GHSA-R29V-JF4C-HPXX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-11-06 12:30
VLAI
Details

The Advanced Members for ACF plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0 via the acf[_amem_local_user_password] parameter of the [advanced-members-account-password] shortcode form submission. This is due to a PHP operator-precedence bug in the pre_update_value function of acf/fields/class-user-password.php that assigns boolean true instead of the resolved user ID to $user_id, causing the _can_edit() authorization check to pass for any logged-in user via PHP loose equality, and causing wp_update_user() to cast 'ID' => true to integer 1 — unconditionally targeting the primary administrator account. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the password of user ID 1 (the site's primary administrator) with an attacker-chosen value, granting full administrative access to the site. The intended exclusion guard in Account::process that strips the password field before saving is defeated because amem_save_all_fields() re-reads the full field list from amem()->submission and silently overwrites the caller-supplied excluded fields array with an empty array, ensuring the password field is always processed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-116624"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-06T12:17:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Advanced Members for ACF plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0 via the `acf[_amem_local_user_password]` parameter of the `[advanced-members-account-password]` shortcode form submission. This is due to a PHP operator-precedence bug in the `pre_update_value` function of `acf/fields/class-user-password.php` that assigns boolean `true` instead of the resolved user ID to `$user_id`, causing the `_can_edit()` authorization check to pass for any logged-in user via PHP loose equality, and causing `wp_update_user()` to cast `\u0027ID\u0027 =\u003e true` to integer `1` \u2014 unconditionally targeting the primary administrator account. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the password of user ID 1 (the site\u0027s primary administrator) with an attacker-chosen value, granting full administrative access to the site. The intended exclusion guard in `Account::process` that strips the password field before saving is defeated because `amem_save_all_fields()` re-reads the full field list from `amem()-\u003esubmission` and silently overwrites the caller-supplied excluded fields array with an empty array, ensuring the password field is always processed.",
  "id": "GHSA-r29v-jf4c-hpxx",
  "modified": "2026-11-06T12:30:46Z",
  "published": "2026-11-06T12:30:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116624"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/advanced-members/trunk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-members/tags/1.3.0/acf/fields/base/trait-amem-field.php#L30"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-members/tags/1.3.0/acf/fields/class-user-password.php#L117"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-members/tags/1.3.0/core/actions/account.php#L227"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-members/tags/1.3.0/core/functions-forms.php#L105"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3779180/advanced-members/trunk/acf/fields/class-user-password.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6fc38f0b-bf13-4d01-a4b3-38a43fc726d6?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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