Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-W4QQ-74H6-58WQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 16:25 – Updated: 2026-05-19 16:25

Summary

AVideo: Unauthenticated Arbitrary Image Read via Path Traversal in `view/img/image404Raw.php`

Details

Summary

The endpoint requires no authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open — including private user-profile photos that the application's normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via .. traversal.

Details

view/img/image404Raw.php reads the image GET parameter and joins it directly into a filesystem path served via readfile(). view/img/image404Raw.php (full file, current master @ 0dbadbcaaa1b415c7db078a72dc4b26d9fac0485):

<?php

// Fetch requested image URL
$imageURL = !empty($_GET['image']) ? $_GET['image'] : $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
$rootDir = dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../';
if ($imageURL == 'favicon.ico') {
    $imgLocalFile = "{$rootDir}/videos/{$imageURL}";
} else {
    $imgLocalFile = "{$rootDir}/{$imageURL}";   // ← attacker-controlled
}

if (file_exists($imgLocalFile)) {
    $imageInfo = getimagesize($imgLocalFile);   // ← format gate
    if (empty($imageInfo)) {
        die('not image');
    }
    // …extension → Content-Type mapping…
    header("HTTP/1.0 200 OK");
    header('Content-Type: ' . $type);
    header('Content-Length: ' . filesize($imgLocalFile));
    readfile($imgLocalFile);   // ← exfil bytes
    exit;
}

Issues:

No authentication. The file is reachable via direct GET; no require of globals.php, no session check, no API-key gate.
No basename / realpath / prefix containment. $_GET['image'] is concatenated into $imgLocalFile with no .. filtering, no realpath() resolution, no allowlist check against the intended view/img/ directory.
getimagesize() is a magic-bytes check, not a path constraint. Any file on disk whose first bytes match a recognized image format (FFD8FF JPEG, 89504E47 PNG, 474946 GIF, 52494646…57454250 WebP) passes the gate — including images stored outside any ACL'd area of the application.
$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] fallback when image is empty widens the attack surface (path components in the URI itself land in $imgLocalFile).

Re-verified pre-submission on 2026-05-13 against view/img/image404Raw.php blob SHA c670b0faff4fbea1fd0508f179956975477d4340 — unsafe shape unchanged since first discovery on 2026-05-12.

Recommended fix — three layered checks, any one alone is insufficient:

// view/img/image404Raw.php — proposed fix
<?php

$imageURL = !empty($_GET['image']) ? $_GET['image'] : '';
if ($imageURL === '') {
    http_response_code(400);
    exit('bad request');
}

// 1. Reject any path-traversal segment outright.
if (strpos($imageURL, '..') !== false
    || strpos($imageURL, "\0") !== false
    || strpos($imageURL, '://') !== false) {
    http_response_code(400);
    exit('bad request');
}

// 2. Resolve to a real path and verify prefix containment under the
//    intended image directory.
$rootDir = realpath(dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../');
$imgLocalFile = realpath($rootDir . '/' . $imageURL);
if ($imgLocalFile === false
    || (strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . '/videos/') !== 0
        && strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . '/view/img/') !== 0)) {
    http_response_code(404);
    exit('not found');
}

// 3. Existing getimagesize() check stays as defense-in-depth.
if (!is_file($imgLocalFile)) {
    http_response_code(404);
    exit('not found');
}
$imageInfo = @getimagesize($imgLocalFile);
if (empty($imageInfo)) {
    http_response_code(404);
    exit('not image');
}

// …rest of the original Content-Type + readfile() flow unchanged…

Drop the $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] fallback entirely; if no image parameter is provided, return 400.

PoC

Discovery probe — any HTTP client, no authentication, no cookies:

GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg HTTP/1.1
Host: avideo.example.com

If videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg exists on the server, the response is the raw image bytes (HTTP 200, Content-Type: image/jpeg). The application's normal user-photo serving wrapper (which can gate by session / channel ownership) is bypassed entirely.

Cross-directory probe — read images outside the AVideo install root:

GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../../../var/www/other-app/uploads/users/admin.jpg HTTP/1.1
Host: avideo.example.com

If the PHP user has read access to a sibling app's image directory, those files are exfiltrable too.

Enumeration — iterate over predictable numeric IDs:

GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg
GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo2.jpg
GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo3.jpg
...

…to harvest all profile images regardless of the application's intended privacy controls.

Impact

Path traversal → arbitrary image read (CWE-22 + CWE-284). Affects any AVideo deployment running master through commit 0dbadbca and likely every release on the supported branches. The attacker:

Bypasses the application's image-content ACLs. Profile photos under videos/userPhoto/ and admin-uploaded private thumbnails that AVideo's normal image-serving wrappers gate by session / channel ownership become readable to any anonymous internet user.
Reads images stored outside the AVideo install root. On shared-hosting / multi-tenant deployments, .. traversal lets the attacker page into sibling-app upload directories — anywhere the PHP user has read access on disk and the target file's first bytes form a valid image header.
Enables enumeration at scale. Numeric ID schemes (photo1.jpg, photo2.jpg, …) and predictable filenames let an attacker harvest every private image on a deployment without detection (each request looks like a single 200-image-OK to the web log).

Because the read primitive is restricted to image-magic-bytes files, there is no source-code or credential exfiltration via this primitive alone — but the privacy / GDPR exposure is substantial on any deployment that hosts user-uploaded photos. CVSS 5.3 (Medium) reflects the limited but real confidentiality impact; many operators will rate this higher because the leaked content is user-private by intent.

This is not a silent-fix disclosure — the bug is still present on current master at submission time; the maintainer is being notified of a previously-unknown issue.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "WWBN/AVideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46337"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T16:25:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe endpoint requires **no authentication**. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open \u2014 including private user-profile photos that the application\u0027s normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via `..` traversal.\n\n### Details\n`view/img/image404Raw.php` reads the `image` GET parameter and joins it directly into a filesystem path served via `readfile()`.  `view/img/image404Raw.php` (full file, current `master` @ `0dbadbcaaa1b415c7db078a72dc4b26d9fac0485`):\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\n\n// Fetch requested image URL\n$imageURL = !empty($_GET[\u0027image\u0027]) ? $_GET[\u0027image\u0027] : $_SERVER[\"REQUEST_URI\"];\n$rootDir = dirname(__FILE__) . \u0027/../../\u0027;\nif ($imageURL == \u0027favicon.ico\u0027) {\n    $imgLocalFile = \"{$rootDir}/videos/{$imageURL}\";\n} else {\n    $imgLocalFile = \"{$rootDir}/{$imageURL}\";   // \u2190 attacker-controlled\n}\n\nif (file_exists($imgLocalFile)) {\n    $imageInfo = getimagesize($imgLocalFile);   // \u2190 format gate\n    if (empty($imageInfo)) {\n        die(\u0027not image\u0027);\n    }\n    // \u2026extension \u2192 Content-Type mapping\u2026\n    header(\"HTTP/1.0 200 OK\");\n    header(\u0027Content-Type: \u0027 . $type);\n    header(\u0027Content-Length: \u0027 . filesize($imgLocalFile));\n    readfile($imgLocalFile);   // \u2190 exfil bytes\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\nIssues:\n\n1. **No authentication.** The file is reachable via direct GET; no `require` of `globals.php`, no session check, no API-key gate.\n2. **No basename / realpath / prefix containment.** `$_GET[\u0027image\u0027]`  is concatenated into `$imgLocalFile` with no `..` filtering, no `realpath()` resolution, no allowlist check against the intended `view/img/` directory.\n3. **`getimagesize()` is a magic-bytes check, not a path constraint.**  Any file on disk whose first bytes match a recognized image format (`FFD8FF` JPEG, `89504E47` PNG, `474946` GIF, `52494646\u202657454250` WebP) passes the gate \u2014 including images stored outside any ACL\u0027d area of the application.\n4. **`$_SERVER[\"REQUEST_URI\"]` fallback** when `image` is empty widens the attack surface (path components in the URI itself land in `$imgLocalFile`).\n\n**Re-verified pre-submission** on 2026-05-13 against `view/img/image404Raw.php` blob SHA `c670b0faff4fbea1fd0508f179956975477d4340` \u2014 unsafe shape unchanged since first discovery on 2026-05-12.\n\n**Recommended fix** \u2014 three layered checks, any one alone is insufficient:\n\n```php\n// view/img/image404Raw.php \u2014 proposed fix\n\u003c?php\n\n$imageURL = !empty($_GET[\u0027image\u0027]) ? $_GET[\u0027image\u0027] : \u0027\u0027;\nif ($imageURL === \u0027\u0027) {\n    http_response_code(400);\n    exit(\u0027bad request\u0027);\n}\n\n// 1. Reject any path-traversal segment outright.\nif (strpos($imageURL, \u0027..\u0027) !== false\n    || strpos($imageURL, \"\\0\") !== false\n    || strpos($imageURL, \u0027://\u0027) !== false) {\n    http_response_code(400);\n    exit(\u0027bad request\u0027);\n}\n\n// 2. Resolve to a real path and verify prefix containment under the\n//    intended image directory.\n$rootDir = realpath(dirname(__FILE__) . \u0027/../../\u0027);\n$imgLocalFile = realpath($rootDir . \u0027/\u0027 . $imageURL);\nif ($imgLocalFile === false\n    || (strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . \u0027/videos/\u0027) !== 0\n        \u0026\u0026 strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . \u0027/view/img/\u0027) !== 0)) {\n    http_response_code(404);\n    exit(\u0027not found\u0027);\n}\n\n// 3. Existing getimagesize() check stays as defense-in-depth.