GHSA-RW53-R2P7-QGMF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:32
VLAI
Details

A DHCP server, or anyone on the LAN who answers a DISCOVER first, can make the client read about a

kilobyte past the end of the received message.

The option walk keeps a pointer and an offset in step, and the only bound check uses the offset:




/* addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7538, 7572 */



while (i < length - 1)



{

    ...
    size = *(++data);      /* data moves 1: type -> length byte */
    data += size + 1;      /* data moves size + 1 more          */
    i += size + 1;         /* i moves only size + 1             */


}



A TLV option occupies size + 2 bytes. data is advanced by size + 2 in total, i by size + 1, so

the offset falls one byte behind the real read position for every option the walk skips. After

enough skipped options the check i < length - 1 still holds while data is already past the end

of the message, and the subsequent read of the type and length bytes comes from whatever follows.

A single OFFER carrying a long run of skippable options is enough:




ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow



READ of size 1 at 0x61b000000794 thread T5

    #0 _nx_dhcp_search_buffer     addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7541
    #1 _nx_dhcp_get_option_value  addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7082


0x61b000000794 is located 164 bytes to the right of 1648-byte region



A well formed OFFER through the same path is handled normally, the client records the offer and

moves to REQUESTING, so the difference is the option layout rather than the harness.

The read runs in the DHCP client thread while the client is still unconfigured, so it happens on

every boot in reach of a hostile DHCP responder. The values read are used to configure the

interface, which is how the disclosed bytes become observable.

Advance i by size + 2, or derive the bound from data rather than keeping a second counter.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102720"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T18:17:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A DHCP server, or anyone on the LAN who answers a DISCOVER first, can make the client read about a\n\n\n\nkilobyte past the end of the received message.\n\n\n\nThe option walk keeps a pointer and an offset in step, and the only bound check uses the offset:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7538, 7572 */\n\n\n\nwhile (i \u003c length - 1)\n\n\n\n{\n\n    ...\n    size = *(++data);      /* data moves 1: type -\u003e length byte */\n    data += size + 1;      /* data moves size + 1 more          */\n    i += size + 1;         /* i moves only size + 1             */\n\n\n}\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nA TLV option occupies size + 2 bytes. `data` is advanced by size + 2 in total, `i` by size + 1, so\n\n\n\nthe offset falls one byte behind the real read position for every option the walk skips. After\n\n\n\nenough skipped options the check `i \u003c length - 1` still holds while `data` is already past the end\n\n\n\nof the message, and the subsequent read of the type and length bytes comes from whatever follows.\n\n\n\nA single OFFER carrying a long run of skippable options is enough:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1 at 0x61b000000794 thread T5\n\n    #0 _nx_dhcp_search_buffer     addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7541\n    #1 _nx_dhcp_get_option_value  addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7082\n\n\n0x61b000000794 is located 164 bytes to the right of 1648-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nA well formed OFFER through the same path is handled normally, the client records the offer and\n\n\n\nmoves to REQUESTING, so the difference is the option layout rather than the harness.\n\n\n\nThe read runs in the DHCP client thread while the client is still unconfigured, so it happens on\n\n\n\nevery boot in reach of a hostile DHCP responder. The values read are used to configure the\n\n\n\ninterface, which is how the disclosed bytes become observable.\n\n\n\nAdvance `i` by size + 2, or derive the bound from `data` rather than keeping a second counter.",
  "id": "GHSA-rw53-r2p7-qgmf",
  "modified": "2026-09-29T18:32:01Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T18:32:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-8hj5-p46x-5h28"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102720"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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