OESA-2026-2173 (CVE-2026-23398)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-05-03 11:11 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:11 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
icmp: fix NULL pointer dereference in icmp_tag_validation()
icmp_tag_validation() unconditionally dereferences the result of rcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto]) without checking for NULL. The inet_protos[] array is sparse -- only about 15 of 256 protocol numbers have registered handlers. When ip_no_pmtu_disc is set to 3 (hardened PMTU mode) and the kernel receives an ICMP Fragmentation Needed error with a quoted inner IP header containing an unregistered protocol number, the NULL dereference causes a kernel panic in softirq context.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:icmp_unreach (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1085 net/ipv4/icmp.c:1143) Call Trace: <IRQ> icmp_rcv (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1527) ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207) ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:242) ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262) ip_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:573) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6164) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6628) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561) </IRQ>
Add a NULL check before accessing icmp_strict_tag_validation. If the protocol has no registered handler, return false since it cannot perform strict tag validation.(CVE-2026-23398)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP32 nframes bounds check
The same bounds-check bug fixed for NDP16 in the previous patch also exists in cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(). The DPE array size is validated against the total skb length without accounting for ndpoffset, allowing out-of-bounds reads when the NDP32 is placed near the end of the NTB.
Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.
Compile-tested only.(CVE-2026-23447)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: teql: Fix double-free in teql_master_xmit
Whenever a TEQL devices has a lockless Qdisc as root, qdisc_reset should be called using the seq_lock to avoid racing with the datapath. Failure to do so may cause crashes like the following:
[ 238.028993][ T318] BUG: KASAN: double-free in skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.029328][ T318] Free of addr ffff88810c67ec00 by task poc_teql_uaf_ke/318 [ 238.029749][ T318] [ 238.029900][ T318] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: poc_teql_ke Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-00149-ge5b31d988a41 #704 PREEMPT(full) [ 238.029906][ T318] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 238.029910][ T318] Call Trace: [ 238.029913][ T318] <TASK> [ 238.029916][ T318] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) [ 238.029928][ T318] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) [ 238.029940][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.029944][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) ... [ 238.029957][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.029969][ T318] kasan_report_invalid_free (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:563) [ 238.029979][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.029989][ T318] check_slab_allocation (mm/kasan/common.c:231) [ 238.029995][ T318] kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:2637 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6168 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6298 (discriminator 1)) [ 238.030004][ T318] skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) ... [ 238.030025][ T318] sk_skb_reason_drop (net/core/skbuff.c:1256) [ 238.030032][ T318] pfifo_fast_reset (./include/linux/ptr_ring.h:171 ./include/linux/ptr_ring.h:309 ./include/linux/skb_array.h:98 net/sched/sch_generic.c:827) [ 238.030039][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) ... [ 238.030054][ T318] qdisc_reset (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1034) [ 238.030062][ T318] teql_destroy (./include/linux/spinlock.h:395 net/sched/sch_teql.c:157) [ 238.030071][ T318] __qdisc_destroy (./include/net/pkt_sched.h:328 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1077) [ 238.030077][ T318] qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1062 net/sched/sch_api.c:1053 net/sched/sch_api.c:1159) [ 238.030089][ T318] ? __pfx_qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1091) [ 238.030095][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 238.030102][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 238.030106][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 238.030114][ T318] tc_get_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1529 net/sched/sch_api.c:1556) ... [ 238.072958][ T318] Allocated by task 303 on cpu 5 at 238.026275s: [ 238.073392][ T318] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) [ 238.073884][ T318] kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:64 (discriminator 5) mm/kasan/common.c:79 (discriminator 5)) [ 238.074230][ T318] __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:369) [ 238.074578][ T318] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:253 mm/slub.c:4542 mm/slub.c:4869 mm/slub.c:4921) [ 238.076091][ T318] kmalloc_reserve (net/core/skbuff.c:616 (discriminator 107)) [ 238.076450][ T318] __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:713) [ 238.076834][ T318] alloc_skb_with_frags (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 net/core/skbuff.c:6763) [ 238.077178][ T318] sock_alloc_send_pskb (net/core/sock.c:2997) [ 238.077520][ T318] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:2926 net/packet/af_packet.c:3019 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108) [ 238.081469][ T318] [ 238.081870][ T318] Freed by task 299 on cpu 1 at 238.028496s: [ 238.082761][ T318] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) [ 238.083481][ T318] kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:64 (discriminator 5) mm/kasan/common.c:79 (discriminator 5)) [ 238.085348][ T318] kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587 (discriminator 1)) [ 238.085900][ T318] __kasan_slab_free (mm/ ---truncated---(CVE-2026-23449)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: check for zero length in DecodeQ931()
In DecodeQ931(), the UserUserIE code path reads a 16-bit length from the packet, then decrements it by 1 to skip the protocol discriminator byte before passing it to DecodeH323_UserInformation(). If the encoded length is 0, the decrement wraps to -1, which is then passed as a large value to the decoder, leading to an out-of-bounds read.
