<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-09T21:01:06.736518+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://db.gcve.eu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-116624</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-116624 — Advanced Members for ACF &lt;= 1.3.0 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation via Account Change-Password Form</title>
    <updated>2026-11-09T21:01:06.740278+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> danbilabs Advanced Members for ACF</p>
<p>The Advanced Members for ACF plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0 via the `acf[_amem_local_user_password]` parameter of the `[advanced-members-account-password]` shortcode form submission. This is due to a PHP operator-precedence bug in the `pre_update_value` function of `acf/fields/class-user-password.php` that assigns boolean `true` instead of the resolved user ID to `$user_id`, causing the `_can_edit()` authorization check to pass for any logged-in user via PHP loose equality, and causing `wp_update_user()` to cast `'ID' =&gt; true` to integer `1` — unconditionally targeting the primary administrator account. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the password of user ID 1 (the site's primary administrator) with an attacker-chosen value, granting full administrative access to the site. The intended exclusion guard in `Account::process` that strips the password field before saving is defeated because `amem_save_all_fields()` re-reads the full field list from `amem()-&gt;submission` and silently overwrites the caller-supplied excluded fields array with an empty array, ensuring the password field is always processed.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-116624"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
