ICSA-25-140-06
Vulnerability from csaf_cisa - Published: 2025-05-13 04:00 - Updated: 2025-05-13 04:00Summary
Schneider Electric PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server
Notes
General Security Recommendations: We strongly recommend the following industry cybersecurity best practices.
* Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network.
* Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks.
* Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the “Program” mode.
* Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device.
* Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks.
* Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation.
* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
* When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices.
For more information refer to the Schneider Electric Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/ document.
For More Information: This document provides an overview of the identified vulnerability or vulnerabilities and actions required to mitigate. For more details and assistance on how to protect your installation, contact your local Schneider Electric representative or Schneider Electric Industrial Cybersecurity Services: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/solutions/cybersecurity/. These organizations will be fully aware of this situation and can support you through the process.
Customers should use appropriate patching methodologies when applying these patches to their systems. We
strongly recommend the use of back-ups and evaluating the impact of these patches in a Test and
Development environment or on an offline infrastructure. Contact Schneider Electric’s Customer Care Center if
you need assistance removing a patch.
For further information related to cybersecurity in Schneider Electric’s products, visit the company’s cybersecurity support portal page: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp
LEGAL DISCLAIMER: THIS NOTIFICATION DOCUMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, AND ANY MATERIALS LINKED FROM IT (COLLECTIVELY, THIS “NOTIFICATION”) ARE INTENDED TO HELP PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION AND SUGGESTED MITIGATION ACTIONS, REMEDIATION, FIX, AND/OR GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IS PROVIDED ON AN “AS-IS” BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES RELATING TO THIS NOTIFICATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT THE NOTIFICATION WILL RESOLVE THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION. IN NO EVENT SHALL SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR LOSSES WHATSOEVER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION IS AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND YOU ARE SOLELY LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO YOUR SYSTEMS OR ASSETS OR OTHER LOSSES THAT MAY RESULT FROM YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC RESERVES THE RIGHT TO UPDATE OR CHANGE THIS NOTIFICATION AT ANY TIME AND IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION
About Schneider Electric: Schneider's purpose is to create Impact by empowering all to make the most of our energy and resources, bridging progress and
sustainability for all. We call this Life Is On.
Our mission is to be the trusted partner in Sustainability and Efficiency.
We are a global industrial technology leader bringing world-leading expertise in electrification, automation and digitization to smart
industries, resilient infrastructure, future-proof data centers, intelligent buildings, and intuitive homes. Anchored by our deep
domain expertise, we provide integrated end-to-end lifecycle AI enabled Industrial IoT solutions with connected products, automation,
software and services, delivering digital twins to enable profitable growth for our customers.
We are a people company with an ecosystem of 150,000 colleagues and more than a million partners operating in over 100 countries
to ensure proximity to our customers and stakeholders. We embrace diversity and inclusion in everything we do, guided by our
meaningful purpose of a sustainable future for all.
Overview: Schneider Electric is aware of a vulnerability disclosed in the Silicon Labs Gecko Bootloader used in the
PrismaSet Active - Wireless Panel Server.
The PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server https://www.se.com/ww/en/product-range/39982243-prismaset-p-active/#products product is the latest generation of low-voltage switchboards,
natively connected to the cloud.
Failure to apply the mitigations provided below may risk unauthorized code execution, which could result in the
unavailability of the Prisma SeT Active Wireless Panel Server for Voltage loss monitoring.
Vulnerability Details: Schneider Electric is aware of a vulnerability disclosed in the Silicon Labs Gecko Bootloader used in the Wiser
AvatarOn 6K Freelocate and Wiser Cuadro H 5P Socket products.
The Wiser AvatarOn 6K Freelocate https://www.se.com/sg/en/product/E8334RWMZB_WE/wiser-avataron-battery-powered-pushbutton-4k-white/ and Wiser Cuadro H 5P Socket https://www.se.com/nz/en/product/PDL395CSG/grid-wiser-connected-double-socket-iconic-smart-10a-ble-default-240v/ are home automation products.
Failure to apply the mitigations provided below may risk buffer overflow vulnerability, which could result in
persistent code execution of the attacker’s code.
Legal Notice: All information products included in https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics are provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information about TLP, see https://us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp/.
Advisory Conversion Disclaimer: This ICSA is a verbatim republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2025-133-04 from a direct conversion of their vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided "as-is" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Schneider Electric CPCERT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
Critical infrastructure sectors: Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Energy
Countries/areas deployed: Worldwide
Company headquarters location: France
Recommended Practices: CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
Recommended Practices: Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
Recommended Practices: Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
Recommended Practices: When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
Recommended Practices: CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Recommended Practices: CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
Recommended Practices: CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
Recommended Practices: Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow'), Out-of-bounds Write, Download of Code Without Integrity Check vulnerability in Silicon Labs Gecko Bootloader on ARM (Firmware Update File Parser modules) allows Code Injection, Authentication Bypass.This issue affects 'Standalone' and 'Application' versions of Gecko Bootloader.
