GHSA-R6FP-X62F-PXFV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-28 21:31The broker-side PushTelemetry API (KIP-714) validates only the compressed size of a client's metrics payload against telemetry.max.bytes (default 1 MB) before decompressing it. ClientTelemetryUtils.decompress() then decompresses the payload with no limit on the decompressed output size, growing a heap buffer until the compressed input is exhausted. A small, highly compressible payload (for example gzip-compressed zeros) can therefore expand to hundreds of megabytes of broker heap.
Impact:
An authenticated client can send a PushTelemetry request with a small compressed payload that decompresses to a very large size, consuming broker heap out of proportion to the request size. Repeated or concurrent requests can exhaust the broker heap and cause an OutOfMemoryError, degrading or crashing the broker; a client that targets multiple brokers can affect cluster availability. PushTelemetry is available to any authenticated client and is not gated by an ACL.
Mitigation:
Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, or 4.4.0. On affected versions there is no configuration that fully prevents the amplification, because telemetry.max.bytes bounds only the compressed size; lowering telemetry.max.bytes reduces the worst-case decompressed size proportionally and is a partial mitigation.
Resolution:
- From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: ClientTelemetryUtils.decompress() enforces a maximum decompressed size equal to telemetry.max.bytes (default 1 MB). Decompression reads in bounded chunks and aborts with a TelemetryTooLargeException once the decompressed total exceeds the limit, so an over-large or highly compressible payload is rejected instead of being fully expanded in heap. The decompressed size is therefore bounded by default.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-111073"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T17:17:38Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "The broker-side PushTelemetry API (KIP-714) validates only the compressed size of\u00a0a client\u0027s metrics payload against telemetry.max.bytes (default 1 MB) before decompressing\u00a0it. ClientTelemetryUtils.decompress() then decompresses the payload with no limit on the\u00a0decompressed output size, growing a heap buffer until the compressed input is exhausted. A\u00a0small, highly compressible payload (for example gzip-compressed zeros) can therefore expand\u00a0to hundreds of megabytes of broker heap.\n\n\nImpact:\n\n\nAn authenticated client can send a PushTelemetry request with a small compressed payload that\u00a0decompresses to a very large size, consuming broker heap out of proportion to the request\u00a0size. Repeated or concurrent requests can exhaust the broker heap and cause an\u00a0OutOfMemoryError, degrading or crashing the broker; a client that targets multiple brokers\u00a0can affect cluster availability. PushTelemetry is available to any authenticated client and is\u00a0not gated by an ACL.\n\n\nMitigation:\n\n\nUpgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, or 4.4.0. On affected versions there is no configuration that fully\u00a0prevents the amplification, because telemetry.max.bytes bounds only the compressed size;\u00a0lowering telemetry.max.bytes reduces the worst-case decompressed size proportionally and is a\u00a0partial mitigation.\n\n\nResolution:\n\n\n- From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: ClientTelemetryUtils.decompress() enforces a maximum decompressed\u00a0size equal to telemetry.max.bytes (default 1 MB). Decompression reads in bounded chunks and\u00a0aborts with a TelemetryTooLargeException once the decompressed total exceeds the limit, so an\u00a0over-large or highly compressible payload is rejected instead of being fully expanded in\u00a0heap. The decompressed size is therefore bounded by default.",
"id": "GHSA-r6fp-x62f-pxfv",
"modified": "2026-10-28T21:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T18:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111073"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kafka.apache.org/cve-list"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/28/11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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