Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-JH6F-W2GP-43JQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-29 09:30

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec

Per-task restrictions apply to all rings created by a task. Once installed, they should not be dropped across exec.

For a task that has used io_uring, the exec cancellation path calls __io_uring_free(). This frees both the task context and the per-task restriction, so a ring created after exec is unrestricted.

Split task context cleanup into io_uring_free_tctx(), and use it from the exec cancellation path. Keep __io_uring_free() for final task cleanup, where both the context and restriction are released.

Severity

8.4 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80713"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T08:16:56Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec\n\nPer-task restrictions apply to all rings created by a task. Once\ninstalled, they should not be dropped across exec.\n\nFor a task that has used io_uring, the exec cancellation path calls\n__io_uring_free(). This frees both the task context and the per-task\nrestriction, so a ring created after exec is unrestricted.\n\nSplit task context cleanup into io_uring_free_tctx(), and use it from\nthe exec cancellation path. Keep __io_uring_free() for final task\ncleanup, where both the context and restriction are released.",
  "id": "GHSA-jh6f-w2gp-43jq",
  "modified": "2026-08-29T09:30:29Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T09:31:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80713"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc0e8faf90e776a2f1f3967a04e8091e6bdb4977"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcef9325afeecced693a7438e975e4a3f8e2716f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-80713 (GCVE-0-2026-80713)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-28 06:53 – Updated: 2026-08-29 06:22

Title

io_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec Per-task restrictions apply to all rings created by a task. Once installed, they should not be dropped across exec. For a task that has used io_uring, the exec cancellation path calls __io_uring_free(). This frees both the task context and the per-task restriction, so a ring created after exec is unrestricted. Split task context cleanup into io_uring_free_tctx(), and use it from the exec cancellation path. Keep __io_uring_free() for final task cleanup, where both the context and restriction are released.

Severity

8.4 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Assigner

Linux mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcef9325afeecced6…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc0e8faf90e776a2f…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: ed82f35b926b2e505c14b7006473614b8f58b4f4 , < fcef9325afeecced693a7438e975e4a3f8e2716f (git) Affected: ed82f35b926b2e505c14b7006473614b8f58b4f4 , < bc0e8faf90e776a2f1f3967a04e8091e6bdb4977 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 7.0 Unaffected: 0 , < 7.0 (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.8 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "io_uring/cancel.c",
            "io_uring/tctx.c",
            "io_uring/tctx.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "fcef9325afeecced693a7438e975e4a3f8e2716f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ed82f35b926b2e505c14b7006473614b8f58b4f4",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "bc0e8faf90e776a2f1f3967a04e8091e6bdb4977",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ed82f35b926b2e505c14b7006473614b8f58b4f4",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "io_uring/cancel.c",
            "io_uring/tctx.c",
            "io_uring/tctx.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.0"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.0",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.8",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1.8",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec\n\nPer-task restrictions apply to all rings created by a task. Once\ninstalled, they should not be dropped across exec.\n\nFor a task that has used io_uring, the exec cancellation path calls\n__io_uring_free(). This frees both the task context and the per-task\nrestriction, so a ring created after exec is unrestricted.\n\nSplit task context cleanup into io_uring_free_tctx(), and use it from\nthe exec cancellation path. Keep __io_uring_free() for final task\ncleanup, where both the context and restriction are released."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 8.4,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
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              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The flaw is reached only via local io_uring syscalls (io_uring_setup/io_uring_register) and execve(); fs/exec.c calls io_uring_task_cancel() which invokes the buggy __io_uring_free() path, and per kernel guidance io_uring is Local not Network.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls the trigger by calling io_uring_setup() to create a task context then execve(); exec deterministically runs io_uring_cancel_generic(true) and frees per-task restrictions without races, special memory layout, or other uncontrollable conditions.\nPR:L - Exploitation requires only an unprivileged local process that had per-task io_uring restrictions installed by a parent/sandbox; the attacker needs no init-namespace CAP_SYS_ADMIN and can use io_uring unless blocked by sysctl or LSM policy.\nUI:N - No victim interaction is required; the confined attacker process itself performs io_uring_setup and execve to drop restrictions, then io_uring_setup again to obtain an unrestricted ring without administrator or other-user action.\nS:C - Per-task io_uring restrictions are a confinement policy enforced by a separate sandbox/parent authority; clearing them across exec lets post-exec code exceed that policy and access kernel interfaces explicitly withheld, crossing the intended sandbox security boundary.\nC:H - Dropping restrictions re-enables blocked io_uring SQEs, register operations, and BPF filters, including IORING_OP_URING_CMD and read-oriented ops against kernel/driver interfaces denied by policy, enabling disclosure beyond the confinement authority\u0027s intent.\nI:H - Bypass restores the full unrestricted io_uring opcode and register surface (writes, open/link ops, IORING_OP_URING_CMD, buffer/file registration), allowing post-exec integrity-affecting kernel and driver interactions explicitly denied by per-task restrictions.\nA:N - The vulnerability only incorrectly frees restriction metadata during exec cleanup; it does not directly cause kernel panics, oopses, deadlocks, or hangs, so there is no availability impact from the bug itself."
            }
          ]
        }
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:29.500Z",
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc0e8faf90e776a2f1f3967a04e8091e6bdb4977"
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-80713",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-28T06:53:12.438Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-26T14:34:25.788Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:29.500Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-JH6F-W2GP-43JQ

CVE-2026-80713 (GCVE-0-2026-80713)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature