GHSA-MRX9-2RRP-RHPX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 00:31 – Updated: 2026-10-05 23:30
Withdrawn 2026-10-05 VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: joi: Quadratic regular-expression backtracking in `Joi.string().isoDate()`
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-6h2x-m376-mqjq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

joi (npm package joi, hapi.js) versions >=17.2.0 <17.13.7 and >=18.0.0 <18.2.6 are vulnerable to regular expression denial of service in the Joi.string().isoDate() validation rule. One of the regular expressions the rule applies to the input is unanchored, so a valid ISO date followed by a long run of fractional-second digits causes the regex engine to restart its search from every position in the string, yielding time proportional to the square of the input length (about 1.4 s for 64 KB of digits and about 22 s for 256 KB). A remote attacker who can supply a string to an isoDate validation can stall the application with a single request. Fixed in 17.13.7 and 18.2.6; as a workaround, cap the length of the string before it reaches joi.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 18.2.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "joi"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "18.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T23:30:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T22:18:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-6h2x-m376-mqjq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\njoi (npm package `joi`, hapi.js) versions \u003e=17.2.0 \u003c17.13.7 and \u003e=18.0.0 \u003c18.2.6 are vulnerable to regular expression denial of service in the `Joi.string().isoDate()` validation rule. One of the regular expressions the rule applies to the input is unanchored, so a valid ISO date followed by a long run of fractional-second digits causes the regex engine to restart its search from every position in the string, yielding time proportional to the square of the input length (about 1.4 s for 64 KB of digits and about 22 s for 256 KB). A remote attacker who can supply a string to an isoDate validation can stall the application with a single request. Fixed in 17.13.7 and 18.2.6; as a workaround, cap the length of the string before it reaches joi.",
  "id": "GHSA-mrx9-2rrp-rhpx",
  "modified": "2026-10-05T23:30:50Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T00:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/joi/security/advisories/GHSA-6h2x-m376-mqjq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92599"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/joi-before-17.13.7-and-18.2.6-redos-via-isodate"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: joi: Quadratic regular-expression backtracking in `Joi.string().isoDate()`",
  "withdrawn": "2026-10-05T23:30:50Z"
}



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