GHSA-JGCH-2JR2-87VJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-27 21:31Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . '.' . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.'/'.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment's own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module's ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr's SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects' documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81730"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T20:18:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message\u0027s MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . \u0027.\u0027 . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.\u0027/\u0027.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment\u0027s own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module\u0027s ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr\u0027s SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects\u0027 documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.",
"id": "GHSA-jgch-2jr2-87vj",
"modified": "2026-08-27T21:31:53Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T21:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81730"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/264a44defb5e438689c75679617f6edc4c038abc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php#L187"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-9.0.0-through-23.0.4-path-traversal-via-emailcollector-attachment-filename"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.