GHSA-Q9F3-JCG6-9J2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-03-06 15:34In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix OOB in binder_add_freeze_work()
In binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc->nodes with the proc->inner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped to acquire the node->lock first (lock nesting order). This can race with binder_deferred_release() which removes the nodes from the proc->nodes rbtree and adds them into binder_dead_nodes list. This leads to a broken iteration in binder_add_freeze_work() as rb_next() will use data from binder_dead_nodes, triggering an out-of-bounds access:
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in rb_next+0xfc/0x124 Read of size 8 at addr ffffcb84285f7170 by task freeze/660
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 660 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #18 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: rb_next+0xfc/0x124 binder_add_freeze_work+0x344/0x534 binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190
The buggy address belongs to the variable: binder_dead_nodes+0x10/0x40 [...] ==================================================================
This is possible because proc->nodes (rbtree) and binder_dead_nodes (list) share entries in binder_node through a union:
struct binder_node {
[...]
union {
struct rb_node rb_node;
struct hlist_node dead_node;
};
Fix the race by checking that the proc is still alive. If not, simply break out of the iteration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56555"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T15:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbinder: fix OOB in binder_add_freeze_work()\n\nIn binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc-\u003enodes with the\nproc-\u003einner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped to\nacquire the node-\u003elock first (lock nesting order). This can race with\nbinder_deferred_release() which removes the nodes from the proc-\u003enodes\nrbtree and adds them into binder_dead_nodes list. This leads to a broken\niteration in binder_add_freeze_work() as rb_next() will use data from\nbinder_dead_nodes, triggering an out-of-bounds access:\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in rb_next+0xfc/0x124\n Read of size 8 at addr ffffcb84285f7170 by task freeze/660\n\n CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 660 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #18\n Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)\n Call trace:\n rb_next+0xfc/0x124\n binder_add_freeze_work+0x344/0x534\n binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac\n __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190\n\n The buggy address belongs to the variable:\n binder_dead_nodes+0x10/0x40\n [...]\n ==================================================================\n\nThis is possible because proc-\u003enodes (rbtree) and binder_dead_nodes\n(list) share entries in binder_node through a union:\n\n\tstruct binder_node {\n\t[...]\n\t\tunion {\n\t\t\tstruct rb_node rb_node;\n\t\t\tstruct hlist_node dead_node;\n\t\t};\n\nFix the race by checking that the proc is still alive. If not, simply\nbreak out of the iteration.",
"id": "GHSA-q9f3-jcg6-9j2x",
"modified": "2025-03-06T15:34:39Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T15:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/011e69a1b23011c0db3af4b8293fdd4522cc97b0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b1be1da1f8279cf091266e71b5153c5b02aaff6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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