GHSA-QC2Q-P7WX-3PX3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 20:50 – Updated: 2026-09-08 20:50Summary
A vulnerability in the xDS RBAC HTTP filter implementation in grpc-go allows remote attackers to bypass authorization policies (specifically DENY rules) by using mixed-case or canonical-case header matchers (e.g., X-Role instead of x-role). Additionally, the safety guards introduced by gRFC A41 to block grpc- prefixed headers can be evaded via variations in casing (e.g., Grpc-Status).
Impact
When an operator defines an RBAC policy referencing headers containing uppercase letters (e.g. X-Role), grpc-go fails to match incoming metadata keys because they are unconditionally lowercased. Because of this case-sensitivity mismatch, a policy designed to block requests containing specific header values fails open: the rule is evaluated as a non-match, and traffic that should have been rejected is served.
Furthermore, gRFC A41 requires rejecting configuration schemas specifying header matchers starting with grpc-. Because this check is executed case-sensitively in grpc-go, attackers can bypass the validation by specifying titles like Grpc-Status.
Patches
The problem is fixed in master and in the 1.83.1 release.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.83.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "google.golang.org/grpc"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.83.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84303"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T20:50:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T19:17:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA vulnerability in the xDS RBAC HTTP filter implementation in grpc-go allows remote attackers to bypass authorization policies (specifically DENY rules) by using mixed-case or canonical-case header matchers (e.g., X-Role instead of x-role). Additionally, the safety guards introduced by gRFC A41 to block grpc- prefixed headers can be evaded via variations in casing (e.g., Grpc-Status).\n\n### Impact\nWhen an operator defines an RBAC policy referencing headers containing uppercase letters (e.g. X-Role), grpc-go fails to match incoming metadata keys because they are unconditionally lowercased. Because of this case-sensitivity mismatch, a policy designed to block requests containing specific header values fails open: the rule is evaluated as a non-match, and traffic that should have been rejected is served.\n\nFurthermore, gRFC A41 requires rejecting configuration schemas specifying header matchers starting with grpc-. Because this check is executed case-sensitively in grpc-go, attackers can bypass the validation by specifying titles like Grpc-Status.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem is fixed in `master` and in the 1.83.1 release.",
"id": "GHSA-qc2q-p7wx-3px3",
"modified": "2026-09-08T20:50:21Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T20:50:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-qc2q-p7wx-3px3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84303"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/db9482836c298f234c896cf82ab68cafc78237f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/ebba6f3f1b206e2b4dc4d1d5a96d18430302c2fe"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.83.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC HTTP Filter bypass via mixed-case Header Matching and gRFC A41 validation evasion"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.