Add a check to ensure len is positive after the decrement.(CVE-2026-23455)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_int() CONS case
In decode_int(), the CONS case calls get_bits(bs, 2) to read a length value, then calls get_uint(bs, len) without checking that len bytes remain in the buffer. The existing boundary check only validates the 2 bits for get_bits(), not the subsequent 1-4 bytes that get_uint() reads. This allows a malformed H.323/RAS packet to cause a 1-4 byte slab-out-of-bounds read.
Add a boundary check for len bytes after get_bits() and before get_uint().(CVE-2026-23456)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix Content-Length u32 truncation in sip_help_tcp()
sip_help_tcp() parses the SIP Content-Length header with simple_strtoul(), which returns unsigned long, but stores the result in unsigned int clen. On 64-bit systems, values exceeding UINT_MAX are silently truncated before computing the SIP message boundary.
For example, Content-Length 4294967328 (2^32 + 32) is truncated to 32, causing the parser to miscalculate where the current message ends. The loop then treats trailing data in the TCP segment as a second SIP message and processes it through the SDP parser.
Fix this by changing clen to unsigned long to match the return type of simple_strtoul(), and reject Content-Length values that exceed the remaining TCP payload length.(CVE-2026-23457)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix use-after-free in ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct()
ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct() stores a conntrack pointer in cb->data for the netlink dump callback ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(), but drops the conntrack reference immediately after netlink_dump_start(). When the dump spans multiple rounds, the second recvmsg() triggers the dump callback which dereferences the now-freed conntrack via nfct_help(ct), leading to a use-after-free on ct->ext.
The bug is that the netlink_dump_control has no .start or .done callbacks to manage the conntrack reference across dump rounds. Other dump functions in the same file (e.g. ctnetlink_get_conntrack) properly use .start/.done callbacks for this purpose.
Fix this by adding .start and .done callbacks that hold and release the conntrack reference for the duration of the dump, and move the nfct_help() call after the cb->args[0] early-return check in the dump callback to avoid dereferencing ct->ext unnecessarily.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table+0x4f/0x2e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810597ebf0 by task ctnetlink_poc/133
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 133 Comm: ctnetlink_poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+ #3 PREEMPTLAZY Call Trace: <TASK> ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table+0x4f/0x2e0 netlink_dump+0x333/0x880 netlink_recvmsg+0x3e2/0x4b0 ? aa_sk_perm+0x184/0x450 sock_recvmsg+0xde/0xf0
Allocated by task 133: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x134/0x440 __nf_conntrack_alloc+0xa8/0x2b0 ctnetlink_create_conntrack+0xa1/0x900 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x3cf/0x7d0 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x48e/0x510 netlink_rcv_skb+0xc9/0x1f0 nfnetlink_rcv+0xdb/0x220 netlink_unicast+0x3ec/0x590 netlink_sendmsg+0x397/0x690 __sys_sendmsg+0xf4/0x180
Freed by task 0: slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0xad/0x1e0 rcu_core+0x5c3/0x9c0(CVE-2026-23458)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: fix use-after-free on controller registration failure
Make sure to deregister from driver core also in the unlikely event that per-cpu statistics allocation fails during controller registration to avoid use-after-free (of driver resources) and unclocked register accesses.(CVE-2026-31389)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
Yiming Qian reported :
<quote>
I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg
ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via skb_under_panic()
(local DoS).
