OESA-2026-3649 (CVE-2026-73433)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-05 15:03 – Updated: 2026-09-05 15:03 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
gstreamer1-plugins-good security update
Details

GStreamer is a streaming media framework, based on graphs of filters which operate on media data. Applications using this library can do anything from real-time sound processing to playing videos, and just about anything else media-related. Its plugin-based architecture means that new data types or processing capabilities can be added simply by installing new plugins.

Security Fix(es):

A flaw was found in GStreamer gst-plugins-good (avidemux). When parsing FUJIFILM metadata in an AVI strd chunk, gst_avi_demux_parse_strd() decrements a remaining-length counter by fixed offsets (98 and 10 bytes) without verifying sufficient data remains. For crafted strd payloads of exactly 106 or 107 bytes, the counter underflows to a very large unsigned value, causing subsequent null-terminated string scanning to read far beyond the allocated heap buffer. Date-format normalization may also write beyond the buffer end. Confirmed impacts include heap out-of-bounds read, out-of-bounds write, heap information disclosure (adjacent data appearing in parsed metadata), and application crash/denial of service. The avidemux element is auto-plugged by playbin, decodebin, and gst-discoverer, so opening or previewing a crafted AVI is sufficient to trigger the issue. Fixed upstream in gst-plugins-good 1.28.6 (GStreamer-SA-2026-0072).(CVE-2026-73433)

A flaw was found in GStreamer gst-plugins-good (avidemux). In gst_avi_demux_riff_parse_vprp(), the number of available gst_riff_vprp_video_field_desc entries is calculated by dividing the remaining buffer size by the attacker-controlled vprp->fields value, rather than by sizeof(gst_riff_vprp_video_field_desc). This can cause the parser to treat more field descriptors as available than fit in the input buffer, resulting in out-of-bounds reads. Processing a crafted AVI via playbin/decodebin can crash the application (denial of service). Fixed upstream in gst-plugins-good 1.28.6 (GStreamer-SA-2026-0072).(CVE-2026-73434)

Severity
6.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-debuginfo-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-debugsource-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-extras-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-gtk-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-qt-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-debuginfo-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-debugsource-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-extras-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-gtk-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "gstreamer1-plugins-good-qt-1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "gstreamer1-plugins-good",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/gstreamer1-plugins-good\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.20.3-9.oe2403sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "GStreamer is a streaming media framework, based on graphs of filters which operate on media data. Applications using this library can do anything from real-time sound processing to playing videos, and just about anything else media-related.  Its plugin-based architecture means that new data types or processing capabilities can be added simply by installing new plugins.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nA flaw was found in GStreamer gst-plugins-good (avidemux). When parsing FUJIFILM metadata in an AVI strd chunk, gst_avi_demux_parse_strd() decrements a remaining-length counter by fixed offsets (98 and 10 bytes) without verifying sufficient data remains. For crafted strd payloads of exactly 106 or 107 bytes, the counter underflows to a very large unsigned value, causing subsequent null-terminated string scanning to read far beyond the allocated heap buffer. Date-format normalization may also write beyond the buffer end. Confirmed impacts include heap out-of-bounds read, out-of-bounds write, heap information disclosure (adjacent data appearing in parsed metadata), and application crash/denial of service. The avidemux element is auto-plugged by playbin, decodebin, and gst-discoverer, so opening or previewing a crafted AVI is sufficient to trigger the issue. Fixed upstream in gst-plugins-good 1.28.6 (GStreamer-SA-2026-0072).(CVE-2026-73433)\n\nA flaw was found in GStreamer gst-plugins-good (avidemux). In gst_avi_demux_riff_parse_vprp(), the number of available gst_riff_vprp_video_field_desc entries is calculated by dividing the remaining buffer size by the attacker-controlled vprp-\u0026gt;fields value, rather than by sizeof(gst_riff_vprp_video_field_desc). This can cause the parser to treat more field descriptors as available than fit in the input buffer, resulting in out-of-bounds reads. Processing a crafted AVI via playbin/decodebin can crash the application (denial of service). Fixed upstream in gst-plugins-good 1.28.6 (GStreamer-SA-2026-0072).(CVE-2026-73434)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-3649",
  "modified": "2026-09-05T15:03:30Z",
  "published": "2026-09-05T15:03:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3649"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73433"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73434"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gstreamer1-plugins-good security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-73433",
    "CVE-2026-73434"
  ]
}



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