GHSA-R555-RGVQ-CQV7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump()

em_text_dump() allocates struct tcf_em_text on the stack without zeroing it. strscpy() writes the algorithm name and a NUL terminator into conf.algo[], leaving the remaining bytes uninitialised. nla_put_nohdr() then copies the full struct to the netlink response.

KMSAN on Linux 7.2-rc6 reports two kernel-infoleak splats from this path, one triggered via "tc filter show" and one via a raw RTM_GETTFILTER dump:

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1c9/0x2620 nla_put_nohdr+0x83/0x130 em_text_dump+0x291/0x550 Local variable conf created at: em_text_dump+0x5d/0x550 Bytes 168-179 of 199 are uninitialized

I am not certain whether this constitutes a real security problem in practice: the test was conducted in a controlled KMSAN environment and the leaked stack bytes may or may not carry sensitive data on actual production kernels. I am reporting it because KMSAN flagged it as a kernel-infoleak and the fix is straightforward. I can provide a userspace reproducer on request.

The original code used strncpy() which zero-pads to the destination size. Commit b04202d6065c ("net/sched: replace strncpy with strscpy") replaced it with strscpy(), which does not pad, creating this condition. Zero-initialising the struct closes it.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-98584"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:10Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump()\n\nem_text_dump() allocates struct tcf_em_text on the stack without zeroing\nit.  strscpy() writes the algorithm name and a NUL terminator into\nconf.algo[], leaving the remaining bytes uninitialised.  nla_put_nohdr()\nthen copies the full struct to the netlink response.\n\nKMSAN on Linux 7.2-rc6 reports two kernel-infoleak splats from this path,\none triggered via \"tc filter show\" and one via a raw RTM_GETTFILTER dump:\n\n  BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1c9/0x2620\n    nla_put_nohdr+0x83/0x130\n    em_text_dump+0x291/0x550\n  Local variable conf created at: em_text_dump+0x5d/0x550\n  Bytes 168-179 of 199 are uninitialized\n\nI am not certain whether this constitutes a real security problem in\npractice: the test was conducted in a controlled KMSAN environment and\nthe leaked stack bytes may or may not carry sensitive data on actual\nproduction kernels.  I am reporting it because KMSAN flagged it as a\nkernel-infoleak and the fix is straightforward.  I can provide a\nuserspace reproducer on request.\n\nThe original code used strncpy() which zero-pads to the destination size.\nCommit b04202d6065c (\"net/sched: replace strncpy with strscpy\") replaced\nit with strscpy(), which does not pad, creating this condition.\nZero-initialising the struct closes it.",
  "id": "GHSA-r555-rgvq-cqv7",
  "modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:55Z",
  "published": "2026-10-18T18:31:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98584"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b160417826d22f24fc31a5b9cfae3b14aa70f76"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9923e1c537f91f3530b52d4efce85f3d9c131bf8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c572a83037a7dcd653ba3a9cc468c16b857d0c9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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