GHSA-JGCG-MPFG-G663

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:34
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_tables: always release netdev hooks from notifier

This reverts "netfilter: nf_tables: skip netdev events generated on netns removal".

The problem is that when a veth device is released, the veth release callback will also queue the peer netns device for removal.

Its possible that the peer netns is also slated for removal. In this case, the device memory is already released before the pre_exit hook of the peer netns runs:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812c0124f0 by task kworker/u8:1/45 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x76/0x510 nft_netdev_unregister_hooks+0xa0/0x220 __nft_release_hook+0x184/0x490 nf_tables_pre_exit_net+0x12f/0x1b0 ..

Order is: 1. First netns is released, veth_dellink() queues peer netns device for removal 2. peer netns is queued for removal 3. peer netns device is released, unreg event is triggered 4. unreg event is ignored because netns is going down 5. pre_exit hook calls nft_netdev_unregister_hooks but device memory might be free'd already.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-54200"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T13:16:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_tables: always release netdev hooks from notifier\n\nThis reverts \"netfilter: nf_tables: skip netdev events generated on netns removal\".\n\nThe problem is that when a veth device is released, the veth release\ncallback will also queue the peer netns device for removal.\n\nIts possible that the peer netns is also slated for removal.  In this\ncase, the device memory is already released before the pre_exit hook of\nthe peer netns runs:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff88812c0124f0 by task kworker/u8:1/45\nWorkqueue: netns cleanup_net\nCall Trace:\n nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0\n __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x76/0x510\n nft_netdev_unregister_hooks+0xa0/0x220\n __nft_release_hook+0x184/0x490\n nf_tables_pre_exit_net+0x12f/0x1b0\n ..\n\nOrder is:\n1. First netns is released, veth_dellink() queues peer netns device\n   for removal\n2. peer netns is queued for removal\n3. peer netns device is released, unreg event is triggered\n4. unreg event is ignored because netns is going down\n5. pre_exit hook calls nft_netdev_unregister_hooks but device memory\n   might be free\u0027d already.",
  "id": "GHSA-jgcg-mpfg-g663",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T12:34:48Z",
  "published": "2025-12-30T15:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-54200"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30e4b13b1bfbdf3bf3b27036d8209ea1b9f0d880"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d56f00c61f67b450fbbdcb874855e60ad92c560"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94032527efbac13be702c76afb9d872c0cca7a43"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc1c9fd4a8bbe1e06add9053010b652449bfe411"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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