GHSA-R4HX-MHRP-XF73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 12:31Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per payment by a large multiplier, degrading the sponsor's operating margin.
When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including the EIP-2930 access list, without validating its length or contents. EIP-2930 access list entries incur intrinsic gas (~2,400 gas per address, plus 1,900 gas per storage key) charged before any opcode executes, regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched. A malicious client submits a valid transferWithMemo call alongside a large number of fabricated access-list entries. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The intended transfer executes normally, but the fee-payer wallet pays a large multiple of the expected gas cost with no corresponding on-chain work.
At the maintainer's default of 137 access-list entries (fitting within Bandit's 10,000-byte per-header-field limit) and 100 Gwei max_fee_per_gas, per-payment gas cost rises from ~51,287 to ~380,087 gas, a 7.4x multiplier. Sustained abuse destroys the sponsor's operating margin on low-cost payments and, over time, drains the fee-payer wallet.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59694"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T11:17:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer\u0027s gas cost per payment by a large multiplier, degrading the sponsor\u0027s operating margin.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including the EIP-2930 access list, without validating its length or contents. EIP-2930 access list entries incur intrinsic gas (~2,400 gas per address, plus 1,900 gas per storage key) charged before any opcode executes, regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched. A malicious client submits a valid transferWithMemo call alongside a large number of fabricated access-list entries. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The intended transfer executes normally, but the fee-payer wallet pays a large multiple of the expected gas cost with no corresponding on-chain work.\n\nAt the maintainer\u0027s default of 137 access-list entries (fitting within Bandit\u0027s 10,000-byte per-header-field limit) and 100 Gwei max_fee_per_gas, per-payment gas cost rises from ~51,287 to ~380,087 gas, a 7.4x multiplier. Sustained abuse destroys the sponsor\u0027s operating margin on low-cost payments and, over time, drains the fee-payer wallet.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.",
"id": "GHSA-r4hx-mhrp-xf73",
"modified": "2026-07-17T12:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T12:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-qpxh-ff8m-c62v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/5d6338e2334084c5f2a78cfcca474830733ed7e8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-59694.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-59694"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.