GHSA-M9MQ-7M7Q-XC6P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 16:28 – Updated: 2026-08-25 16:28Impact
browser_download wrote a fetched file to join(save_dir, filename) with no validation of save_dir, and browser_save_state / browser_load_state honored an explicit path unchanged. The MCP caller controls these arguments (a malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page), so an attacker could supply an arbitrary save_dir (or state path) together with a URL whose response body became the file contents, writing attacker-controlled bytes to any path the process can reach (for example ~/.bashrc, an autostart entry, or a cron file). That is an arbitrary file write that can lead to host code execution. The force_fetch fallback additionally used a raw fetch() that bypassed the BROWSE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS origin fence.
Estimated severity: CVSS 3.1 around 7.8 (High) for the local / agent-mediated case.
Patches
Fixed in 0.8.2. save_dir is confined under the download root (~/.browse-mcp/downloads) and the explicit state path under ~/.browse-mcp/state; absolute paths and .. escapes are rejected, and download filenames are reduced to a bare basename. force_fetch now also honors the origin fence. Data roots remain relocatable via BROWSE_MCP_HOME. Upgrade to browse-mcp 0.8.2.
Workarounds
Restrict the exposed tools with BROWSE_MCP_TOOLS to a set that excludes browser_download, browser_save_state, and browser_load_state (for example the hardened recipe in SECURITY.md). Note that the allowlist hides the tools from an agent but does not stop a malicious MCP client from calling them by name, so upgrading is the real fix.
- Reported privately by novice-22.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "browse-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55557"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T16:28:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n`browser_download` wrote a fetched file to `join(save_dir, filename)` with no validation of `save_dir`, and `browser_save_state` / `browser_load_state` honored an explicit `path` unchanged. The MCP caller controls these arguments (a malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page), so an attacker could supply an arbitrary `save_dir` (or state `path`) together with a URL whose response body became the file contents, writing attacker-controlled bytes to any path the process can reach (for example `~/.bashrc`, an autostart entry, or a cron file). That is an arbitrary file write that can lead to host code execution. The `force_fetch` fallback additionally used a raw `fetch()` that bypassed the `BROWSE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` origin fence.\n\nEstimated severity: CVSS 3.1 around 7.8 (High) for the local / agent-mediated case.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in 0.8.2. `save_dir` is confined under the download root (`~/.browse-mcp/downloads`) and the explicit state `path` under `~/.browse-mcp/state`; absolute paths and `..` escapes are rejected, and download filenames are reduced to a bare basename. `force_fetch` now also honors the origin fence. Data roots remain relocatable via `BROWSE_MCP_HOME`. Upgrade to browse-mcp 0.8.2.\n\n### Workarounds\nRestrict the exposed tools with `BROWSE_MCP_TOOLS` to a set that excludes `browser_download`, `browser_save_state`, and `browser_load_state` (for example the hardened recipe in SECURITY.md). Note that the allowlist hides the tools from an agent but does not stop a malicious MCP client from calling them by name, so upgrading is the real fix.\n\n- Reported privately by novice-22.",
"id": "GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p",
"modified": "2026-08-25T16:28:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T16:28:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/pull/58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/commit/5352a4a56f626254b445bfa07e4bb48c5aad15c1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/blob/v0.8.2/CHANGELOG.md#082---2026-06-13"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/releases/tag/v0.8.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "browse-mcp has an arbitrary file write via unconfined download and state paths"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.