GHSA-P7MH-274J-M4MQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-09 12:31
VLAI
Details

Description

Nimbus instantiates the class named by a topology's topology.scheduler.strategy when scheduling it. The allowlist intended to constrain that choice, nimbus.scheduler.strategy.class.whitelist, was treated as "allow any class" when unset, and it had no entry in the shipped defaults.yaml, so unset was the shipped state. An authenticated submitter could therefore cause Nimbus to instantiate any class on the Nimbus classpath that has a no-argument constructor.

Storm's own production artifacts contain classes with side effects suitable for this: instantiating org.apache.storm.testing.InProcessZookeeper starts a ZooKeeper server with its own threads and sockets and nothing closes it, and org.apache.storm.LocalCluster behaves similarly. Repeated submissions therefore consume threads, sockets and memory in the most privileged daemon in the cluster.

Mitigation

Upgrade to 3.1.0, where an unset allowlist means the strategies shipped with Storm rather than any class.

Note that this is a behaviour change: a cluster running an out-of-tree scheduler strategy without an explicit allowlist will have those topologies refused until the class is added to nimbus.scheduler.strategy.class.whitelist. The rejection message names the refused class and the configuration key.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should set nimbus.scheduler.strategy.class.whitelist explicitly to the strategies they intend to permit.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82440"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-09T10:17:11Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Description\n\nNimbus instantiates the class named by a topology\u0027s `topology.scheduler.strategy` when scheduling it. The\nallowlist intended to constrain that choice, `nimbus.scheduler.strategy.class.whitelist`, was treated as\n\"allow any class\" when unset, and it had no entry in the shipped `defaults.yaml`, so unset was the shipped\nstate. An authenticated submitter could therefore cause Nimbus to instantiate any class on the Nimbus\nclasspath that has a no-argument constructor.\n\nStorm\u0027s own production artifacts contain classes with side effects suitable for this: instantiating\n`org.apache.storm.testing.InProcessZookeeper` starts a ZooKeeper server with its own threads and sockets\nand nothing closes it, and `org.apache.storm.LocalCluster` behaves similarly. Repeated submissions\ntherefore consume threads, sockets and memory in the most privileged daemon in the cluster.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where an unset allowlist means the strategies shipped with Storm rather than any class.\n\nNote that this is a behaviour change: a cluster running an out-of-tree scheduler strategy without an\nexplicit allowlist will have those topologies refused until the class is added to\n`nimbus.scheduler.strategy.class.whitelist`. The rejection message names the refused class and the\nconfiguration key.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should set `nimbus.scheduler.strategy.class.whitelist` explicitly to\nthe strategies they intend to permit.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7mh-274j-m4mq",
  "modified": "2026-11-09T12:31:41Z",
  "published": "2026-11-09T12:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82440"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/hxcyk1vg9qx8bzos8g3kx91nz8d23jgt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/09/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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