CVE-2026-80713 (GCVE-0-2026-80713)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-28 06:53 – Updated: 2026-08-29 06:22
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
io_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec
Per-task restrictions apply to all rings created by a task. Once
installed, they should not be dropped across exec.
For a task that has used io_uring, the exec cancellation path calls
__io_uring_free(). This frees both the task context and the per-task
restriction, so a ring created after exec is unrestricted.
Split task context cleanup into io_uring_free_tctx(), and use it from
the exec cancellation path. Keep __io_uring_free() for final task
cleanup, where both the context and restriction are released.
Severity
8.4 (High)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
ed82f35b926b2e505c14b7006473614b8f58b4f4 , < fcef9325afeecced693a7438e975e4a3f8e2716f
(git)
Affected: ed82f35b926b2e505c14b7006473614b8f58b4f4 , < bc0e8faf90e776a2f1f3967a04e8091e6bdb4977 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
7.0
Unaffected: 0 , < 7.0 (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.8 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
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"affected": [
{
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"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"io_uring/cancel.c",
"io_uring/tctx.c",
"io_uring/tctx.h"
],
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"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "ed82f35b926b2e505c14b7006473614b8f58b4f4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bc0e8faf90e776a2f1f3967a04e8091e6bdb4977",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ed82f35b926b2e505c14b7006473614b8f58b4f4",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
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"io_uring/tctx.c",
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"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
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"nodes": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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}
],
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec\n\nPer-task restrictions apply to all rings created by a task. Once\ninstalled, they should not be dropped across exec.\n\nFor a task that has used io_uring, the exec cancellation path calls\n__io_uring_free(). This frees both the task context and the per-task\nrestriction, so a ring created after exec is unrestricted.\n\nSplit task context cleanup into io_uring_free_tctx(), and use it from\nthe exec cancellation path. Keep __io_uring_free() for final task\ncleanup, where both the context and restriction are released."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The flaw is reached only via local io_uring syscalls (io_uring_setup/io_uring_register) and execve(); fs/exec.c calls io_uring_task_cancel() which invokes the buggy __io_uring_free() path, and per kernel guidance io_uring is Local not Network.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls the trigger by calling io_uring_setup() to create a task context then execve(); exec deterministically runs io_uring_cancel_generic(true) and frees per-task restrictions without races, special memory layout, or other uncontrollable conditions.\nPR:L - Exploitation requires only an unprivileged local process that had per-task io_uring restrictions installed by a parent/sandbox; the attacker needs no init-namespace CAP_SYS_ADMIN and can use io_uring unless blocked by sysctl or LSM policy.\nUI:N - No victim interaction is required; the confined attacker process itself performs io_uring_setup and execve to drop restrictions, then io_uring_setup again to obtain an unrestricted ring without administrator or other-user action.\nS:C - Per-task io_uring restrictions are a confinement policy enforced by a separate sandbox/parent authority; clearing them across exec lets post-exec code exceed that policy and access kernel interfaces explicitly withheld, crossing the intended sandbox security boundary.\nC:H - Dropping restrictions re-enables blocked io_uring SQEs, register operations, and BPF filters, including IORING_OP_URING_CMD and read-oriented ops against kernel/driver interfaces denied by policy, enabling disclosure beyond the confinement authority\u0027s intent.\nI:H - Bypass restores the full unrestricted io_uring opcode and register surface (writes, open/link ops, IORING_OP_URING_CMD, buffer/file registration), allowing post-exec integrity-affecting kernel and driver interactions explicitly denied by per-task restrictions.\nA:N - The vulnerability only incorrectly frees restriction metadata during exec cleanup; it does not directly cause kernel panics, oopses, deadlocks, or hangs, so there is no availability impact from the bug itself."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:29.500Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcef9325afeecced693a7438e975e4a3f8e2716f"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc0e8faf90e776a2f1f3967a04e8091e6bdb4977"
}
],
"title": "io_uring: preserve task restrictions across exec",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-80713",
"datePublished": "2026-08-28T06:53:12.438Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-26T14:34:25.788Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:29.500Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
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"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-80713",
"date": "2026-08-28",
"epss": "0.00145",
"percentile": "0.04038"
},
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}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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