleness field is discarded.
The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket in a user and network namespace.(CVE-2026-64551)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bpftool-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-source-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"kernel-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bpftool-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-source-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.10.0-332.0.0.233.oe2203sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Critical"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness\n\nWhen an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the\nCOOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure\nof Staleness that follows the cause header:\n\n\terr = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk-\u0026gt;skb-\u0026gt;data);\n\tstale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));\n\nerr is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that\ncaused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is\npresent. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the\n4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs\npast the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb-\u0026gt;tail. The value\nis echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,\nleaking uninitialized memory.\n\nsctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so\ncheck its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which\nreads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too\nshort to hold the staleness field is discarded.\n\nThe read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into\nCOOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket\nin a user and network namespace.(CVE-2026-64551)",
"id": "OESA-2026-3986",
"modified": "2026-09-20T13:23:51Z",
"published": "2026-09-20T13:23:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3986"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64551"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-64551"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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