9.8 (Critical)
Affected products
Known affected
1 product
| Product | Identifier | Version | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Schneider Electric PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server All versions
Schneider Electric / PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server
|
vers:all/* |
Mitigation
|
References
11 references
{
"document": {
"acknowledgments": [
{
"organization": "Schneider Electric CPCERT",
"summary": "reporting this vulnerability to CISA."
}
],
"category": "csaf_security_advisory",
"csaf_version": "2.0",
"distribution": {
"text": "Disclosure is not limited",
"tlp": {
"label": "WHITE",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp/"
}
},
"lang": "en-US",
"notes": [
{
"category": "general",
"text": "We strongly recommend the following industry cybersecurity best practices.\n* Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network.\n* Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks.\n* Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the \u201cProgram\u201d mode.\n* Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device.\n* Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks.\n* Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation.\n* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.\n* When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices.\n\nFor more information refer to the Schneider Electric Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/ document. ",
"title": "General Security Recommendations"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "This document provides an overview of the identified vulnerability or vulnerabilities and actions required to mitigate. For more details and assistance on how to protect your installation, contact your local Schneider Electric representative or Schneider Electric Industrial Cybersecurity Services: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/solutions/cybersecurity/. These organizations will be fully aware of this situation and can support you through the process.\n\n Customers should use appropriate patching methodologies when applying these patches to their systems. We\r\nstrongly recommend the use of back-ups and evaluating the impact of these patches in a Test and\r\nDevelopment environment or on an offline infrastructure. Contact Schneider Electric\u2019s Customer Care Center if\r\nyou need assistance removing a patch.\n\nFor further information related to cybersecurity in Schneider Electric\u2019s products, visit the company\u2019s cybersecurity support portal page: https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp",
"title": "For More Information"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "THIS NOTIFICATION DOCUMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, AND ANY MATERIALS LINKED FROM IT (COLLECTIVELY, THIS \u201cNOTIFICATION\u201d) ARE INTENDED TO HELP PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION AND SUGGESTED MITIGATION ACTIONS, REMEDIATION, FIX, AND/OR GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IS PROVIDED ON AN \u201cAS-IS\u201d BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES RELATING TO THIS NOTIFICATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT THE NOTIFICATION WILL RESOLVE THE IDENTIFIED SITUATION. IN NO EVENT SHALL SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR LOSSES WHATSOEVER IN CONNECTION WITH THIS NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION IS AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND YOU ARE SOLELY LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO YOUR SYSTEMS OR ASSETS OR OTHER LOSSES THAT MAY RESULT FROM YOUR USE OF THIS NOTIFICATION. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC RESERVES THE RIGHT TO UPDATE OR CHANGE THIS NOTIFICATION AT ANY TIME AND IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION",
"title": "LEGAL DISCLAIMER"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Schneider\u0027s purpose is to create Impact by empowering all to make the most of our energy and resources, bridging progress and\r\nsustainability for all. We call this Life Is On.\n\nOur mission is to be the trusted partner in Sustainability and Efficiency.\n\nWe are a global industrial technology leader bringing world-leading expertise in electrification, automation and digitization to smart\r\nindustries, resilient infrastructure, future-proof data centers, intelligent buildings, and intuitive homes. Anchored by our deep\r\ndomain expertise, we provide integrated end-to-end lifecycle AI enabled Industrial IoT solutions with connected products, automation,\r\nsoftware and services, delivering digital twins to enable profitable growth for our customers.\n\nWe are a people company with an ecosystem of 150,000 colleagues and more than a million partners operating in over 100 countries\r\nto ensure proximity to our customers and stakeholders. We embrace diversity and inclusion in everything we do, guided by our\r\nmeaningful purpose of a sustainable future for all.",
"title": "About Schneider Electric"
},
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "Schneider Electric is aware of a vulnerability disclosed in the Silicon Labs Gecko Bootloader used in the \r\nPrismaSet Active - Wireless Panel Server. \r\n\nThe PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server https://www.se.com/ww/en/product-range/39982243-prismaset-p-active/#products product is the latest generation of low-voltage switchboards, \r\n\nnatively connected to the cloud. \r\nFailure to apply the mitigations provided below may risk unauthorized code execution, which could result in the\r\nunavailability of the Prisma SeT Active Wireless Panel Server for Voltage loss monitoring. ",
"title": "Overview"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Schneider Electric is aware of a vulnerability disclosed in the Silicon Labs Gecko Bootloader used in the Wiser \r\nAvatarOn 6K Freelocate and Wiser Cuadro H 5P Socket products. \r\n\nThe Wiser AvatarOn 6K Freelocate https://www.se.com/sg/en/product/E8334RWMZB_WE/wiser-avataron-battery-powered-pushbutton-4k-white/ and Wiser Cuadro H 5P Socket https://www.se.com/nz/en/product/PDL395CSG/grid-wiser-connected-double-socket-iconic-smart-10a-ble-default-240v/ are home automation products. \r\n\nFailure to apply the mitigations provided below may risk buffer overflow vulnerability, which could result in \r\npersistent code execution of the attacker\u2019s code. ",
