GHSA-MCJ4-MPHF-J9FF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 17:33 – Updated: 2026-08-25 17:33Summary
When Trivy downloads an OCI artifact, it uses the org.opencontainers.image.title annotation from the artifact manifest as the destination filename without validation. An attacker who can make Trivy fetch an attacker-controlled artifact can supply a crafted annotation that resolves to a path outside the intended destination, causing Trivy to write the layer content to an arbitrary location on the host filesystem.
Affected configurations
Exploitation requires the attacker to direct Trivy at an attacker-controlled OCI artifact via one of the following inputs:
| Input | Used for |
|---|---|
--db-repository flag, TRIVY_DB_REPOSITORY environment variable, or db.repository in trivy.yaml |
Vulnerability database |
--java-db-repository flag, TRIVY_JAVA_DB_REPOSITORY environment variable, or db.java-repository in trivy.yaml |
Java vulnerability database |
--checks-bundle-repository flag (and the deprecated --policy-bundle-repository alias), TRIVY_CHECKS_BUNDLE_REPOSITORY environment variable, or misconfiguration.checks-bundle-repository in trivy.yaml |
Misconfiguration checks bundle |
Repository argument to trivy module install <REPO> |
WASM module installation |
Realistic scenarios in which an attacker may influence these inputs include a copy-pasted command or documentation snippet pointing to an untrusted mirror, or a third-party mirror that turns out to be hostile.
Trivy's default configuration, which downloads these artifacts from Aqua-operated repositories, is not affected. The risk applies only when one of the inputs above is overridden to download a different artifact.
Impact
An attacker who satisfies the conditions above can overwrite or create arbitrary files on the host filesystem within the privilege boundary of the user running Trivy. The vulnerability does not grant any privileges beyond what that user already has.
The practical impact depends on the deployment. In environments where the running user can overwrite files such as SSH authorized_keys, shell startup files, cron entries, or binaries on PATH, the file write may be leveraged to achieve code execution as that user. In more restricted deployments, the impact is bounded to the user's writable scope but may still allow tampering with scan results, build artifacts, or other files consumed by subsequent steps in the same pipeline.
Patches
Fixed in Trivy 0.71.1. Users should upgrade to that release or later.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not download Trivy artifacts (vulnerability database, Java database, misconfiguration checks bundle, modules, etc.) from OCI repositories you do not operate or trust.
Credits
Reported by @ikkebr.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/aquasecurity/trivy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.71.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55092"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T17:33:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T17:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen Trivy downloads an OCI artifact, it uses the `org.opencontainers.image.title` annotation from the artifact manifest as the destination filename without validation. An attacker who can make Trivy fetch an attacker-controlled artifact can supply a crafted annotation that resolves to a path outside the intended destination, causing Trivy to write the layer content to an arbitrary location on the host filesystem.\n\n## Affected configurations\n\nExploitation requires the attacker to direct Trivy at an attacker-controlled OCI artifact via one of the following inputs:\n\n| Input | Used for |\n| --- | --- |\n| `--db-repository` flag, `TRIVY_DB_REPOSITORY` environment variable, or `db.repository` in `trivy.yaml` | Vulnerability database |\n| `--java-db-repository` flag, `TRIVY_JAVA_DB_REPOSITORY` environment variable, or `db.java-repository` in `trivy.yaml` | Java vulnerability database |\n| `--checks-bundle-repository` flag (and the deprecated `--policy-bundle-repository` alias), `TRIVY_CHECKS_BUNDLE_REPOSITORY` environment variable, or `misconfiguration.checks-bundle-repository` in `trivy.yaml` | Misconfiguration checks bundle |\n| Repository argument to `trivy module install \u003cREPO\u003e` | WASM module installation |\n\nRealistic scenarios in which an attacker may influence these inputs include a copy-pasted command or documentation snippet pointing to an untrusted mirror, or a third-party mirror that turns out to be hostile.\n\nTrivy\u0027s default configuration, which downloads these artifacts from Aqua-operated repositories, is not affected. The risk applies only when one of the inputs above is overridden to download a different artifact.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who satisfies the conditions above can overwrite or create arbitrary files on the host filesystem within the privilege boundary of the user running Trivy. The vulnerability does not grant any privileges beyond what that user already has.\n\nThe practical impact depends on the deployment. In environments where the running user can overwrite files such as SSH `authorized_keys`, shell startup files, cron entries, or binaries on `PATH`, the file write may be leveraged to achieve code execution as that user. In more restricted deployments, the impact is bounded to the user\u0027s writable scope but may still allow tampering with scan results, build artifacts, or other files consumed by subsequent steps in the same pipeline.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in Trivy `0.71.1`. Users should upgrade to that release or later.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, do not download Trivy artifacts (vulnerability database, Java database, misconfiguration checks bundle, modules, etc.) from OCI repositories you do not operate or trust.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @ikkebr.",
"id": "GHSA-mcj4-mphf-j9ff",
"modified": "2026-08-25T17:33:02Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T17:33:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GHSA-mcj4-mphf-j9ff"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/commit/39e0b132260c60d59fa746c3f6dd10374b0ff6e4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/commit/a72d9a4d997c25fbb6534e231b4e206c9b202b31"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/tag/v0.71.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Trivy has a path traversal via a crafted vulnerability database or other downloaded artifacts"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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