GHSA-VHGW-Q6Q5-V9W3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:36In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix out-of-bounds read on option matching
In nf_osf_match(), the nf_osf_hdr_ctx structure is initialized once and passed by reference to nf_osf_match_one() for each fingerprint checked. During TCP option parsing, nf_osf_match_one() advances the shared ctx->optp pointer.
If a fingerprint perfectly matches, the function returns early without restoring ctx->optp to its initial state. If the user has configured NF_OSF_LOGLEVEL_ALL, the loop continues to the next fingerprint. However, because ctx->optp was not restored, the next call to nf_osf_match_one() starts parsing from the end of the options buffer. This causes subsequent matches to read garbage data and fail immediately, making it impossible to log more than one match or logging incorrect matches.
Instead of using a shared ctx->optp pointer, pass the context as a constant pointer and use a local pointer (optp) for TCP option traversal. This makes nf_osf_match_one() strictly stateless from the caller's perspective, ensuring every fingerprint check starts at the correct option offset.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52999"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix out-of-bounds read on option matching\n\nIn nf_osf_match(), the nf_osf_hdr_ctx structure is initialized once\nand passed by reference to nf_osf_match_one() for each fingerprint\nchecked. During TCP option parsing, nf_osf_match_one() advances the\nshared ctx-\u003eoptp pointer.\n\nIf a fingerprint perfectly matches, the function returns early without\nrestoring ctx-\u003eoptp to its initial state. If the user has configured\nNF_OSF_LOGLEVEL_ALL, the loop continues to the next fingerprint.\nHowever, because ctx-\u003eoptp was not restored, the next call to\nnf_osf_match_one() starts parsing from the end of the options buffer.\nThis causes subsequent matches to read garbage data and fail\nimmediately, making it impossible to log more than one match or logging\nincorrect matches.\n\nInstead of using a shared ctx-\u003eoptp pointer, pass the context as a\nconstant pointer and use a local pointer (optp) for TCP option\ntraversal. This makes nf_osf_match_one() strictly stateless from the\ncaller\u0027s perspective, ensuring every fingerprint check starts at the\ncorrect option offset.",
"id": "GHSA-vhgw-q6q5-v9w3",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:36:12Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T18:32:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0145548346c4a30981a870a8ca00eac46ba27e85"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c136f2c44a5913646bac85303612fd0825197a0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e19a07291bb8682c14c39a64725a3ae54ab8ccc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21883587593d7c8bb519a79460a0b5bc5ffbdabd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32e50f92c7cf3f4eba29622179a5fcdc2aebab41"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70a3f31d25cf2ec9d4ddfa408120171ead955623"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edb78a142d2e5948e63647c0646aa7e7886935f0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5ca450087c3baf3651055e7a6de92600f827af3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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