GHSA-RQ6Q-WR2Q-7PGP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-21 22:36 – Updated: 2026-01-22 15:41Impact
Multiple Scaffolder actions and archive extraction utilities were vulnerable to symlink-based path traversal attacks. An attacker with access to create and execute Scaffolder templates could exploit symlinks to:
- Read arbitrary files via the
debug:logaction by creating a symlink pointing to sensitive files (e.g.,/etc/passwd, configuration files, secrets) - Delete arbitrary files via the
fs:deleteaction by creating symlinks pointing outside the workspace - Write files outside the workspace via archive extraction (tar/zip) containing malicious symlinks
This affects any Backstage deployment where users can create or execute Scaffolder templates.
Patches
This vulnerability is fixed in the following package versions:
@backstage/backend-defaultsversion 0.12.2, 0.13.2, 0.14.1, 0.15.0@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backendversion 2.2.2, 3.0.2, 3.1.1@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-nodeversion 0.11.2, 0.12.3
Users should upgrade to these versions or later.
Workarounds
- Follow the recommendation in the Backstage Threat Model to limit access to creating and updating templates
- Restrict who can create and execute Scaffolder templates using the permissions framework
- Audit existing templates for symlink usage
- Run Backstage in a containerized environment with limited filesystem access
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@backstage/backend-defaults"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@backstage/backend-defaults"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@backstage/backend-defaults"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-node"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.11.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-node"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.12.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24046"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-21T22:36:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-21T23:15:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nMultiple Scaffolder actions and archive extraction utilities were vulnerable to symlink-based path traversal attacks. An attacker with access to create and execute Scaffolder templates could exploit symlinks to:\n\n1. **Read arbitrary files** via the `debug:log` action by creating a symlink pointing to sensitive files (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, configuration files, secrets)\n2. **Delete arbitrary files** via the `fs:delete` action by creating symlinks pointing outside the workspace\n3. **Write files outside the workspace** via archive extraction (tar/zip) containing malicious symlinks\n\nThis affects any Backstage deployment where users can create or execute Scaffolder templates.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis vulnerability is fixed in the following package versions:\n\n- `@backstage/backend-defaults` version 0.12.2, 0.13.2, 0.14.1, 0.15.0\n- `@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend` version 2.2.2, 3.0.2, 3.1.1\n- `@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-node` version 0.11.2, 0.12.3\n\nUsers should upgrade to these versions or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Follow the recommendation in the [Backstage Threat Model](https://backstage.io/docs/overview/threat-model#scaffolder) to limit access to creating and updating templates\n- Restrict who can create and execute Scaffolder templates using the permissions framework\n- Audit existing templates for symlink usage\n- Run Backstage in a containerized environment with limited filesystem access\n\n### References\n\n- [CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html)\n- [OWASP Path Traversal](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal)",
"id": "GHSA-rq6q-wr2q-7pgp",
"modified": "2026-01-22T15:41:18Z",
"published": "2026-01-21T22:36:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/security/advisories/GHSA-rq6q-wr2q-7pgp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24046"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/commit/c641c147ab371a9a8a2f5f67fdb7cb9c97ef345d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Backstage has a Possible Symlink Path Traversal in Scaffolder Actions"
}
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