GHSA-RCGG-9C38-7XPX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 16:36 – Updated: 2026-05-14 16:36Overview
A vulnerability affects the baggage propagation implementation in
opentelemetry-api and opentelemetry-extension-trace-propagators. Parsing oversized baggage
causes unbounded memory allocation and CPU consumption. Because baggage is automatically
re-injected into every outgoing request, the effect can fan out to downstream services that
never received the original malicious request.
Technical Details
W3CBaggagePropagatordid not enforce any limit on the total size or entry count of thebaggageheader. The parser iterated character-by-character through the entire value regardless of length.JaegerPropagatorandOtTracePropagatorhad the same gap in their respective baggage extraction paths.- The W3C Baggage specification recommends a maximum of 8,192 bytes and 180 entries; none of these limits were enforced.
Impact
The practical availability impact for most deployments is limited. Every major Java HTTP server enforces its own header size limit (Tomcat, Jetty, Netty, Vert.x, and gRPC-Java all default to 8 KiB), constraining what an external attacker can deliver before the application is reached. The risk is higher when transport-layer limits are absent — e.g., a compromised internal service communicating over a non-HTTP or custom transport.
Remediation
Update to version 1.62.0 or later (#8380). The fix enforces limits consistent with the W3C Baggage specification at the propagator level:
- Maximum total baggage size: 8,192 bytes across all
baggageheader values - Maximum number of entries: 64
Headers that would exceed either limit are dropped at the point the limit is reached; already-extracted valid entries are retained.
Workarounds
Ensure HTTP header size limits are configured at the server or gateway level. Most Java HTTP servers enforce an 8 KiB header limit by default, which mitigates external attack vectors independently of this fix.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.61.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.62.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.61.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-extension-trace-propagators"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.62.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45292"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T16:36:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Overview\n\nA vulnerability affects the baggage propagation implementation in\n`opentelemetry-api` and `opentelemetry-extension-trace-propagators`. Parsing oversized baggage\ncauses unbounded memory allocation and CPU consumption. Because baggage is automatically\nre-injected into every outgoing request, the effect can fan out to downstream services that\nnever received the original malicious request.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n- `W3CBaggagePropagator` did not enforce any limit on the total size or entry count of the\n `baggage` header. The parser iterated character-by-character through the entire value\n regardless of length.\n- `JaegerPropagator` and `OtTracePropagator` had the same gap in their respective baggage\n extraction paths.\n- The W3C Baggage specification recommends a maximum of 8,192 bytes and 180 entries; none of\n these limits were enforced.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe practical availability impact for most deployments is limited. Every major Java HTTP server\nenforces its own header size limit (Tomcat, Jetty, Netty, Vert.x, and gRPC-Java all default to\n8 KiB), constraining what an external attacker can deliver before the application is reached.\nThe risk is higher when transport-layer limits are absent \u2014 e.g., a compromised internal service\ncommunicating over a non-HTTP or custom transport.\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpdate to version 1.62.0 or later ([#8380](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java/pull/8380)).\nThe fix enforces limits consistent with the W3C Baggage specification at the propagator level:\n\n- Maximum total baggage size: 8,192 bytes across all `baggage` header values\n- Maximum number of entries: 64\n\nHeaders that would exceed either limit are dropped at the point the limit is reached;\nalready-extracted valid entries are retained.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nEnsure HTTP header size limits are configured at the server or gateway level. Most Java HTTP\nservers enforce an 8 KiB header limit by default, which mitigates external attack vectors\nindependently of this fix.\n\n## References\n\n- [W3C Baggage Specification \u00a7Limits](https://www.w3.org/TR/baggage/#limits)",
"id": "GHSA-rcgg-9c38-7xpx",
"modified": "2026-05-14T16:36:04Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T16:36:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java/security/advisories/GHSA-rcgg-9c38-7xpx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java/pull/8380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java/commit/03837d3c1763bc35464aea1078671e2ef2336a5f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java/releases/tag/v1.62.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenTelemetry Java SDK has Unbounded Memory Allocation in W3C Baggage Propagation"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.