OESA-2022-1981 (CVE-2022-38177)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2022-10-14 11:05 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:05 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
bind security update
Details

BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Domain) is an implementation of the DNS (Domain Name System) protocols. BIND includes a DNS server (named), which resolves host names to IP addresses; a resolver library (routines for applications to use when interfacing with DNS); and tools for verifying that the DNS server is operating properly.

Security Fix(es):

By spoofing the target resolver with responses that have a malformed ECDSA signature, an attacker can trigger a small memory leak. It is possible to gradually erode available memory to the point where named crashes for lack of resources.(CVE-2022-38177)

By spoofing the target resolver with responses that have a malformed EdDSA signature, an attacker can trigger a small memory leak. It is possible to gradually erode available memory to the point where named crashes for lack of resources.(CVE-2022-38178)

By flooding the target resolver with queries exploiting this flaw an attacker can significantly impair the resolver's performance, effectively denying legitimate clients access to the DNS resolution service.(CVE-2022-2795)

The underlying bug might cause read past end of the buffer and either read memory it should not read, or crash the process.(CVE-2022-2881)

An attacker can leverage this flaw to gradually erode available memory to the point where named crashes for lack of resources. Upon restart the attacker would have to begin again, but nevertheless there is the potential to deny service.(CVE-2022-2906)

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "bind-export-devel-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-export-libs-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-chroot-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-libs-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-debuginfo-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-utils-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-libs-lite-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-pkcs11-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-devel-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-debugsource-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
          "bind-pkcs11-devel-9.11.21-15.oe1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "noarch": [
          "python3-bind-9.11.21-15.oe1.noarch.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "bind-9.11.21-15.oe1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bind-pkcs11-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-export-devel-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-devel-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-utils-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-chroot-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-libs-lite-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-export-libs-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-debugsource-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-debuginfo-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-libs-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
          "bind-pkcs11-devel-9.11.21-15.oe1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "bind",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/bind\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.11.21-15.oe1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Domain) is an implementation of the DNS (Domain Name System) protocols. BIND includes a DNS server (named), which resolves host names to IP addresses; a resolver library (routines for applications to use when interfacing with DNS); and tools for verifying that the DNS server is operating properly.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nBy spoofing the target resolver with responses that have a malformed ECDSA signature, an attacker can trigger a small memory leak. It is possible to gradually erode available memory to the point where named crashes for lack of resources.(CVE-2022-38177)\r\n\r\nBy spoofing the target resolver with responses that have a malformed EdDSA signature, an attacker can trigger a small memory leak. It is possible to gradually erode available memory to the point where named crashes for lack of resources.(CVE-2022-38178)\r\n\r\nBy flooding the target resolver with queries exploiting this flaw an attacker can significantly impair the resolver\u0026apos;s performance, effectively denying legitimate clients access to the DNS resolution service.(CVE-2022-2795)\r\n\r\nThe underlying bug might cause read past end of the buffer and either read memory it should not read, or crash the process.(CVE-2022-2881)\r\n\r\nAn attacker can leverage this flaw to gradually erode available memory to the point where named crashes for lack of resources. Upon restart the attacker would have to begin again, but nevertheless there is the potential to deny service.(CVE-2022-2906)",
  "id": "OESA-2022-1981",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:05:17Z",
  "published": "2022-10-14T11:05:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2022-1981"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38177"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38178"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2795"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2881"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2906"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "bind security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2022-38177",
    "CVE-2022-38178",
    "CVE-2022-2795",
    "CVE-2022-2881",
    "CVE-2022-2906"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.