Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-VWG8-CR9J-895F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 00:30 – Updated: 2026-08-26 21:31

Details

Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl allow the second-factor attempt limit to be reset by replaying an earlier session cookie because the challenge route counts failures in the session.

The POST handler on challenge_path keeps the failure count as tries inside the totp_pending record in the session, raising it on each rejected code and deleting the pending record once it reaches attempts, five by default. Punk::Session carries the session in a signed cookie unless the application declares a store, and keeps no server-side record, so an earlier value of the same session stays valid until the expiry stamped inside it. A client that saves the cookie before its failed attempts and presents it again gets the pending record back with its counter, and the limit never fires. The replayed record is accepted while its own expiry, pending_ttl seconds from the challenge and 300 by default, has not passed.

Sessions declared with a store are not affected: the pending record and its counter then live server-side.

The attempt limit does not bound guessing of the second factor, which is left to the per-address rate limit the plugin registers on the same path, 30 requests per 60 seconds.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78655"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-307"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T22:17:06Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl allow the second-factor attempt limit to be reset by replaying an earlier session cookie because the challenge route counts failures in the session.\n\nThe POST handler on challenge_path keeps the failure count as tries inside the totp_pending record in the session, raising it on each rejected code and deleting the pending record once it reaches attempts, five by default. Punk::Session carries the session in a signed cookie unless the application declares a store, and keeps no server-side record, so an earlier value of the same session stays valid until the expiry stamped inside it. A client that saves the cookie before its failed attempts and presents it again gets the pending record back with its counter, and the limit never fires. The replayed record is accepted while its own expiry, pending_ttl seconds from the challenge and 300 by default, has not passed.\n\nSessions declared with a store are not affected: the pending record and its counter then live server-side.\n\nThe attempt limit does not bound guessing of the second factor, which is left to the per-address rate limit the plugin registers on the same path, 30 requests per 60 seconds.",
  "id": "GHSA-vwg8-cr9j-895f",
  "modified": "2026-08-26T21:31:39Z",
  "published": "2026-08-26T00:30:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78655"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-0.32/view/lib/Punk/Session.pm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/source/include/ptotp/ptotp_plugin.h"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/view/lib/Punk/Plugin/TOTP.pm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.05/source/Changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/25/7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-78655 (GCVE-0-2026-78655)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-25 21:23 – Updated: 2026-08-26 18:44

Title

Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl allow the second-factor attempt limit to be reset by replaying an earlier session cookie because the challenge route counts failures in the session

Summary

Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl allow the second-factor attempt limit to be reset by replaying an earlier session cookie because the challenge route counts failures in the session. The POST handler on challenge_path keeps the failure count as tries inside the totp_pending record in the session, raising it on each rejected code and deleting the pending record once it reaches attempts, five by default. Punk::Session carries the session in a signed cookie unless the application declares a store, and keeps no server-side record, so an earlier value of the same session stays valid until the expiry stamped inside it. A client that saves the cookie before its failed attempts and presents it again gets the pending record back with its counter, and the limit never fires. The replayed record is accepted while its own expiry, pending_ttl seconds from the challenge and 300 by default, has not passed. Sessions declared with a store are not affected: the pending record and its counter then live server-side. The attempt limit does not bound guessing of the second factor, which is left to the per-address rate limit the plugin registers on the same path, 30 requests per 60 seconds.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-26 18:43 UTC

CWE

CWE-307 - Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
CWE-642 - External Control of Critical State Data

Assigner

CPANSec redhat root

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.…	technical-description
https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.…	technical-description
https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-0.32/vi…	related
https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.…	release-notes
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/25/7

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
		Affected: 0 , < 0.05 (custom)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-25T23:07:24.336Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/25/7"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      },
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "cvssV3_1": {
              "attackComplexity": "LOW",
              "attackVector": "NETWORK",
              "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
              "baseScore": 9.1,
              "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
              "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
              "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
              "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
              "scope": "UNCHANGED",
              "userInteraction": "NONE",
              "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
              "version": "3.1"
            }
          },
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-78655",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-26T18:43:41.983076Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T18:44:53.718Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "Punk::Plugin::TOTP"
          ],
          "packageName": "Punk-TOTP",
          "packageURL": "pkg:cpan/Punk-TOTP",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/ptotp/ptotp_plugin.h"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "pp_r_post"
            },
            {
              "name": "pp_set_pending"
            }
          ],
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.05",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl allow the second-factor attempt limit to be reset by replaying an earlier session cookie because the challenge route counts failures in the session.\n\nThe POST handler on challenge_path keeps the failure count as tries inside the totp_pending record in the session, raising it on each rejected code and deleting the pending record once it reaches attempts, five by default. Punk::Session carries the session in a signed cookie unless the application declares a store, and keeps no server-side record, so an earlier value of the same session stays valid until the expiry stamped inside it. A client that saves the cookie before its failed attempts and presents it again gets the pending record back with its counter, and the limit never fires. The replayed record is accepted while its own expiry, pending_ttl seconds from the challenge and 300 by default, has not passed.\n\nSessions declared with a store are not affected: the pending record and its counter then live server-side.\n\nThe attempt limit does not bound guessing of the second factor, which is left to the per-address rate limit the plugin registers on the same path, 30 requests per 60 seconds."
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-307",
              "description": "CWE-307 Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-642",
              "description": "CWE-642 External Control of Critical State Data",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-25T21:23:48.494Z",
        "orgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
        "shortName": "CPANSec"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/source/include/ptotp/ptotp_plugin.h"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/view/lib/Punk/Plugin/TOTP.pm"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-0.32/view/lib/Punk/Session.pm"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "release-notes"
          ],
          "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.05/source/Changes"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Upgrade to Punk-TOTP 0.05 or later, and add the two columns the count is kept in to the user table (totp_failed and totp_failed_at by default, named by fields)."
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl allow the second-factor attempt limit to be reset by replaying an earlier session cookie because the challenge route counts failures in the session",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "For deployments that cannot upgrade to 0.05, declare the session keyword with a store, which needs a Punk::Cache backend shared between workers. The cookie then carries only an opaque id and the counter is out of the client\u0027s reach."
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
    "assignerShortName": "CPANSec",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-78655",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-25T21:23:48.494Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-24T23:12:17.196Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T18:44:53.718Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-VWG8-CR9J-895F

CVE-2026-78655 (GCVE-0-2026-78655)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature