OESA-2023-1147 (CVE-2023-25153)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2023-03-04 11:05 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:05 – Source websitecontainerd is an industry-standard container runtime with an emphasis on simplicity, robustness and portability. It is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows, which can manage the complete container lifecycle of its host system: image transfer and storage, container execution and supervision, low-level storage and network attachments, etc.
Security Fix(es):
containerd is an open source container runtime. Before versions 1.6.18 and 1.5.18, when importing an OCI image, there was no limit on the number of bytes read for certain files. A maliciously crafted image with a large file where a limit was not applied could cause a denial of service. This bug has been fixed in containerd 1.6.18 and 1.5.18. Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. As a workaround, ensure that only trusted images are used and that only trusted users have permissions to import images.(CVE-2023-25153)
containerd is an open source container runtime. A bug was found in containerd prior to versions 1.6.18 and 1.5.18 where supplementary groups are not set up properly inside a container. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. Downstream applications that use the containerd client library may be affected as well. This bug has been fixed in containerd v1.6.18 and v.1.5.18. Users should update to these versions and recreate containers to resolve this issue. Users who rely on a downstream application that uses containerd's client library should check that application for a separate advisory and instructions. As a workaround, ensure that the "USER $USERNAME" Dockerfile instruction is not used. Instead, set the container entrypoint to a value similar to ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"] to allow su to properly set up supplementary groups.(CVE-2023-25173)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"containerd-1.2.0-209.oe1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"containerd-1.2.0-209.oe1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"containerd-1.2.0-209.oe1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1",
"name": "containerd",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/containerd\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.0-209.oe1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"containerd-1.2.0-209.oe1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"containerd-1.2.0-209.oe1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"containerd-1.2.0-209.oe1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "containerd",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/containerd\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.0-209.oe1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"containerd-1.2.0-310.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
"containerd-1.2.0-309.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"containerd-1.2.0-310.oe2203.src.rpm",
"containerd-1.2.0-309.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"containerd-1.2.0-310.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
"containerd-1.2.0-309.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS",
"name": "containerd",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/containerd\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.0-309.oe2203sp1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"containerd-1.2.0-309.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"containerd-1.2.0-309.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"containerd-1.2.0-309.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1",
"name": "containerd",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/containerd\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.0-309.oe2203sp1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "containerd is an industry-standard container runtime with an emphasis on simplicity, robustness and portability. It is available as a daemon for Linux and Windows, which can manage the complete container lifecycle of its host system: image transfer and storage, container execution and supervision, low-level storage and network attachments, etc.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\ncontainerd is an open source container runtime. Before versions 1.6.18 and 1.5.18, when importing an OCI image, there was no limit on the number of bytes read for certain files. A maliciously crafted image with a large file where a limit was not applied could cause a denial of service. This bug has been fixed in containerd 1.6.18 and 1.5.18. Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. As a workaround, ensure that only trusted images are used and that only trusted users have permissions to import images.(CVE-2023-25153)\r\n\r\ncontainerd is an open source container runtime. A bug was found in containerd prior to versions 1.6.18 and 1.5.18 where supplementary groups are not set up properly inside a container. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. Downstream applications that use the containerd client library may be affected as well. This bug has been fixed in containerd v1.6.18 and v.1.5.18. Users should update to these versions and recreate containers to resolve this issue. Users who rely on a downstream application that uses containerd\u0026apos;s client library should check that application for a separate advisory and instructions. As a workaround, ensure that the `\u0026quot;USER $USERNAME\u0026quot;` Dockerfile instruction is not used. Instead, set the container entrypoint to a value similar to `ENTRYPOINT [\u0026quot;su\u0026quot;, \u0026quot;-\u0026quot;, \u0026quot;user\u0026quot;]` to allow `su` to properly set up supplementary groups.(CVE-2023-25173)",
"id": "OESA-2023-1147",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:05:37Z",
"published": "2023-03-04T11:05:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2023-1147"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25153"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25173"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "containerd security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2023-25153",
"CVE-2023-25173"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.