"title": "Vulnerability Details"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "All information products included in https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics are provided \"as is\" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information about TLP, see https://us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp/.",
"title": "Legal Notice"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "This ICSA is a verbatim republication of Schneider Electric CPCERT SEVD-2025-133-04 from a direct conversion of their vendor\u0027s Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA\u0027s website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided \"as-is\" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Schneider Electric CPCERT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.",
"title": "Advisory Conversion Disclaimer"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Energy",
"title": "Critical infrastructure sectors"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "Worldwide",
"title": "Countries/areas deployed"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "France",
"title": "Company headquarters location"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
}
],
"publisher": {
"category": "other",
"contact_details": "central@cisa.dhs.gov",
"name": "CISA",
"namespace": "https://www.cisa.gov/"
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "Schneider Electric PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server - SEVD-2025-133-04 CSAF Version",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2025-133-04\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=sevd-2025-133-04.json"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "Schneider Electric PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server - SEVD-2025-133-04 PDF Version",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2025-133-04\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=sevd-2025-133-04.pdf"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices",
"url": "https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "ICS Advisory ICSA-25-140-06 JSON",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2025/icsa-25-140-06.json"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "ICS Advisory ICSA-25-140-06 - Web Version",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-140-06"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-10-301-01"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/ics-recommended-practices"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/industrial-control-systems"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cybersecurity_Best_Practices_for_Industrial_Control_Systems.pdf"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B"
}
],
"title": "Schneider Electric PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server",
"tracking": {
"current_release_date": "2025-05-13T04:00:00.000000Z",
"generator": {
"date": "2025-05-20T15:04:30.214150Z",
"engine": {
"name": "CISA CSAF Generator",
"version": "1.0.0"
}
},
"id": "ICSA-25-140-06",
"initial_release_date": "2025-05-13T04:00:00.000000Z",
"revision_history": [
{
"date": "2025-05-13T04:00:00.000000Z",
"number": "1.0.0",
"summary": "Original Release"
}
],
"status": "final",
"version": "1.0.0"
}
},
"product_tree": {
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:all/*",
"product": {
"name": "Schneider Electric PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server All versions",
"product_id": "CSAFPID-0001"
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server"
}
],
"category": "vendor",
"name": "Schneider Electric"
}
]
},
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2023-4041",
"cwe": {
"id": "CWE-120",
"name": "Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input (\u0027Classic Buffer Overflow\u0027)"
},
"notes": [
{
"category": "description",
"text": "Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input (\u0027Classic Buffer Overflow\u0027), Out-of-bounds Write, Download of Code Without Integrity Check vulnerability in Silicon Labs Gecko Bootloader on ARM (Firmware Update File Parser modules) allows Code Injection, Authentication Bypass.This issue affects \u0027Standalone\u0027 and \u0027Application\u0027 versions of Gecko Bootloader.",
"title": "CVE Description"
}
],
"product_status": {
"known_affected": [
"CSAFPID-0001"
]
},
"remediations": [
{
"category": "mitigation",
"details": "PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server product has reached its end of life and \r\nis no longer supported. \r\n\nCustomers should immediately apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk \r\nof exploit:\r\n* Deactivate Bluetooth Low (BLE) communication of Wireless Panel Server \r\nwhen it is not in use.\r\n* Periodically review audit logs and/or EcoStruxure\u2122 Facility Expert App \r\nsecurity notifications to detect unexpected behaviors.\r\n* Regularly check the physical security of the Wireless Panel Server to \r\nprotect against unauthorized Bluetooth pairing.\r\n* Use only Schneider Electric official EcoStruxure\u2122 Power Commission \r\nApp and EcoStruxure\u2122 Facility Expert App available in Google Play Store \r\nand Apple App Store.\r\n* Do not use EcoStruxure Power Commission App and EcoStruxure\u2122\r\nFacility Expert App in rooted or jail-broken mobile devices.\r\n* Follow PrismaSeT Active - Wireless Panel Server Cybersecurity Recommendations https://www.productinfo.schneider-electric.com/wirelesspanelserverguide/viewer?docidentity=TPC_PanelServerCybersecurityRecomme-3453D816\u0026lang=en\u0026extension=xml\u0026manualidentity=UserGuideWirelessPanelServerWHENPUB-5475323F",
"product_ids": [
"CSAFPID-0001"
],
"restart_required": {
"category": "none"
}
}
],
"scores": [
{
"cvss_v3": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"environmentalScore": 9.8,
"environmentalSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"temporalScore": 9.8,
"temporalSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"products": [
"CSAFPID-0001"
]
}
],
"title": "CVE-2023-4041"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.