GHSA-R3MJ-HQ6X-H82Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-17 09:31 – Updated: 2026-11-17 09:31Issue summary: A server configured with the Suite B certificate flag through SSL_CTX_set_cert_flags() and with TLS 1.3 enabled may read past the end of a fixed group list when it processes a ClientHello whose supported_groups and key_share contain no Suite B group.
Impact summary: A remote client can send a ClientHello that makes the server read past the end of a static array. The values read are never returned to the client, so no memory is disclosed; on builds with sanitizers or hardened allocators the read may crash the process, causing Denial of Service.
CWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read
Description: When the Suite B certificate flag is set, OpenSSL restricts the accepted groups to P-256 and P-384 by substituting a fixed two-element list for the configured group list. The tuple machinery used for key-share selection was not updated for this substitution: tls1_get_group_tuples() still returns the configured tuples, which by default describe eight groups. The server-side walk in tls_parse_ctos_key_share() then advances through the two-element list using those tuple counts without checking the cumulative offset against the number of groups present.
Only applications that call SSL_CTX_set_cert_flags() with SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS and leave TLS 1.3 enabled are affected. The openssl s_server -suiteB_128 option sets an X.509 verification parameter instead, so the stock command line server is not vulnerable. Default configurations do not reach this code.
A client that offers only groups outside the Suite B set, such as X25519, forces every tuple to be walked and the read to run past the array. The bytes read are compared against client group IDs and never sent back, so no memory is disclosed. On builds with address sanitizers or hardened allocators the read can abort the process; in ordinary release builds it reads a few bytes of adjacent constant data.
FIPS impact: no The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35190"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T09:17:27Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "Issue summary: A server configured with the Suite B certificate flag through\nSSL_CTX_set_cert_flags() and with TLS 1.3 enabled may read past the end of a\nfixed group list when it processes a ClientHello whose supported_groups and\nkey_share contain no Suite B group.\n\nImpact summary: A remote client can send a ClientHello that makes the server\nread past the end of a static array. The values read are never returned to the\nclient, so no memory is disclosed; on builds with sanitizers or hardened\nallocators the read may crash the process, causing Denial of Service.\n\nCWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read\n\nDescription: When the Suite B certificate flag is set, OpenSSL restricts the\naccepted groups to P-256 and P-384 by substituting a fixed two-element list\nfor the configured group list. The tuple machinery used for key-share\nselection was not updated for this substitution: tls1_get_group_tuples() still\nreturns the configured tuples, which by default describe eight groups. The\nserver-side walk in tls_parse_ctos_key_share() then advances through the\ntwo-element list using those tuple counts without checking the cumulative\noffset against the number of groups present.\n\nOnly applications that call SSL_CTX_set_cert_flags() with\nSSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS and leave TLS 1.3 enabled are affected. The\nopenssl s_server -suiteB_128 option sets an X.509 verification parameter\ninstead, so the stock command line server is not vulnerable. Default\nconfigurations do not reach this code.\n\nA client that offers only groups outside the Suite B set, such as X25519,\nforces every tuple to be walked and the read to run past the array. The bytes\nread are compared against client group IDs and never sent back, so no memory\nis disclosed. On builds with address sanitizers or hardened allocators the\nread can abort the process; in ordinary release builds it reads a few bytes of\nadjacent constant data.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.",
"id": "GHSA-r3mj-hq6x-h82q",
"modified": "2026-11-17T09:31:45Z",
"published": "2026-11-17T09:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9491b0d9cc7950af1f3dc89499bd5433b9cd4f43"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9a812981b927c5714b7c2e5d138618105cea2152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ade64619df04056b3e5fd1c1befe9425a7c80eb6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20261117.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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