OESA-2023-1146 (CVE-2023-0045)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2023-03-04 11:05 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:05 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
kernel security update
Details

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

The Linux kernel does not correctly mitigate SMT attacks, as discovered through a strange pattern in the kernel API using STIBP as a mitigation[1 <https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.html>], leaving the process exposed for a short period of time after a syscall. The kernel also does not issue an IBPB immediately during the syscall. The ib_prctl_set [2 <https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15.56/source/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c#L1467>]function updates the Thread Information Flags (TIFs) for the task and updates the SPEC_CTRL MSR on the function __speculation_ctrl_update [3 <https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15.56/source/arch/x86/kernel/process.c#L557>], but the IBPB is only issued on the next schedule, when the TIF bits are checked. This leaves the victim vulnerable to values already injected on the BTB, prior to the prctl syscall. The behavior is only corrected after a reschedule of the task happens. Furthermore, the kernel entrance (due to the syscall itself), does not issue an IBPB in the default scenarios (i.e., when the kernel protects itself via retpoline or eIBRS).(CVE-2023-0045)

REMAP cmd of SVM driver can be used to remap read only memory as read-write, then cause read only memory/file modified..(CVE-2021-33639)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.19.90-2302.5.0.0190.oe1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nThe Linux kernel does not correctly mitigate SMT attacks, as discovered\nthrough a strange pattern in the kernel API using STIBP as a mitigation[1\n\u0026lt;https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.html\u0026gt;], leaving the\nprocess exposed for a short period of time after a syscall. The kernel also\ndoes not issue an IBPB immediately during the syscall.\nThe ib_prctl_set [2\n\u0026lt;https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15.56/source/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c#L1467\u0026gt;]function\nupdates the Thread Information Flags (TIFs) for the task and updates the\nSPEC_CTRL MSR on the function __speculation_ctrl_update [3\n\u0026lt;https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15.56/source/arch/x86/kernel/process.c#L557\u0026gt;],\nbut the IBPB is only issued on the next schedule, when the TIF bits are\nchecked. This leaves the victim vulnerable to values already injected on\nthe BTB, prior to the prctl syscall.\nThe behavior is only corrected after a reschedule of the task happens.\nFurthermore, the kernel entrance (due to the syscall itself), does not\nissue an IBPB in the default scenarios (i.e., when the kernel protects\nitself via retpoline or eIBRS).(CVE-2023-0045)\r\n\r\nREMAP cmd of SVM driver can be used to remap read only memory as read-write, then cause read only memory/file modified..(CVE-2021-33639)",
  "id": "OESA-2023-1146",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:05:37Z",
  "published": "2023-03-04T11:05:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2023-1146"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0045"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33639"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2023-0045",
    "CVE-2021-33639"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.