GHSA-MRC5-3MM3-45C5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:38 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:38Summary
Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP Host header, then passes it to exec(). A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.
The vulnerable code path is reached from BackpackServiceProvider::boot() on every HTTP request in production when exec() and curl are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.
Severity
High — CVSS 8.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack Complexity is rated High because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and exec() is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.
Impact
A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (www-data, nginx, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in .env), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach.
Fix
makeCurlRequest was replaced with the Guzzle-based path already present in the codebase, eliminating the shell-command construction entirely. Upgrade to a patched release immediately.
Affected versions
| Branch | Vulnerable range | First safe version |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.x | < 4.1.70 |
4.1.70 |
| 5.x | < 5.6.2 |
5.6.2 |
| 6.x | < 6.8.13 |
6.8.13 |
| 7.x | < 7.0.36 |
7.0.36 |
Credits
Reported by Vishal Shukla (@shukla304) via sechub.dev AI Agent.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "backpack/crud"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.72"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "backpack/crud"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "backpack/crud"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.8.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "backpack/crud"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.36"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54182"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-20",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:38:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard \u2014 an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High \u2014 CVSS 8.1** \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach.\n\n## Fix\n\n`makeCurlRequest` was replaced with the Guzzle-based path already present in the codebase, eliminating the shell-command construction entirely. **Upgrade to a patched release immediately.**\n\n## Affected versions\n\n| Branch | Vulnerable range | First safe version |\n|--------|-----------------|-------------------|\n| 4.1.x | `\u003c 4.1.70` | 4.1.70 |\n| 5.x | `\u003c 5.6.2` | 5.6.2 |\n| 6.x | `\u003c 6.8.13` | 6.8.13 |\n| 7.x | `\u003c 7.0.36` | 7.0.36 |\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Vishal Shukla ([@shukla304](https://github.com/shukla304)) via sechub.dev AI Agent.",
"id": "GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5",
"modified": "2026-08-20T18:38:55Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T18:38:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/security/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/4.1.72"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/5.6.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/6.8.13"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/7.0.36"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Laravel Backpack CRUD: OS command injection in Stats::makeCurlRequest via attacker-controlled Host header (pre-auth)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.