GHSA-P4WW-MCP9-J6F2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-02 00:36 – Updated: 2025-12-02 00:36Summary
- A low privilege user account with page editing privilege can read any server files using "Frontmatter" form.
- This includes Grav user account files - /grav/user/accounts/*.yaml. This file stores hashed user password, 2FA secret, and the password reset token.
- This can allow an adversary to compromise any registered account by resetting a password for a user to get access to the password reset token from the file or by cracking the hashed password.
Details
The vulnerability can be found in /user/plugins/form/templates/forms/fields/display/display.html.twig
PoC
- This PoC was conducted on Grav CMS version 1.7.46 and Admin Plugin version 1.10.46
- go to “http://grav.local/admin/pages” then create new page with “Page Template” option set to “Form”.
- Then go to “Expert” and on Frontmatter input box used to following form template.
- Save page and go the preview or published page you will see the content of “/etc/passwd” file on the server.
Impact
This can allow a low privileged user to perform a full account takeover of other registered users including Administrators. This can also allow an adversary to read any file on the web server. And Due to insufficient permission verification , user who can write a page also can use frontmatter feature using this IDOR vulnerability PoC IDOR mention in CVE-2024-2792
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.0-beta.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66300"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T00:36:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T22:15:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n- A low privilege user account with page editing privilege can read any server files using \"Frontmatter\" form.\n- This includes Grav user account files - /grav/user/accounts/*.yaml. This file stores hashed user password, 2FA secret, and the password reset token.\n- This can allow an adversary to compromise any registered account by resetting a password for a user to get access to the password reset token from the file or by cracking the hashed password.\n\n### Details\n_The vulnerability can be found in /user/plugins/form/templates/forms/fields/display/display.html.twig_\n\n\n\n### PoC\n1.\tThis PoC was conducted on Grav CMS version 1.7.46 and Admin Plugin version 1.10.46\n \n\n\n2.\tgo to \u201chttp://grav.local/admin/pages\u201d then create new page with \u201cPage Template\u201d option set to \u201cForm\u201d.\n \n\n\n3.\tThen go to \u201cExpert\u201d and on Frontmatter input box used to following form template.\n\n\n\n4.\tSave page and go the preview or published page you will see the content of \u201c/etc/passwd\u201d file on the server.\n \n\n\n\n\n### Impact\nThis can allow a low privileged user to perform a full account takeover of other registered users including Administrators. This can also allow an adversary to read any file on the web server. And Due to insufficient permission verification , user who can write a page also can use frontmatter feature using this IDOR vulnerability [PoC IDOR](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EU1QA0idoWE\u0026ab_channel=%EA%B9%80%EC%A2%85%EB%AF%BC) mention in [CVE-2024-2792](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-f6g2-h7qv-3m5v)",
"id": "GHSA-p4ww-mcp9-j6f2",
"modified": "2025-12-02T00:36:44Z",
"published": "2025-12-02T00:36:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-p4ww-mcp9-j6f2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66300"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/ed640a13143c4177af013cf001969ed2c5e197ee"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Grav is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.