GHSA-RGQ4-6FXX-V9RG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 15:34 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:34
VLAI
Details

A race condition in Epiphany allows a malicious website to bypass the TLS/SSL certificate warning page.

Epiphany registers the main-world script message handler "tlsErrorPage" so its internal TLS error page can implement "Accept Risk and Proceed". The handler was registered immediately before loading the error page, leaving a brief window where the previously loaded untrusted origin could still call window.webkit.messageHandlers.tlsErrorPage.postMessage(...). The only authorization check compares a numeric WebKit page id that increments predictably; an attacker can burst-guess ids and approve a certificate exception with no user click.

If a victim visits malicious site A that redirects to site B with an invalid certificate, site A can, for a few milliseconds, disable TLS certificate error warnings for host B until Epiphany is restarted, enabling man-in-the-middle or site spoofing for that host.

Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2978 Proof of concept: https://beford.net/poc/ssl_poc.html Fix: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2245 (register handlers on LOAD_COMMITTED). No fixed release tagged yet; reporter and maintainer describe all current versions as affected. Maintainer notes the risky registration timing dates to commit 1da1caed (Epiphany 45.x era); before that the handlers were always registered and similarly reachable from web content.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-115683"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T14:16:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A race condition in Epiphany allows a malicious website to bypass the TLS/SSL certificate warning page.\n\nEpiphany registers the main-world script message handler \"tlsErrorPage\" so its internal TLS error page can implement \"Accept Risk and Proceed\". The handler was registered immediately before loading the error page, leaving a brief window where the previously loaded untrusted origin could still call window.webkit.messageHandlers.tlsErrorPage.postMessage(...). The only authorization check compares a numeric WebKit page id that increments predictably; an attacker can burst-guess ids and approve a certificate exception with no user click.\n\nIf a victim visits malicious site A that redirects to site B with an invalid certificate, site A can, for a few milliseconds, disable TLS certificate error warnings for host B until Epiphany is restarted, enabling man-in-the-middle or site spoofing for that host.\n\nUpstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2978\nProof of concept: https://beford.net/poc/ssl_poc.html\nFix: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2245 (register handlers on LOAD_COMMITTED). No fixed release tagged yet; reporter and maintainer describe all current versions as affected. Maintainer notes the risky registration timing dates to commit 1da1caed (Epiphany 45.x era); before that the handlers were always registered and similarly reachable from web content.",
  "id": "GHSA-rgq4-6fxx-v9rg",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:34:32Z",
  "published": "2026-10-30T15:34:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115683"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-115683"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://beford.net/poc/ssl_poc.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2560012"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2978"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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