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oesa-2024-2449
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler
Published
2024-11-22 11:07
Modified
2026-08-06 11:07
Summary
kernel security update
Details

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) PM: subject line tweaks

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory for nested SVM, as bits 4:0 of CR3 are ignored when PAE paging is used, and thus VMRUN doesn't enforce 32-byte alignment of nCR3. In the absolute worst case scenario, failure to ignore bits 4:0 can result in an out-of-bounds read, e.g. if the target page is at the end of a memslot, and the VMM isn't using guard pages. Per the APM: The CR3 register points to the base address of the page-directory-pointer table. The page-directory-pointer table is aligned on a 32-byte boundary, with the low 5 address bits 4:0 assumed to be 0. And the SDM's much more explicit: 4:0 Ignored Note, KVM gets this right when loading PDPTRs, it's only the nSVM flow that is broken.(CVE-2024-50115)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd: Guard against bad data for ATIF ACPI method If a BIOS provides bad data in response to an ATIF method call this causes a NULL pointer dereference in the caller. ? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 (discriminator 1)) ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:423 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:544 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:705 (discriminator 2)) ? do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:440 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1232 (discriminator 1)) ? acpi_ut_update_object_reference (drivers/acpi/acpica/utdelete.c:642) ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542) ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623) ? amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps.constprop.0 (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:387 (discriminator 2)) amdgpu ? amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps.constprop.0 (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:386 (discriminator 1)) amdgpu It has been encountered on at least one system, so guard for it. (cherry picked from commit c9b7c809b89f24e9372a4e7f02d64c950b07fdee)(CVE-2024-50117)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-clock: Fix missing timespec64 check in pc_clock_settime() As Andrew pointed out, it will make sense that the PTP core checked timespec64 struct's tv_sec and tv_nsec range before calling ptp->info->settime64(). As the man manual of clock_settime() said, if tp.tv_sec is negative or tp.tv_nsec is outside the range [0..999,999,999], it should return EINVAL, which include dynamic clocks which handles PTP clock, and the condition is consistent with timespec64_valid(). As Thomas suggested, timespec64_valid() only check the timespec is valid, but not ensure that the time is in a valid range, so check it ahead using timespec64_valid_strict() in pc_clock_settime() and return -EINVAL if not valid. There are some drivers that use tp->tv_sec and tp->tv_nsec directly to write registers without validity checks and assume that the higher layer has checked it, which is dangerous and will benefit from this, such as hclge_ptp_settime(), igb_ptp_settime_i210(), _rcar_gen4_ptp_settime(), and some drivers can remove the checks of itself.(CVE-2024-50195)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: do not pass a stopped vif to the driver in .get_txpower Avoid potentially crashing in the driver because of uninitialized private data(CVE-2024-50237)

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.19.90-2411.4.0.0304.oe2003sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()  The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn\u0026apos;t contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.  So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.  The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1].  The PoC:  $ cat \u0026gt; test.c  int main(void) {  size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);  int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, \u0026quot;test\u0026quot;, 0);  const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,   MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0);  unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff);  syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old);  syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0);  syscall(SYS_personality, old);  // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced  int fd = open(\u0026quot;/proc/self/maps\u0026quot;, O_RDONLY);  unsigned char buf2[1024];  while (1) {   int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024);   if (ret \u0026lt;= 0) break;   write(1, buf2, ret);  }  close(fd); }  $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted)  [PM: subject line tweaks](CVE-2024-47745)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  KVM: nSVM: Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory  Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory for nested SVM, as bits 4:0 of CR3 are ignored when PAE paging is used, and thus VMRUN doesn\u0026apos;t enforce 32-byte alignment of nCR3.  In the absolute worst case scenario, failure to ignore bits 4:0 can result in an out-of-bounds read, e.g. if the target page is at the end of a memslot, and the VMM isn\u0026apos;t using guard pages.  Per the APM:    The CR3 register points to the base address of the page-directory-pointer   table. The page-directory-pointer table is aligned on a 32-byte boundary,   with the low 5 address bits 4:0 assumed to be 0.  And the SDM\u0026apos;s much more explicit:    4:0    Ignored  Note, KVM gets this right when loading PDPTRs, it\u0026apos;s only the nSVM flow that is broken.(CVE-2024-50115)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  drm/amd: Guard against bad data for ATIF ACPI method  If a BIOS provides bad data in response to an ATIF method call this causes a NULL pointer dereference in the caller.  ``` ? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 (discriminator 1)) ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:423 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:544 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:705 (discriminator 2)) ? do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:440 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1232 (discriminator 1)) ? acpi_ut_update_object_reference (drivers/acpi/acpica/utdelete.c:642) ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542) ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623) ? amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps.constprop.0 (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:387 (discriminator 2)) amdgpu ? amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps.constprop.0 (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:386 (discriminator 1)) amdgpu ```  It has been encountered on at least one system, so guard for it.  (cherry picked from commit c9b7c809b89f24e9372a4e7f02d64c950b07fdee)(CVE-2024-50117)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  posix-clock: Fix missing timespec64 check in pc_clock_settime()  As Andrew pointed out, it will make sense that the PTP core checked timespec64 struct\u0026apos;s tv_sec and tv_nsec range before calling ptp-\u0026gt;info-\u0026gt;settime64().  As the man manual of clock_settime() said, if tp.tv_sec is negative or tp.tv_nsec is outside the range [0..999,999,999], it should return EINVAL, which include dynamic clocks which handles PTP clock, and the condition is consistent with timespec64_valid(). As Thomas suggested, timespec64_valid() only check the timespec is valid, but not ensure that the time is in a valid range, so check it ahead using timespec64_valid_strict() in pc_clock_settime() and return -EINVAL if not valid.  There are some drivers that use tp-\u0026gt;tv_sec and tp-\u0026gt;tv_nsec directly to write registers without validity checks and assume that the higher layer has checked it, which is dangerous and will benefit from this, such as hclge_ptp_settime(), igb_ptp_settime_i210(), _rcar_gen4_ptp_settime(), and some drivers can remove the checks of itself.(CVE-2024-50195)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  wifi: mac80211: do not pass a stopped vif to the driver in .get_txpower  Avoid potentially crashing in the driver because of uninitialized private data(CVE-2024-50237)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-2449",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:55Z",
  "published": "2024-11-22T11:07:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-2449"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47745"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50115"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50117"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50195"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50237"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-47745",
    "CVE-2024-50115",
    "CVE-2024-50117",
    "CVE-2024-50195",
    "CVE-2024-50237"
  ]
}



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