GHSA-RGQ4-6FXX-V9RG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 15:34 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:34A race condition in Epiphany allows a malicious website to bypass the TLS/SSL certificate warning page.
Epiphany registers the main-world script message handler "tlsErrorPage" so its internal TLS error page can implement "Accept Risk and Proceed". The handler was registered immediately before loading the error page, leaving a brief window where the previously loaded untrusted origin could still call window.webkit.messageHandlers.tlsErrorPage.postMessage(...). The only authorization check compares a numeric WebKit page id that increments predictably; an attacker can burst-guess ids and approve a certificate exception with no user click.
If a victim visits malicious site A that redirects to site B with an invalid certificate, site A can, for a few milliseconds, disable TLS certificate error warnings for host B until Epiphany is restarted, enabling man-in-the-middle or site spoofing for that host.
Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2978 Proof of concept: https://beford.net/poc/ssl_poc.html Fix: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2245 (register handlers on LOAD_COMMITTED). No fixed release tagged yet; reporter and maintainer describe all current versions as affected. Maintainer notes the risky registration timing dates to commit 1da1caed (Epiphany 45.x era); before that the handlers were always registered and similarly reachable from web content.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115683"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T14:16:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A race condition in Epiphany allows a malicious website to bypass the TLS/SSL certificate warning page.\n\nEpiphany registers the main-world script message handler \"tlsErrorPage\" so its internal TLS error page can implement \"Accept Risk and Proceed\". The handler was registered immediately before loading the error page, leaving a brief window where the previously loaded untrusted origin could still call window.webkit.messageHandlers.tlsErrorPage.postMessage(...). The only authorization check compares a numeric WebKit page id that increments predictably; an attacker can burst-guess ids and approve a certificate exception with no user click.\n\nIf a victim visits malicious site A that redirects to site B with an invalid certificate, site A can, for a few milliseconds, disable TLS certificate error warnings for host B until Epiphany is restarted, enabling man-in-the-middle or site spoofing for that host.\n\nUpstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2978\nProof of concept: https://beford.net/poc/ssl_poc.html\nFix: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2245 (register handlers on LOAD_COMMITTED). No fixed release tagged yet; reporter and maintainer describe all current versions as affected. Maintainer notes the risky registration timing dates to commit 1da1caed (Epiphany 45.x era); before that the handlers were always registered and similarly reachable from web content.",
"id": "GHSA-rgq4-6fxx-v9rg",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:34:32Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T15:34:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115683"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-115683"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://beford.net/poc/ssl_poc.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2560012"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2245"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2978"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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