GHSA-VP7W-82CM-HJ3H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 12:31Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.
When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.
The wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59252"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T11:17:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.",
"id": "GHSA-vp7w-82cm-hj3h",
"modified": "2026-07-17T12:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T12:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59252"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/d84e3e528db39654540c2035ea0fbdf7b950d3d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-59252.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-59252"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.