GHSA-VP7W-82CM-HJ3H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 12:31
VLAI
Details

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.

When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.

The wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59252"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T11:17:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp7w-82cm-hj3h",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T12:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-07-17T12:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59252"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/d84e3e528db39654540c2035ea0fbdf7b950d3d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-59252.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-59252"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…