GHSA-VR6J-92C6-9P78

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-09-19 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

clk: clk-loongson2: Fix memory corruption bug in struct loongson2_clk_provider

Some heap space is allocated for the flexible structure struct clk_hw_onecell_data and its flexible-array member hws through the composite structure struct loongson2_clk_provider in function loongson2_clk_probe(), as shown below:

289 struct loongson2_clk_provider *clp; ... 296 for (p = data; p->name; p++) 297 clks_num++; 298 299 clp = devm_kzalloc(dev, struct_size(clp, clk_data.hws, clks_num), 300 GFP_KERNEL);

Then some data is written into the flexible array:

350 clp->clk_data.hws[p->id] = hw;

This corrupts clk_lock, which is the spinlock variable immediately following the clk_data member in struct loongson2_clk_provider:

struct loongson2_clk_provider { void __iomem *base; struct device dev; struct clk_hw_onecell_data clk_data; spinlock_t clk_lock; / protect access to DIV registers */ };

The problem is that the flexible structure is currently placed in the middle of struct loongson2_clk_provider instead of at the end.

Fix this by moving struct clk_hw_onecell_data clk_data; to the end of struct loongson2_clk_provider. Also, add a code comment to help prevent this from happening again in case new members are added to the structure in the future.

This change also fixes the following -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warning:

drivers/clk/clk-loongson2.c:32:36: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-53193"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T14:15:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclk: clk-loongson2: Fix memory corruption bug in struct loongson2_clk_provider\n\nSome heap space is allocated for the flexible structure `struct\nclk_hw_onecell_data` and its flexible-array member `hws` through\nthe composite structure `struct loongson2_clk_provider` in function\n`loongson2_clk_probe()`, as shown below:\n\n289         struct loongson2_clk_provider *clp;\n\t...\n296         for (p = data; p-\u003ename; p++)\n297                 clks_num++;\n298\n299         clp = devm_kzalloc(dev, struct_size(clp, clk_data.hws, clks_num),\n300                            GFP_KERNEL);\n\nThen some data is written into the flexible array:\n\n350                 clp-\u003eclk_data.hws[p-\u003eid] = hw;\n\nThis corrupts `clk_lock`, which is the spinlock variable immediately\nfollowing the `clk_data` member in `struct loongson2_clk_provider`:\n\nstruct loongson2_clk_provider {\n\tvoid __iomem *base;\n\tstruct device *dev;\n\tstruct clk_hw_onecell_data clk_data;\n\tspinlock_t clk_lock;\t/* protect access to DIV registers */\n};\n\nThe problem is that the flexible structure is currently placed in the\nmiddle of `struct loongson2_clk_provider` instead of at the end.\n\nFix this by moving `struct clk_hw_onecell_data clk_data;` to the end of\n`struct loongson2_clk_provider`. Also, add a code comment to help\nprevent this from happening again in case new members are added to the\nstructure in the future.\n\nThis change also fixes the following -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end\nwarning:\n\ndrivers/clk/clk-loongson2.c:32:36: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]",
  "id": "GHSA-vr6j-92c6-9p78",
  "modified": "2025-09-19T18:31:18Z",
  "published": "2024-12-27T15:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53193"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/145de18065b9840687d9b4e63746238c1da25d22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e4bf018bb040955da53dae9f8628ef8fcec2dbe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76918202615f2ba7deda14901d9fff528a180099"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.