GHSA-QPRQ-675R-82H6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:32
VLAI
Details

OpenPLC Runtime v3's compile_program() function (webserver/openplc.py) parses (*FILE:path content*) directives from uploaded Structured Text (.st) program files and writes the referenced content to os.path.join('./core', file_path) with no validation that file_path stays within the ./core directory. A crafted .st file containing a directive such as (*FILE:../../../etc/cron.d/x * * * * root <command>*) writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path, enabling remote code execution (e.g. via cron or SSH authorized_keys). A path-validation function, validate_file_path(), exists elsewhere in the codebase (webserver/credentials.py) but is never invoked from compile_program(), leaving the sink unprotected. OpenPLC additionally ships with hardcoded default credentials (openplc:openplc), lowering the practical bar for exploitation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71268"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T13:24:51Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "OpenPLC Runtime v3\u0027s compile_program() function (webserver/openplc.py) parses `(*FILE:path content*)` directives from uploaded Structured Text (.st) program files and writes the referenced content to `os.path.join(\u0027./core\u0027, file_path)` with no validation that file_path stays within the ./core directory. A crafted .st file containing a directive such as `(*FILE:../../../etc/cron.d/x * * * * root \u003ccommand\u003e*)` writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path, enabling remote code execution (e.g. via cron or SSH authorized_keys). A path-validation function, validate_file_path(), exists elsewhere in the codebase (webserver/credentials.py) but is never invoked from compile_program(), leaving the sink unprotected. OpenPLC additionally ships with hardcoded default credentials (openplc:openplc), lowering the practical bar for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-qprq-675r-82h6",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T15:32:20Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T15:32:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71268"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thiagoralves/OpenPLC_v3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thiagoralves/OpenPLC_v3/blob/master/webserver/openplc.py"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…