GHSA-RP9P-GGXC-P9XM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:32
VLAI
Details

Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its

transmit packet.

The string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four:




/* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */



memory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF;



...



len = *((USHORT*)(p - 2));           /* slot size, not string length */



if ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...)



The lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size,

so names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered

with the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than

the length the caller accounted for. _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only

bound check from that stale length, and _nx_mdns_name_string_encode writes the real string.

Two PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a _http._tcp query, with owner names

whose lengths fall in the same bucket:




==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow



WRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5

    #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode  addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096
    #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add       addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911


0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region



The overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past nx_packet_data_end. In a

normal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible

effect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash.

Compare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the

string length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check

agree.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102715"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-697",
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T18:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its\n\n\n\ntransmit packet.\n\n\n\nThe string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */\n\n\n\nmemory_len = ((memory_len \u0026 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) \u0026 0xFFFFFFFF;\n\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nlen = *((USHORT*)(p - 2));           /* slot size, not string length */\n\n\n\nif ((len == memory_len) \u0026\u0026 ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...)\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThe lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size,\n\n\n\nso names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered\n\n\n\nwith the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than\n\n\n\nthe length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only\n\n\n\nbound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string.\n\n\n\nTwo PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names\n\n\n\nwhose lengths fall in the same bucket:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nWRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5\n\n    #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode  addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096\n    #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add       addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911\n\n\n0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThe overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a\n\n\n\nnormal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible\n\n\n\neffect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash.\n\n\n\nCompare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the\n\n\n\nstring length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check\n\n\n\nagree.",
  "id": "GHSA-rp9p-ggxc-p9xm",
  "modified": "2026-09-29T18:32:01Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T18:32:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-2gf7-5224-5vrj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102715"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.