GHSA-QCXH-2CM7-9FCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-30 12:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Drop the translation cache reference only for the erased entry
vgic_its_invalidate_cache() walks the per-ITS translation cache with xa_for_each() and drops the cache's reference on each entry with vgic_put_irq(). It puts the iterated pointer, though, rather than the value returned by xa_erase().
The function is called from contexts that do not exclude one another: the ITS command handlers hold its_lock, the GITS_CTLR write path holds cmd_lock, and the path that clears EnableLPIs in a redistributor's GICR_CTLR holds neither. Two or more of them can drain the same cache concurrently, and if each one observes the same entry, erases it and then puts it, the single reference the cache holds on that entry is dropped more than once. The entry can then be freed while an ITE still maps it.
xa_erase() is atomic and returns the previous entry, so put only the entry that this context actually removed. The cache reference is then dropped exactly once per entry even when the invalidations run concurrently, and the behavior is unchanged when only one context runs.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46316"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-911"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T13:16:36Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: arm64: vgic-its: Drop the translation cache reference only for the erased entry\n\nvgic_its_invalidate_cache() walks the per-ITS translation cache with\nxa_for_each() and drops the cache\u0027s reference on each entry with\nvgic_put_irq(). It puts the iterated pointer, though, rather than the\nvalue returned by xa_erase().\n\nThe function is called from contexts that do not exclude one another: the\nITS command handlers hold its_lock, the GITS_CTLR write path holds\ncmd_lock, and the path that clears EnableLPIs in a redistributor\u0027s\nGICR_CTLR holds neither. Two or more of them can drain the same cache\nconcurrently, and if each one observes the same entry, erases it and then\nputs it, the single reference the cache holds on that entry is dropped\nmore than once. The entry can then be freed while an ITE still maps it.\n\nxa_erase() is atomic and returns the previous entry, so put only the entry\nthat this context actually removed. The cache reference is then dropped\nexactly once per entry even when the invalidations run concurrently, and\nthe behavior is unchanged when only one context runs.",
"id": "GHSA-qcxh-2cm7-9fcc",
"modified": "2026-07-30T12:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T15:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34911"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36018"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:38902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:39371"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:40764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:40779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:40787"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:44231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2486982"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13031fb6b8357fbbcded2a7f4cba73e4781ee594"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2bbc395e81bd29c543a0529a678327e932a7ec69"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9121f4605ab94969f62d1b5714ca3c6c69bd202f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7b72e88046328c9fdc638fe887d4240257dd5dc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-46316.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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