Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-VRG5-XM7Q-QCJH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-10 18:31

Details

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to obtain paid resources by resubmitting one settled on-chain transfer.

MPP.Methods.EVM.verify/2 accepts a transaction-hash credential and matches a transfer purely on token, to and amount (ERC-20) or to and value (native). It binds the proof neither to the challenge being verified nor to any record of prior use, and the generic MPP.Plug dedup store keys on challenge.id, which is regenerated for every 402 response. On a static-price route, a single historical transfer matching the charge therefore satisfies an unbounded number of later charges, including transfers an attacker can read off a public block explorer.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.3.0 before 0.6.3.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67581"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-294"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T18:17:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to obtain paid resources by resubmitting one settled on-chain transfer.\n\nMPP.Methods.EVM.verify/2 accepts a transaction-hash credential and matches a transfer purely on token, to and amount (ERC-20) or to and value (native). It binds the proof neither to the challenge being verified nor to any record of prior use, and the generic MPP.Plug dedup store keys on challenge.id, which is regenerated for every 402 response. On a static-price route, a single historical transfer matching the charge therefore satisfies an unbounded number of later charges, including transfers an attacker can read off a public block explorer.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.3.0 before 0.6.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrg5-xm7q-qcjh",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T18:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T18:32:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-vp5h-xh25-44wf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67581"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/ecc038088b1cda09ad8a84acc6cc112addb4a68f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-67581.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-67581"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-67581 (GCVE-0-2026-67581)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-19 17:20 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:44

Title

On-chain transfer proof is not single-use in mpp EVM payment method, enabling cross-challenge replay

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to obtain paid resources by resubmitting one settled on-chain transfer. MPP.Methods.EVM.verify/2 accepts a transaction-hash credential and matches a transfer purely on token, to and amount (ERC-20) or to and value (native). It binds the proof neither to the challenge being verified nor to any record of prior use, and the generic MPP.Plug dedup store keys on challenge.id, which is regenerated for every 402 response. On a static-price route, a single historical transfer matching the charge therefore satisfies an unbounded number of later charges, including transfers an attacker can read off a public block explorer. This issue affects mpp: from 0.3.0 before 0.6.3.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-19 18:43 UTC

CWE

CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

Assigner

EEF CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard A 97/100 over 314 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisorie…	vendor-advisoryrelated
https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-67581.html	related
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-67581	related
https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/ecc038088b1…	patch

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
ZenHive	mpp	Affected: 0.3.0 , < 0.6.3 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp::::::::
ZenHive	mpp	Affected: 65b9e425ce27631c786a5b380b5e4c5ae607ec6d , < ecc038088b1cda09ad8a84acc6cc112addb4a68f (git) cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp::::::::

Date Public

2026-07-06 00:00

Credits

E.FU E.FU Jonatan Männchen / EEF

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JSON

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        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-67581",
                "options": [
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                  },
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                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-19T18:43:43.808136Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
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              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.EVM\u0027:verify/2"
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          ],
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          "vendor": "ZenHive",
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              "lessThan": "0.6.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.3.0",
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          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
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          "packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp",
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            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
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              "cpeMatch": [
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                  "versionEndExcluding": "0.6.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "0.3.0",
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                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
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          ],
          "operator": "AND"
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
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          "type": "finder",
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        },
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          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "E.FU"
        },
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          "lang": "en",
          "type": "analyst",
          "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
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      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-07-06T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eAuthentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to obtain paid resources by resubmitting one settled on-chain transfer.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.EVM.verify/2\u003c/code\u003e accepts a transaction-hash credential and matches a transfer purely on \u003ccode\u003etoken\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eto\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eamount\u003c/code\u003e (ERC-20) or \u003ccode\u003eto\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003evalue\u003c/code\u003e (native). It binds the proof neither to the challenge being verified nor to any record of prior use, and the generic \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Plug\u003c/code\u003e dedup store keys on \u003ccode\u003echallenge.id\u003c/code\u003e, which is regenerated for every 402 response. On a static-price route, a single historical transfer matching the charge therefore satisfies an unbounded number of later charges, including transfers an attacker can read off a public block explorer.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.3.0 before 0.6.3.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
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        }
      ],
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      "metrics": [
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            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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            "baseScore": 8.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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      "title": "On-chain transfer proof is not single-use in mpp EVM payment method, enabling cross-challenge replay",
      "workarounds": [
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003ePrice each challenge uniquely (per-challenge or single-use amounts) so that a historical transfer cannot match a later charge, and keep challenge expiry short to narrow the window in which any given transfer stays useful. Deployments that can use the Tempo method for on-chain payments get per-challenge attribution binding instead.\u003c/p\u003e"
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            {
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              "type": "text/markdown",
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            }
          ],
          "value": "Price each challenge uniquely (per-challenge or single-use amounts) so that a historical transfer cannot match a later charge, and keep challenge expiry short to narrow the window in which any given transfer stays useful. Deployments that can use the Tempo method for on-chain payments get per-challenge attribution binding instead."
        }
      ]
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    "datePublished": "2026-08-19T17:20:09.606Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-18T10:30:01.759Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:44:31.945Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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