The core issue is a mismatch between:
- a 16-bit length accumulator (
struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen, type__u16) and - a pointer to the last provided destination-options header (
opt->dst1opt)
when multiple IPV6_DSTOPTS control messages (cmsgs) are provided.
include/net/ipv6.h:struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flenis__u16(wrap possible). (lines 291-307, especially 298)net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl():- Accepts repeated
IPV6_DSTOPTSand accumulates intoopt_flenwithout rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933) net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data():- Uses
opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflento compute header sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465) net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb():- Calls
ipv6_push_frag_opts()ifopt->opt_flenis non-zero. (lines 1930-1934) net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()/ipv6_push_exthdr():-
Push size comes from
ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)(based on the pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211) -
opt_flenis a 16-bit accumulator: -
include/net/ipv6.h:298defines__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */. -
ip6_datagram_send_ctl()accepts repeatedIPV6_DSTOPTScmsgs and incrementsopt_fleneach time: -
In
net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933, forIPV6_DSTOPTS: - It computes
len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3); - It checks
CAP_NET_RAWusingns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW). (line 922) - Then it does:
opt->opt_flen += len;(line 927)opt->dst1opt = hdr;(line 928)
There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy
IPV6_2292DSTOPTS path which rejects duplicates at
net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904).
If enough large IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs are provided, opt_flen wraps
while dst1opt still points to a large (2048-byte)
destination-options header.
In the attached PoC (poc.c):
- 32 cmsgs with
hdrlen=255=>len = (255+1)*8 = 2048 - 1 cmsg with
hdrlen=0=>len = 8 - Total increment:
32*2048 + 8 = 65544, so(__u16)opt_flen == 8 -
The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so
dst1optpoints to a 2048-byte header. -
The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped
opt_flen: -
In
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465: headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;
With wrapped opt_flen, headersize/headroom decisions underestimate
what will be pushed later.
-
When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from
dst1optand is not limited by wrappedopt_flen: -
In
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934: if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);- In
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211,ipv6_push_frag_opts()pushesdst1optviaipv6_push_exthdr(). - In
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184,ipv6_push_exthdr()does: skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));
With insufficient headroom, skb_push() underflows and triggers
skb_under_panic() -> BUG():
net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675(skb_push()callsskb_under_panic())-
net/core/skbuff.c:207-214(skb_panic()ends inBUG()) -
The
IPV6_DSTOPTScmsg path requiresCAP_NET_RAWin the target netns user namespace (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)). - Root (or any task with
CAP_NET_RAW) can trigger this without user namespaces. -
An unprivileged
uid=1000user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespacedCAP_NET_RAW(the attached PoC does this). -
Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash). - ---truncated---(CVE-2026-31415)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: account for netlink header size
This is a followup to an old bug fix: NLMSG_DONE needs to account for the netlink header size, not just the attribute size.
This can result in a WARN splat + drop of the netlink message, but other than this there are no ill effects.(CVE-2026-31416)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix use of uninitialized rtp_addr in process_sdp
process_sdp() declares union nf_inet_addr rtp_addr on the stack and passes it to the nf_nat_sip sdp_session hook after walking the SDP media descriptions. However rtp_addr is only initialized inside the media loop when a recognized media type with a non-zero port is found.
If the SDP body contains no m= lines, only inactive media sections (m=audio 0 ...) or only unrecognized media types, rtp_addr is never assigned. Despite that, the function still calls hooks->sdp_session() with &rtp_addr, causing nf_nat_sdp_session() to format the stale stack value as an IP address and rewrite the SDP session owner and connection lines with it.
With CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (default on most distributions) this results in the session-level o= and c= addresses being rewritten to 0.0.0.0 for inactive SDP sessions. Without stack auto-init the rewritten address is whatever happened to be on the stack.
Fix this by pre-initializing rtp_addr from the session-level connection address (caddr) when available, and tracking via a have_rtp_addr flag whether any valid address was established. Skip the sdp_session hook entirely when no valid address exists.(CVE-2026-31427)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: fix uninitialized padding leak in NFULA_PAYLOAD
__build_packet_message() manually constructs the NFULA_PAYLOAD netlink attribute using skb_put() and skb_copy_bits(), bypassing the standard nla_reserve()/nla_put() helpers. While nla_total_size(data_len) bytes are allocated (including NLA alignment padding), only data_len bytes of actual packet data are copied. The trailing nla_padlen(data_len) bytes (1-3 when data_len is not 4-byte aligned) are never initialized, leaking stale heap contents to userspace via the NFLOG netlink socket.
Replace the manual attribute construction with nla_reserve(), which handles the tailroom check, header setup, and padding zeroing via __nla_reserve(). The subsequent skb_copy_bits() fills in the payload data on top of the properly initialized attribute.(CVE-2026-31428)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place\n\nThis mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data.\n\nThere is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly.(CVE-2026-31431)
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
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"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.0-145.0.7.138.oe2403sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Critical"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nicmp: fix NULL pointer dereference in icmp_tag_validation()\n\nicmp_tag_validation() unconditionally dereferences the result of\nrcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto]) without checking for NULL.\nThe inet_protos[] array is sparse -- only about 15 of 256 protocol\nnumbers have registered handlers. When ip_no_pmtu_disc is set to 3\n(hardened PMTU mode) and the kernel receives an ICMP Fragmentation\nNeeded error with a quoted inner IP header containing an unregistered\nprotocol number, the NULL dereference causes a kernel panic in\nsoftirq context.\n\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]\n RIP: 0010:icmp_unreach (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1085 net/ipv4/icmp.c:1143)\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n icmp_rcv (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1527)\n ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207)\n ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:242)\n ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262)\n ip_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:573)\n __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6164)\n process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6628)\n handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561)\n \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;\n\nAdd a NULL check before accessing icmp_strict_tag_validation. If the\nprotocol has no registered handler, return false since it cannot\nperform strict tag validation.(CVE-2026-23398)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP32 nframes bounds check\n\nThe same bounds-check bug fixed for NDP16 in the previous patch also\nexists in cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(). The DPE array size is validated\nagainst the total skb length without accounting for ndpoffset, allowing\nout-of-bounds reads when the NDP32 is placed near the end of the NTB.\n\nAdd ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to\nexpress the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.\n\nCompile-tested only.(CVE-2026-23447)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: teql: Fix double-free in teql_master_xmit\n\nWhenever a TEQL devices has a lockless Qdisc as root, qdisc_reset should\nbe called using the seq_lock to avoid racing with the datapath. Failure\nto do so may cause crashes like the following:\n\n[ 238.028993][ T318] BUG: KASAN: double-free in skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)\n[ 238.029328][ T318] Free of addr ffff88810c67ec00 by task poc_teql_uaf_ke/318\n[ 238.029749][ T318]\n[ 238.029900][ T318] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: poc_teql_ke Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-00149-ge5b31d988a41 #704 PREEMPT(full)\n[ 238.029906][ T318] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011\n[ 238.029910][ T318] Call Trace:\n[ 238.029913][ T318] \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[ 238.029916][ T318] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)\n[ 238.029928][ T318] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)\n[ 238.029940][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)\n[ 238.029944][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)\n...\n[ 238.029957][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)\n[ 238.029969][ T318] kasan_report_invalid_free (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:563)\n[ 238.029979][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)\n[ 238.029989][ T318] check_slab_allocation (mm/kasan/common.c:231)\n[ 238.029995][ T318] kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:2637 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6168 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6298 (discriminator 1))\n[ 238.030004][ T318] skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)\n...\n[ 238.030025][ T318] sk_skb_reason_drop (net/core/skbuff.c:1256)\n[ 238.030032][ T318] pfifo_fast_reset (./include/linux/ptr_ring.h:171 ./include/linux/ptr_ring.h:309 ./include/linux/skb_array.h:98 net/sched/sch_generic.c:827)\n[ 238.030039][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)\n...\n[ 238.030054][ T318] qdisc_reset (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1034)\n[ 238.030062][ T318] teql_destroy (./include/linux/spinlock.h:395 net/sched/sch_teql.c:157)\n[ 238.030071][ T318] __qdisc_destroy (./include/net/pkt_sched.h:328 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1077)\n[ 238.030077][ T318] qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1062 net/sched/sch_api.c:1053 net/sched/sch_api.c:1159)\n[ 238.030089][ T318] ? __pfx_qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1091)\n[ 238.030095][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)\n[ 238.030102][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)\n[ 238.030106][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)\n[ 238.030114][ T318] tc_get_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1529 net/sched/sch_api.c:1556)\n...\n[ 238.072958][ T318] Allocated by task 303 on cpu 5 at 238.026275s:\n[ 238.073392][ T318] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58)\n[ 238.073884][ T318] kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:64 (discriminator 5) mm/kasan/common.c:79 (discriminator 5))\n[ 238.074230][ T318] __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:369)\n[ 238.074578][ T318] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:253 mm/slub.c:4542 mm/slub.c:4869 mm/slub.c:4921)\n[ 238.076091][ T318] kmalloc_reserve (net/core/skbuff.c:616 (discriminator 107))\n[ 238.076450][ T318] __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:713)\n[ 238.076834][ T318] alloc_skb_with_frags (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 net/core/skbuff.c:6763)\n[ 238.077178][ T318] sock_alloc_send_pskb (net/core/sock.c:2997)\n[ 238.077520][ T318] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:2926 net/packet/af_packet.c:3019 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108)\n[ 238.081469][ T318]\n[ 238.081870][ T318] Freed by task 299 on cpu 1 at 238.028496s:\n[ 238.082761][ T318] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58)\n[ 238.083481][ T318] kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:64 (discriminator 5) mm/kasan/common.c:79 (discriminator 5))\n[ 238.085348][ T318] kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587 (discriminator 1))\n[ 238.085900][ T318] __kasan_slab_free (mm/\n---truncated---(CVE-2026-23449)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: check for zero length in DecodeQ931()\n\nIn DecodeQ931(), the UserUserIE code path reads a 16-bit length from\nthe packet, then decrements it by 1 to skip the protocol discriminator\nbyte before passing it to DecodeH323_UserInformation(). If the encoded\nlength is 0, the decrement wraps to -1, which is then passed as a\nlarge value to the decoder, leading to an out-of-bounds read.\n\nAdd a check to ensure len is positive after the decrement.(CVE-2026-23455)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_int() CONS case\n\nIn decode_int(), the CONS case calls get_bits(bs, 2) to read a length\nvalue, then calls get_uint(bs, len) without checking that len bytes\nremain in the buffer. The existing boundary check only validates the\n2 bits for get_bits(), not the subsequent 1-4 bytes that get_uint()\nreads. This allows a malformed H.323/RAS packet to cause a 1-4 byte\nslab-out-of-bounds read.\n\nAdd a boundary check for len bytes after get_bits() and before\nget_uint().(CVE-2026-23456)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix Content-Length u32 truncation in sip_help_tcp()\n\nsip_help_tcp() parses the SIP Content-Length header with\nsimple_strtoul(), which returns unsigned long, but stores the result in\nunsigned int clen. On 64-bit systems, values exceeding UINT_MAX are\nsilently truncated before computing the SIP message boundary.\n\nFor example, Content-Length 4294967328 (2^32 + 32) is truncated to 32,\ncausing the parser to miscalculate where the current message ends. The\nloop then treats trailing data in the TCP segment as a second SIP\nmessage and processes it through the SDP parser.\n\nFix this by changing clen to unsigned long to match the return type of\nsimple_strtoul(), and reject Content-Length values that exceed the\nremaining TCP payload length.(CVE-2026-23457)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: ctnetlink: fix use-after-free in ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct()\n\nctnetlink_dump_exp_ct() stores a conntrack pointer in cb-\u0026gt;data for the\nnetlink dump callback ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(), but drops the\nconntrack reference immediately after netlink_dump_start(). When the\ndump spans multiple rounds, the second recvmsg() triggers the dump\ncallback which dereferences the now-freed conntrack via nfct_help(ct),\nleading to a use-after-free on ct-\u0026gt;ext.\n\nThe bug is that the netlink_dump_control has no .start or .done\ncallbacks to manage the conntrack reference across dump rounds. Other\ndump functions in the same file (e.g. ctnetlink_get_conntrack) properly\nuse .start/.done callbacks for this purpose.\n\nFix this by adding .start and .done callbacks that hold and release the\nconntrack reference for the duration of the dump, and move the\nnfct_help() call after the cb-\u0026gt;args[0] early-return check in the dump\ncallback to avoid dereferencing ct-\u0026gt;ext unnecessarily.\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table+0x4f/0x2e0\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810597ebf0 by task ctnetlink_poc/133\n\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 133 Comm: ctnetlink_poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+ #3 PREEMPTLAZY\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table+0x4f/0x2e0\n netlink_dump+0x333/0x880\n netlink_recvmsg+0x3e2/0x4b0\n ? aa_sk_perm+0x184/0x450\n sock_recvmsg+0xde/0xf0\n\n Allocated by task 133:\n kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x134/0x440\n __nf_conntrack_alloc+0xa8/0x2b0\n ctnetlink_create_conntrack+0xa1/0x900\n ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x3cf/0x7d0\n nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x48e/0x510\n netlink_rcv_skb+0xc9/0x1f0\n nfnetlink_rcv+0xdb/0x220\n netlink_unicast+0x3ec/0x590\n netlink_sendmsg+0x397/0x690\n __sys_sendmsg+0xf4/0x180\n\n Freed by task 0:\n slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0xad/0x1e0\n rcu_core+0x5c3/0x9c0(CVE-2026-23458)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nspi: fix use-after-free on controller registration failure\n\nMake sure to deregister from driver core also in the unlikely event that\nper-cpu statistics allocation fails during controller registration to\navoid use-after-free (of driver resources) and unclocked register\naccesses.(CVE-2026-31389)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()\n\nYiming Qian reported :\n\u0026lt;quote\u0026gt;\n I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg\n ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via `skb_under_panic()`\n (local DoS).\n\n The core issue is a mismatch between:\n\n - a 16-bit length accumulator (`struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen`, type\n `__u16`) and\n - a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (`opt-\u0026gt;dst1opt`)\n\n when multiple `IPV6_DSTOPTS` control messages (cmsgs) are provided.\n\n - `include/net/ipv6.h`:\n - `struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen` is `__u16` (wrap possible).\n (lines 291-307, especially 298)\n - `net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl()`:\n - Accepts repeated `IPV6_DSTOPTS` and accumulates into `opt_flen`\n without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933)\n - `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data()`:\n - Uses `opt-\u0026gt;opt_flen + opt-\u0026gt;opt_nflen` to compute header\n sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465)\n - `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb()`:\n - Calls `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` if `opt-\u0026gt;opt_flen` is non-zero.\n (lines 1930-1934)\n - `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()` / `ipv6_push_exthdr()`:\n - Push size comes from `ipv6_optlen(opt-\u0026gt;dst1opt)` (based on the\n pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211)\n\n 1. `opt_flen` is a 16-bit accumulator:\n\n - `include/net/ipv6.h:298` defines `__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */`.\n\n 2. `ip6_datagram_send_ctl()` accepts *repeated* `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs\n and increments `opt_flen` each time:\n\n - In `net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933`, for `IPV6_DSTOPTS`:\n - It computes `len = ((hdr-\u0026gt;hdrlen + 1) \u0026lt;\u0026lt; 3);`\n - It checks `CAP_NET_RAW` using `ns_capable(net-\u0026gt;user_ns,\n CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922)\n - Then it does:\n - `opt-\u0026gt;opt_flen += len;` (line 927)\n - `opt-\u0026gt;dst1opt = hdr;` (line 928)\n\n There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy\n `IPV6_2292DSTOPTS` path which rejects duplicates at\n `net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904`).\n\n If enough large `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs are provided, `opt_flen` wraps\n while `dst1opt` still points to a large (2048-byte)\n destination-options header.\n\n In the attached PoC (`poc.c`):\n\n - 32 cmsgs with `hdrlen=255` =\u0026gt; `len = (255+1)*8 = 2048`\n - 1 cmsg with `hdrlen=0` =\u0026gt; `len = 8`\n - Total increment: `32*2048 + 8 = 65544`, so `(__u16)opt_flen == 8`\n - The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so `dst1opt` points to a 2048-byte header.\n\n 3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped `opt_flen`:\n\n- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465`:\n - `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt-\u0026gt;opt_flen +\n opt-\u0026gt;opt_nflen : 0) + ...;`\n\n With wrapped `opt_flen`, `headersize`/headroom decisions underestimate\n what will be pushed later.\n\n 4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from\n `dst1opt` and is not limited by wrapped `opt_flen`:\n\n - In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934`:\n - `if (opt-\u0026gt;opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);`\n - In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211`, `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` pushes\n `dst1opt` via `ipv6_push_exthdr()`.