GHSA-M3GJ-74X3-VC94
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:31Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.
Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.
The guard $link < $offset prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache ($cache) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.
A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of offset / 2. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl's default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.
The vulnerability is triggered by Net::DNS::Packet->new(\$wire) i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64194"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-20T19:17:30Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.\n\nNet::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.\n\nThe guard `$link \u003c $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.\n\nA crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl\u0027s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.\n\nThe vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-\u003enew(\\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.",
"id": "GHSA-m3gj-74x3-vc94",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T21:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/NLNETLABS/Net-DNS-1.55_01/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rt.cpan.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=179946"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.net-dns.org/blog/#release-candidate-for-netdns-1.56"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/20/13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.