GHSA-X567-49G5-P4CF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 21:14 – Updated: 2026-10-28 21:14
VLAI
Summary
vLLM: Responses API bypasses trust_request_chat_template for chat_template_kwargs
Details

Summary

vLLM's /v1/responses endpoint accepts request-level chat_template_kwargs, but does not apply the --trust-request-chat-template gate that protects Chat Completions, render, tokenize, and pooling paths.

When the server is run with the documented default trust_request_chat_template=False and no explicit --chat-template, a Responses request can pass:

{"chat_template_kwargs": {"chat_template": "<attacker Jinja template>"}}

That key is preserved by ChatParams.get_apply_chat_template_kwargs() and then bound as the chat_template parameter to the shared HF renderer. Prior vLLM advisories establish that request-controlled Jinja chat templates can cause CPU/memory exhaustion. This report covers the current-head Responses sibling path missed by the earlier fixes.

Technical Details

The shared OpenAI frontend has a validation helper that rejects request-supplied chat templates unless the trust flag is enabled. It explicitly checks both top-level chat_template and chat_template_kwargs["chat_template"].

Responses is a separate serving path:

  • vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py exposes chat_template_kwargs.
  • ResponsesRequest.build_chat_params() merges request kwargs.
  • OpenAIServingResponses._effective_chat_template_kwargs() uses those kwargs.
  • ChatParams.get_apply_chat_template_kwargs() preserves a request chat_template key when the server chat template is None.
  • vllm/renderers/hf.py unpacks the result into safe_apply_chat_template.

There is no equivalent trust gate in vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py.

Impact

An authenticated caller who can submit /v1/responses requests can supply a request-controlled Jinja chat template despite the trust flag being disabled. The expected fixed behavior is the same as Chat Completions: reject chat_template_kwargs["chat_template"] unless the server was started with --trust-request-chat-template.

Suggested Fix

  • Add trust_request_chat_template to OpenAIServingResponses.
  • Pass args.trust_request_chat_template when constructing the Responses serving object.
  • Reject request.chat_template_kwargs["chat_template"] before rendering when trust is false.
  • Keep ordinary kwargs such as enable_thinking working.
  • Add regression tests for default-deny and opt-in-allow behavior on /v1/responses.

Affected Package/Versions

Source sweep found the affected shape in:

  • v0.16.0
  • v0.18.0
  • v0.20.0
  • v0.21.0
  • v0.22.0
  • v0.22.1
  • v0.23.0
  • current checkout 470229c37efaf69c86e8bc97482b0b1ff7551c65
  • current origin/main b3f0a0a0df76dda92ec4b2c9335f77e84adad911

Suggested affected range:

>= 0.16.0, <= 0.23.0

Appendix: Duplicate Research

This is related to, but distinct from:

  • GHSA-6fvq-23cw-5628 / CVE-2025-61620
  • GHSA-69j4-grxj-j64p / CVE-2025-62426

Those advisories establish the security impact of request-controlled Jinja templates and chat_template_kwargs, but they cover older Chat Completions/tokenize implementations. This report covers a current /v1/responses sibling path that still lacks the trust gate.

Local prior submissions this report..029 do not cover this root cause.

This advisory was fixed in MR50300.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vllm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.16.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.32.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-115918"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T21:14:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T18:17:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nvLLM\u0027s `/v1/responses` endpoint accepts request-level `chat_template_kwargs`, but does not apply the `--trust-request-chat-template` gate that protects Chat Completions, render, tokenize, and pooling paths.\n\nWhen the server is run with the documented default `trust_request_chat_template=False` and no explicit `--chat-template`, a Responses request can pass:\n\n```json\n{\"chat_template_kwargs\": {\"chat_template\": \"\u003cattacker Jinja template\u003e\"}}\n```\n\nThat key is preserved by `ChatParams.get_apply_chat_template_kwargs()` and then bound as the `chat_template` parameter to the shared HF renderer. Prior vLLM advisories establish that request-controlled Jinja chat templates can cause CPU/memory exhaustion. This report covers the current-head Responses sibling path missed by the earlier fixes.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe shared OpenAI frontend has a validation helper that rejects request-supplied chat templates unless the trust flag is enabled. It explicitly checks both top-level `chat_template` and `chat_template_kwargs[\"chat_template\"]`.\n\nResponses is a separate serving path:\n\n- `vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py` exposes `chat_template_kwargs`.\n- `ResponsesRequest.build_chat_params()` merges request kwargs.\n- `OpenAIServingResponses._effective_chat_template_kwargs()` uses those kwargs.\n- `ChatParams.get_apply_chat_template_kwargs()` preserves a request `chat_template` key when the server chat template is `None`.\n- `vllm/renderers/hf.py` unpacks the result into `safe_apply_chat_template`.\n\nThere is no equivalent trust gate in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/serving.py`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated caller who can submit `/v1/responses` requests can supply a request-controlled Jinja chat template despite the trust flag being disabled. The expected fixed behavior is the same as Chat Completions: reject `chat_template_kwargs[\"chat_template\"]` unless the server was started with `--trust-request-chat-template`.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n- Add `trust_request_chat_template` to `OpenAIServingResponses`.\n- Pass `args.trust_request_chat_template` when constructing the Responses serving object.\n- Reject `request.chat_template_kwargs[\"chat_template\"]` before rendering when trust is false.\n- Keep ordinary kwargs such as `enable_thinking` working.\n- Add regression tests for default-deny and opt-in-allow behavior on `/v1/responses`.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nSource sweep found the affected shape in:\n\n- `v0.16.0`\n- `v0.18.0`\n- `v0.20.0`\n- `v0.21.0`\n- `v0.22.0`\n- `v0.22.1`\n- `v0.23.0`\n- current checkout `470229c37efaf69c86e8bc97482b0b1ff7551c65`\n- current `origin/main` `b3f0a0a0df76dda92ec4b2c9335f77e84adad911`\n\nSuggested affected range:\n\n```text\n\u003e= 0.16.0, \u003c= 0.23.0\n```\n\n## Appendix: Duplicate Research\n\nThis is related to, but distinct from:\n\n- `GHSA-6fvq-23cw-5628` / `CVE-2025-61620`\n- `GHSA-69j4-grxj-j64p` / `CVE-2025-62426`\n\nThose advisories establish the security impact of request-controlled Jinja templates and `chat_template_kwargs`, but they cover older Chat Completions/tokenize implementations. This report covers a current `/v1/responses` sibling path that still lacks the trust gate.\n\nLocal prior submissions this report..029 do not cover this root cause.\n\nThis advisory was fixed in [MR50300](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/50300).",
  "id": "GHSA-x567-49g5-p4cf",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T21:14:59Z",
  "published": "2026-10-28T21:14:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-x567-49g5-p4cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115918"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/50300"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/cff08b461e086523cee8bba5bd3c66d302625134"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.32.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vLLM: Responses API bypasses trust_request_chat_template for chat_template_kwargs"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.