GHSA-WWC5-7R8X-52GG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-30 03:37
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow

klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path with the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It stores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies the payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but passes the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy:

count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, size, &port->lock);

When the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting two bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its end. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for the header as safe_serial already does.

Writing bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab out-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with dummy_hcd and raw-gadget:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0 Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3 kfifo_copy_out klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105] usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial] Allocated by task 139: usb_serial_probe [usbserial] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region

The out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53194"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow\n\nklsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path\nwith the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It\nstores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies\nthe payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but\npasses the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy:\n\n  count = kfifo_out_locked(\u0026port-\u003ewrite_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN,\n                           size, \u0026port-\u003elock);\n\nWhen the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting\ntwo bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its\nend. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for\nthe header as safe_serial already does.\n\nWriting bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab\nout-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with\ndummy_hcd and raw-gadget:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0\n  Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3\n   kfifo_copy_out\n   klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105]\n   usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial]\n  Allocated by task 139:\n   usb_serial_probe [usbserial]\n  The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region\n\nThe out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied.",
  "id": "GHSA-wwc5-7r8x-52gg",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T03:37:13Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T09:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492703"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a57320f71941d4e0b1307453c9a1f0939afe666"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14147b7963685957839c76ba8094924e22777d79"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/372f33ebed747d91870f57c0a2e62884a870bffa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60af1fd82983c26604102e63a3fcc822c186cceb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70d86e355c564b5510fde61361df014f5476c83e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96d47e40bf9db4a9efd5c8fb53287a508d165f14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1288cd700f721c1a119c4f1e8efa234e59caada"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bde742b076cbe26ecc89c8c68c76ae076a524d02"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-53194.json"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.