GHSA-PVJG-PWH7-34PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-19 12:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 12:32Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Apache Camel Netty HTTP component.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.
The camel-netty-http security constraint compared the request path against the configured context path using a case-sensitive match, while the routing that dispatches the request to the endpoint did not apply the same rule. The two comparisons therefore disagreed for any path whose case differed from the configured value. An external caller could alter the case of a character in a path segment so that the security constraint no longer recognised the path as protected, while the request still dispatched to the same endpoint. The result is that the constraint is skipped and the protected route is reached without satisfying it. No credential, prior access or special configuration is required beyond being able to send a request to the consumer.
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. The constraint now matches the request path with the same case rules the dispatch uses, so the two can no longer disagree. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place the authorization decision in front of the Camel consumer, for example in a reverse proxy that normalises the request path before forwarding.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80343"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T11:17:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Apache Camel Netty HTTP component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\n\n\nThe camel-netty-http security constraint compared the request path against the configured context path using a case-sensitive match, while the routing that dispatches the request to the endpoint did not apply the same rule. The two comparisons therefore disagreed for any path whose case differed from the configured value. An external caller could alter the case of a character in a path segment so that the security constraint no longer recognised the path as protected, while the request still dispatched to the same endpoint. The result is that the constraint is skipped and the protected route is reached without satisfying it. No credential, prior access or special configuration is required beyond being able to send a request to the consumer.\n\n\n\nUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. The constraint now matches the request path with the same case rules the dispatch uses, so the two can no longer disagree. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place the authorization decision in front of the Camel consumer, for example in a reverse proxy that normalises the request path before forwarding.",
"id": "GHSA-pvjg-pwh7-34pj",
"modified": "2026-10-19T12:32:50Z",
"published": "2026-10-19T12:32:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80343"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25761"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-80343.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24412"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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