\nif (!is_file($imgLocalFile)) {\n    http_response_code(404);\n    exit(\u0027not found\u0027);\n}\n$imageInfo = @getimagesize($imgLocalFile);\nif (empty($imageInfo)) {\n    http_response_code(404);\n    exit(\u0027not image\u0027);\n}\n\n// \u2026rest of the original Content-Type + readfile() flow unchanged\u2026\n```\n\nDrop the `$_SERVER[\"REQUEST_URI\"]` fallback entirely; if no `image`\nparameter is provided, return 400.\n\n### PoC\n\nDiscovery probe \u2014 any HTTP client, no authentication, no cookies:\n\n```http\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg HTTP/1.1\nHost: avideo.example.com\n```\n\nIf `videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg` exists on the server, the response is the raw image bytes (HTTP 200, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`). The application\u0027s normal user-photo serving wrapper (which can gate by session / channel ownership) is bypassed entirely.\n\nCross-directory probe \u2014 read images outside the AVideo install root:\n\n```http\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../../../var/www/other-app/uploads/users/admin.jpg HTTP/1.1\nHost: avideo.example.com\n```\n\nIf the PHP user has read access to a sibling app\u0027s image directory, those files are exfiltrable too.\n\nEnumeration \u2014 iterate over predictable numeric IDs:\n\n```\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo2.jpg\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo3.jpg\n...\n```\n\n\u2026to harvest all profile images regardless of the application\u0027s intended privacy controls.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Path traversal \u2192 arbitrary image read (CWE-22 + CWE-284).** Affects any AVideo deployment running master through commit `0dbadbca` and likely every release on the supported branches. The attacker:\n\n1. **Bypasses the application\u0027s image-content ACLs.** Profile photos under `videos/userPhoto/` and admin-uploaded private thumbnails  that AVideo\u0027s normal image-serving wrappers gate by session / channel ownership become readable to any anonymous internet user.\n2. **Reads images stored outside the AVideo install root.** On shared-hosting / multi-tenant deployments, `..` traversal lets the  attacker page into sibling-app upload directories \u2014 anywhere the PHP user has read access on disk and the target file\u0027s first bytes form a valid image header.\n3. **Enables enumeration at scale.** Numeric ID schemes (`photo1.jpg`, `photo2.jpg`, \u2026) and predictable filenames let an attacker harvest every private image on a deployment without detection (each request looks like a single 200-image-OK to the web log).\n\nBecause the read primitive is restricted to image-magic-bytes files, there is no source-code or credential exfiltration via this primitive alone \u2014 but the **privacy / GDPR exposure** is substantial on any deployment that hosts user-uploaded photos. CVSS 5.3 (Medium) reflects the limited but real confidentiality impact; many operators will rate this higher because the leaked content is user-private by intent.\n\nThis is **not** a silent-fix disclosure \u2014 the bug is still present on current `master` at submission time; the maintainer is being\nnotified of a previously-unknown issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T16:25:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T16:25:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Unauthenticated Arbitrary Image Read via Path Traversal in `view/img/image404Raw.php`"
}

CVE-2026-46337 (GCVE-0-2026-46337)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-29 13:03 – Updated: 2026-05-29 16:21

Title

WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Arbitrary Image Read via Path Traversal in `view/img/image404Raw.php`

Summary

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, an unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open — including private user-profile photos that the application's normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via .. traversal. The endpoint requires no authentication.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
WWBN	AVideo	Affected: <= 29.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-46337",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-29T16:21:04.888967Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-29T16:21:29.279Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "AVideo",
          "vendor": "WWBN",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 29.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, an unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open \u2014 including private user-profile photos that the application\u0027s normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via .. traversal. The endpoint requires no authentication."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6.9,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-29T13:03:01.529Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Arbitrary Image Read via Path Traversal in `view/img/image404Raw.php`"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-46337",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-29T13:03:01.529Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-13T18:37:30.989Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-29T16:21:29.279Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-W4QQ-74H6-58WQ

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-46337 (GCVE-0-2026-46337)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature