OESA-2026-3608 (CVE-2021-45958)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-05 15:03 – Updated: 2026-09-05 15:03 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
python-ujson security update
Details

UltraJSON

Security Fix(es):

UltraJSON (aka ujson) through 5.1.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow in Buffer_AppendIndentUnchecked (called from encode). Exploitation can, for example, use a large amount of indentation.(CVE-2021-45958)

UltraJSON is a fast JSON encoder and decoder written in pure C with bindings for Python 3.7+. Versions 5.10 through 5.11.0 are vulnerable to buffer overflow or infinite loop through large indent handling. ujson.dumps() crashes the Python interpreter (segmentation fault) when the product of the indent parameter and the nested depth of the input exceeds INT32_MAX. It can also get stuck in an infinite loop if the indent is a large negative number. Both are caused by an integer overflow/underflow whilst calculating how much memory to reserve for indentation. And both can be used to achieve denial of service. To be vulnerable, a service must call ujson.dump()/ujson.dumps()/ujson.encode() whilst giving untrusted users control over the indent parameter and not restrict that indentation to reasonably small non-negative values. A service may also be vulnerable to the infinite loop if it uses a fixed negative indent. An underflow always occurs for any negative indent when the input data is at least one level nested but, for small negative indents, the underflow is usually accidentally rectified by another overflow. This issue has been fixed in version 5.12.0.(CVE-2026-32875)

UltraJSON is a fast JSON encoder and decoder written in pure C with bindings for Python 3.7+. Prior to 5.12.1, when ujson.dump() writes to a file-like object and the write operation raises an exception, the serialized JSON string object is not decremented, leaking memory. Each failed write operation leaks the full size of the serialized payload. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.12.1.(CVE-2026-44660)

UltraJSON is a fast JSON encoder and decoder written in pure C with bindings for Python 3.7+. Prior to 5.13.0, ujson.dumps() (or ujson.dump() or ujson.encode()) have a reject_bytes=False option. When set, they may accept malformed or truncated UTF-8 byte sequences, silently rewriting them into different Unicode characters instead of rejecting them. This leads to input validation bypass and data integrity issues. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.13.0.(CVE-2026-54911)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "python-ujson-debuginfo-5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "python-ujson-debugsource-5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-ujson-5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "noarch": [
          "python-ujson-help-5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "python-ujson-5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "python-ujson-debuginfo-5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "python-ujson-debugsource-5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-ujson-5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
        "name": "python-ujson",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/python-ujson\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.0-7.oe2403sp3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "UltraJSON\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nUltraJSON (aka ujson) through 5.1.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow in Buffer_AppendIndentUnchecked (called from encode). Exploitation can, for example, use a large amount of indentation.(CVE-2021-45958)\n\nUltraJSON is a fast JSON encoder and decoder written in pure C with bindings for Python 3.7+. Versions 5.10 through 5.11.0 are vulnerable to buffer overflow or infinite loop through large indent handling. ujson.dumps() crashes the Python interpreter (segmentation fault) when the product of the indent parameter and the nested depth of the input exceeds INT32_MAX. It can also get stuck in an infinite loop if the indent is a large negative number. Both are caused by an integer overflow/underflow whilst calculating how much memory to reserve for indentation. And both can be used to achieve denial of service. To be vulnerable, a service must call ujson.dump()/ujson.dumps()/ujson.encode() whilst giving untrusted users control over the indent parameter and not restrict that indentation to reasonably small non-negative values. A service may also be vulnerable to the infinite loop if it uses a fixed negative indent. An underflow always occurs for any negative indent when the input data is at least one level nested but, for small negative indents, the underflow is usually accidentally rectified by another overflow. This issue has been fixed in version 5.12.0.(CVE-2026-32875)\n\nUltraJSON is a fast JSON encoder and decoder written in pure C with bindings for Python 3.7+. Prior to 5.12.1, when ujson.dump() writes to a file-like object and the write operation raises an exception, the serialized JSON string object is not decremented, leaking memory. Each failed write operation leaks the full size of the serialized payload. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.12.1.(CVE-2026-44660)\n\nUltraJSON is a fast JSON encoder and decoder written in pure C with bindings for Python 3.7+. Prior to 5.13.0, ujson.dumps() (or ujson.dump() or ujson.encode()) have a reject_bytes=False option. When set, they may accept malformed or truncated UTF-8 byte sequences, silently rewriting them into different Unicode characters instead of rejecting them. This leads to input validation bypass and data integrity issues. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.13.0.(CVE-2026-54911)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-3608",
  "modified": "2026-09-05T15:03:07Z",
  "published": "2026-09-05T15:03:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3608"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45958"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32875"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44660"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54911"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "python-ujson security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2021-45958",
    "CVE-2026-32875",
    "CVE-2026-44660",
    "CVE-2026-54911"
  ]
}



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