\n - In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184`, `ipv6_push_exthdr()` does:\n - `skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));`\n - `memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));`\n\n With insufficient headroom, `skb_push()` underflows and triggers\n `skb_under_panic()` -\u0026gt; `BUG()`:\n\n - `net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675` (`skb_push()` calls `skb_under_panic()`)\n - `net/core/skbuff.c:207-214` (`skb_panic()` ends in `BUG()`)\n\n - The `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsg path requires `CAP_NET_RAW` in the target\n netns user namespace (`ns_capable(net-\u0026gt;user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`).\n - Root (or any task with `CAP_NET_RAW`) can trigger this without user\n namespaces.\n - An unprivileged `uid=1000` user can trigger this if unprivileged\n user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain\n namespaced `CAP_NET_RAW` (the attached PoC does this).\n\n - Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash).\n -\n---truncated---(CVE-2026-31415)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nfnetlink_log: account for netlink header size\n\nThis is a followup to an old bug fix: NLMSG_DONE needs to account\nfor the netlink header size, not just the attribute size.\n\nThis can result in a WARN splat + drop of the netlink message,\nbut other than this there are no ill effects.(CVE-2026-31416)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix use of uninitialized rtp_addr in process_sdp\n\nprocess_sdp() declares union nf_inet_addr rtp_addr on the stack and\npasses it to the nf_nat_sip sdp_session hook after walking the SDP\nmedia descriptions. However rtp_addr is only initialized inside the\nmedia loop when a recognized media type with a non-zero port is found.\n\nIf the SDP body contains no m= lines, only inactive media sections\n(m=audio 0 ...) or only unrecognized media types, rtp_addr is never\nassigned. Despite that, the function still calls hooks-\u0026gt;sdp_session()\nwith \u0026amp;rtp_addr, causing nf_nat_sdp_session() to format the stale stack\nvalue as an IP address and rewrite the SDP session owner and connection\nlines with it.\n\nWith CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (default on most distributions) this\nresults in the session-level o= and c= addresses being rewritten to\n0.0.0.0 for inactive SDP sessions. Without stack auto-init the\nrewritten address is whatever happened to be on the stack.\n\nFix this by pre-initializing rtp_addr from the session-level connection\naddress (caddr) when available, and tracking via a have_rtp_addr flag\nwhether any valid address was established. Skip the sdp_session hook\nentirely when no valid address exists.(CVE-2026-31427)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nfnetlink_log: fix uninitialized padding leak in NFULA_PAYLOAD\n\n__build_packet_message() manually constructs the NFULA_PAYLOAD netlink\nattribute using skb_put() and skb_copy_bits(), bypassing the standard\nnla_reserve()/nla_put() helpers. While nla_total_size(data_len) bytes\nare allocated (including NLA alignment padding), only data_len bytes\nof actual packet data are copied. The trailing nla_padlen(data_len)\nbytes (1-3 when data_len is not 4-byte aligned) are never initialized,\nleaking stale heap contents to userspace via the NFLOG netlink socket.\n\nReplace the manual attribute construction with nla_reserve(), which\nhandles the tailroom check, header setup, and padding zeroing via\n__nla_reserve(). The subsequent skb_copy_bits() fills in the payload\ndata on top of the properly initialized attribute.(CVE-2026-31428)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\ncrypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place\\n\\nThis mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data.\\n\\nThere is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly.(CVE-2026-31431)",
"id": "OESA-2026-2173",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:11:09Z",
"published": "2026-05-03T11:11:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2173"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23398"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23447"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23449"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23455"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23456"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23457"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23458"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31389"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31415"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31416"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31427"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31428"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31431"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-23398",
"CVE-2026-23447",
"CVE-2026-23449",
"CVE-2026-23455",
"CVE-2026-23456",
"CVE-2026-23457",
"CVE-2026-23458",
"CVE-2026-31389",
"CVE-2026-31415",
"CVE-2026-31416",
"CVE-2026-31427",
"CVE-2026-31428",
"CVE-2026-31431"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.