GHSA-MMM4-X298-C649
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-14 21:31Description
A topology's topology.blobstore.map lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the
supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without
normalisation, in both AsyncLocalizer and Container.createBlobstoreLinks, and the symlink helper
force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.
A submitter could therefore use ../ segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary
path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include
recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker
launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the
isolation that supervisor.run.worker.as.user is intended to provide.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may
reject submissions whose topology.blobstore.map entries contain path separators or .. segments before
they reach Nimbus.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-82427"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-14T15:17:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Description\n\nA topology\u0027s `topology.blobstore.map` lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the\nsupervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology\u0027s working directory without\nnormalisation, in both `AsyncLocalizer` and `Container.createBlobstoreLinks`, and the symlink helper\nforce-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.\n\nA submitter could therefore use `../` segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary\npath, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include\nrecursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker\nlaunch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant\u0027s operating-system user, which defeats the\nisolation that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` is intended to provide.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may\nreject submissions whose `topology.blobstore.map` entries contain path separators or `..` segments before\nthey reach Nimbus.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.",
"id": "GHSA-mmm4-x298-c649",
"modified": "2026-09-14T21:31:38Z",
"published": "2026-09-14T15:32:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82427"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/o0j51w6m0qdmwypvzfnd8w97s7ysnmyj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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